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Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro is proposing extensive reforms of the state
sector in an effort to reduce public debt, which was 130% of the GDP in 2001 and is
expected to rise to 140% of the GDP in 2002. The reforms include the streamlining of
Special Status Corporations and public corporations along with the downsizing of the
Fiscal Investment Loan Program and the privatization of the Postal Account Agency, the
two bodies that fund public works projects, Special Status Corporations and public
corporations.
Since the 1930s Japan's ministries have been establishing public corporations related to
the sectors they administrate. As the Japanese economy has grown so have the number
of these organizations. According to government's tally there are over 13,000. The
ministries originally established Special Status Corporations after the Second World
War to aid in the reconstruction of infrastructure and businesses. The government has
formally recognized 163 Special Status Corporations.
Japan's prolonged recession and mounting public debt have brought about public
concern that the ministries are using their corporations to perpetuate their own interests.
Opposition parties are demanding the elimination or privatization of Special Status
Corporations and public corporations for the following reasons: 1) corporations offer
postretirement positions to bureaucrats who receive retirement benefits from their
ministries in conjunction with salaries earned as staff in corporations, 2) corporations
serve as a means to expand territorial jurisdiction, 3) bureaucrats are sent to branch
offices of these corporations to monitor local government policy.
Koizumi's proposed reforms are facing stiff opposition from the ministries as well as
from members of his own party, the Liberal Democrats, who are determined to continue
public corporations because of vested interests. The efforts to eliminate some of the
corporations began in 1995 but by 1999 the number had decreased by only fourteen.
Although public opinion polls reveal that the Japanese would like to see the elimination
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of public corporations and the practice of ex-bureaucrats taking postretirement positions
in both public and private corporations, it is doubtful that extensive reforms will proceed
smoothly.
The thesis proposes the hypothesis that despite Prime Minister Koizumi's commitment
to implement the reform of Special Status Corporations and public corporations, the
ministries, which are in charge of administering reforms, will certainly continue
operating their organizations over the long term.
The thesis shows that elements inherent in Japan's political economy function to inhibit
the movement for structural reforms thus allowing the ministries to maintain the status
quo.
As an example of how the ministries can use their Special Status Corporations the thesis
examines the Japan External Trade Organization, a Special Status Corporation managed
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and how it serves the
ministry for postretirement positions, for expanding jurisdiction and for monitoring local
government policy. Despite the fact that the corporation has received harsh criticism in
the Japanese press for no longer serving its original purpose MITI has continuously re-
orchestrated its functions in order to keep the organization thriving.
Although some of the commentators cited in the thesis point to corruption in the
bureaucracy, the thesis does not seek to judge bureaucrats. They are products of a
system that can no longer support an economy that must adapt to internal and external
pressures in order to survive in the global economy.
The research by Western scholars regarding Special Status Corporations and public
corporations in Japan has been minimal. It is hoped that this thesis will stimulate furthef
study of the subject.
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Chapter 1
Structure, Content and Research
Structure
The thesis seeks to explain how the Japanese political economy is dominated by the
bureaucracy and, in particular, how ministries use their Special Status Corporations. It
identifies the factors that promote the continuation of Special Status Corporations
despite political moves to streamline them. The chapters are organized to demonstrate
why the bureaucracy has been able to dominate, why it has have been able to resist
efforts to streamline or eliminate Special Status Corporations and why the system will
continue as before despite the fact that the government machine has been unable to deal
with Japan's economic stagnation since 1990.
Content
There are two main themes; 1) the power of the bureaucracy and 2) the ossification of
the Japanese political economy that inhibits structural reform. Chapter two and three
define the role of the bureaucracy in Japan's political economy and its source of power.
Chapter 2 reviews literature of Western and Japanese commentators, who point to the
bureaucracy as being the dominant power in Japan's governing system. Chapter three
examines the sources of bureaucratic power and the attitudes of bureaucrats from an
historical perspective. It examines some of the factors within the Japanese socio-political
system that have given the bureaucracy the power to continue their Special Status
Corporations and to resist reforms.
Chapter four discusses the functions of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
and the character and background of MITI elite officials. The chapter analyses MITI's
role in terms of the extent of control over industrial sectors to illustrate the power of the
ministry and the interpersonal network running between business and the bureaucracy.
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MITI manages twelve Special Status Corporations and over 900 other public
corporations and associations, second only to the Ministry of Education.
Chapter 5 defines Special Status Corporations and discusses how they serve their patron
ministries and how proposed structural reforms might effect their future operations.
Chapter 6 discusses how a combination of factors unique to Japan's political economy
continues to perpetuate a system of dependency between the Japanese and the manner in
which they are governed.
Chapter 7 considers the Japan External Trade Organization, one of MITEs primary
Special Status Corporations to illustrate how ministries can use Special Status
Corporations and why they are highly motivated to continue their existence.
The Conclusion looks at the current state of Japan's economic condition and predicts
when structural reforms will be successfully implemented.
Sources of Materials
The interviews and case studies used in the thesis are results of field research conducted
continuously from 1988 to 2001.
Interviews
The writer worked for almost seven years at the Japan External Trade Organization, one
of MITI's Special Status Corporations where MITI officers are posted. The interviews
cited in the thesis were conducted from 1994-1995 with MITI officers and officers from
local governments who had been posted at JETRO New York for longer than two years
The writer wanted to know their impressions of the United States before they arrived
and if these impressions had changed during their tour of duty. The interviews took one
to two hours and the one hundred questions covered their background, education,
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language and communication difficulties, economics, political views, social values and
racial issues.
Studies
The studies given in the thesis are results of research conducted from 1988, the peak of
the "bubble economy" to 2001, the depth of Japan's economic recession. The study in
chapter 3 of Mercian, Inc is the result of research conducted from 1988-1991 at Mercian,
Inc. where the writer worked for three years as a marketer of imported spirits and wine.
The study of a medium-sized chemical company in chapter 6 was the result of research
conducted in Japan in 1999, 2000 and 2001 about how small businesses were coping
with the recession. Officers from the Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, a
MITI Special Status Corporation, facilitated the initial visits to small businesses.
The study of Ehime Prefecture in chapter 6 was the result of research conducted in




Part 1: JAPAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE PERCEPTIONS OF
WESTERN COMMENTATORS




The first part of this chapter examines the perceptions of western commentators about
the Japanese political economy, specifically the bureaucracy as the dominant power in
Japan's governing system. Their work is used in the thesis to identify and define certain
elements in the Japanese socio-political system that, together, portray the rigidity of the
political system which is defying efforts by government to implement structural reforms.
All of the commentators agreed that the Japanese bureaucracy has dominated Japan's
governing system historically since the 1890s and with the exception of one
commentator they showed the more positive aspects of bureaucratic rule and the
strengths of the bureaucracy in terms of planning Japan's economic achievements. Even
after the bursting of Japan's "bubble economy" and the consistent delay of
implementation of policies that would trigger recovery, commentaries about Japan's
bureaucrats in general were positive.
The commentators whose work on amakudari is reviewed here define the system
correctly and show how the system operates. Some essays suggested that the system
provided a built-in security system for Japanese industries. On the other hand, there was
little indication that the system also served the ministries as a natural control mechanism
over industry and that amakudari was a major stumbling block to the implementation of
structural reforms.
A recurring theme throughout is that the Japanese socio-political environment is not as
transparent as Europe's and America's and, therefore, in order to access reliable
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information, to gain a balanced perspective of Japan's political economic system and,
consequently, to be able to analyse the affects of the elements defined in the
commentaries it is necessary to do empirical research by becoming a player in the
system.
PART 2
The second part of this chapter begins with a review of a book by a Japanese
commentator written before 1990 when Japan's economy was still on track to illustrate
that the majority of Japanese viewed bureaucrats in a positive light and accepted
amakudari as a part of the civil service system. The section continues with reviews of
books written after 1992 about Special Status Corporations, public corporations and
amakudari when Japan was in recession to illustrate that Japanese had become
disenchanted with bureaucratic guidance and had recognized the need to reform the civil
service system and amakudari.
Generally Special Status Corporations and public corporations received little attention
before Japan's recessions began because the Japanese were satisfied with ministerial
management. However, Japan's economic crisis combined with the disclosure of
scandals involving various ministries and the political movement to initiate structural
reforms in 1992 and 1993 encouraged commentators to feel less pressure to conform to
popular sentiment and write more openly about such issues as amakudari and how the
ministries utilize their Special Status Corporations and public corporations.
Nevertheless, there is a reticence to cite sources. Sources are not referred to by their
names but described by job title and place of employment. In addition, although such
well-known publications as Shukan Bunshu, a weekly magazine, and Sentaku, a monthly
magazine, have done objective reporting of scandals in the ministries, often the writers
are identified merely as "staff writers." Many journals prefer not to divulge sources,
which raises the question of reliability.
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PART 1: Japan's Political Economy: The Perception of Western
Commentators
Japan's Post-war Economy: Too Good To Be True?
Japan's post-war industrial rebirth and rapid economic growth and its challenge to
American industries in global markets inspired economists and scholars alike to look
with wonder at what had come to be known as Japan's "economic miracle." Even in
1992, although Japan was in a recession and clearly beset with grave economic
problems, Japan commentators remained very positive about future developments
because Japan still had the second largest economy in the world. Professor Joseph S.
Nye, Jr. of the Center of International Affairs at Harvard University wrote in 1992 that
many Americans were concerned that Japan would surpass the United States
economically by the 21st century:
"...the impressive fact is that Japan tripled its shape of world product in three decades. Japan has
become the world's largest creditor and the largest exporter of manufactured goods. It is the
acknowledged leader in many areas of technology...While some of Japan's economic power is
exaggerated by the unique circumstances that led to inflation of the stock market and real estate in
the 1980s, strong savings, investments, and technology mean that Japan's rise was based on real
factors." (Nye, 1992, p.98)
Nye felt that Japan would indeed grow stronger economically claiming:
"As Japan's strength increases, it will grow and resent dependency, and American pressure will
stimulate nationalism in Japanese domestic politics." (p. 97)
He warned that Americans had to: "...decide how to respond to Japan's rising power." Nye
was alluding in part to the growing popularity of the Japanese nationalist movement in
the late 1980s but it could be argued that the current nationalistic sentiment may be a
reaction to Japan's serious depression and not to the strength of the economy.
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In his December 20, 2001 article for the Far Eastern Economic Review' Eugene A.
Matthews, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), agrees with
Nye that these nationalists whom he calls "new nationalists" resent American pressures
to keep American military forces in Japan and to house nuclear submarines in Japanese
ports.
"The nationalists also favor amending the constitution to allow a "true army" instead of the current
self-defense force, a mockery of a military." Matthews describes the new nationalists as
young corporate executives and entrepreneurs, who are intent on reforming the economy
and more forward-looking than bureaucrats.
"They want to change the way Japan views itself and the way the rest of the world views the
country." (p. ?)
Nye was not alone in his estimation of Japan's continuous economic growth. Indeed he
was in the majority of commentators, who were led to believe by spokesmen for the
Japanese government that economic restructuring, stimulus packages and deregulation
would put the economy back on track. Peter Drucker wrote extensively on Japanese
management techniques in the 1970s and 1980s and has visited Japan yearly since 1959.
When he was interviewed in November 1994 by Management Accounting Drucker
contended that economic recovery would occur after several years but that drastic
reforms would have to be implemented.
"The Japanese have an incredible capacity, unparalleled in any other country, to face up to reality
and to make tough radical decisions, but not always the right ones. I think that they are getting to
that point slowly. However, there is an enormous job left cleaning up Japan's financial institutions,
banks insurance companies. You may see some fairly drastic measures in the next few years." 2
Seven years have passed since the interview and the "drastic measures" which Drucker





commentator who has a more realistic perception of the Japanese political economic
environment.
Yamamura Kozo, a professor of economics at the University of Washington has written
prolifically on the Japanese political economy, particularly about industrial policy and
the role of MITI in Japan's economic growth. In 1997, Yamamura predicted that the
ministries would maintain a firm grip on the regulation of industries and that despite
domestic and foreign pressures to deregulate and open markets, the ministries would
continue to plan protectionist policies. (Yamamura K.,1997, p. 325)
Yamamura, who received his higher education in the United States, taught at Tokyo,
Hitotsubashi and Aoyama universities. His interpretation of the Japanese economic
environment has been insightful, especially his estimation of the weaknesses in the
Japanese system. In the 1980s, when influential academics were praising the Japanese
system and crediting the intimate relationship between business and government for
producing a solid economy and MITI for planning effective policy, he wrote "Success
that Soured: Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan" (1982 Policy and Trade
Issues of the Japanese Economy University of Washington Press). He stated that foreign
commentators praised the Japan model because they saw only the superficial aspects.
Yamamura wrote that Japan's economy during its period of rapid growth was heavily
controlled by the two economic ministries, MITI and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) ,
marked by huge capital investments, acquisition of cheap technology, and a pro-cartel
policy that nurtured Japan's rapid industrial growth. Taking advantage of new
technologies, Japanese firms tried to maximize their production and, hence, profits.
However, too many firms were maximizing production and supplies exceeded domestic
demand. In order to allow smaller firms to compete with larger firms in domestic
3 It is generally recognized that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry MITI) played the most influential role in Japan's economic development. However, since
this thesis is concerned with MITI and its Special Status Corporations in regards to bureaucratic controls
and not directly to Japan's economic development, MOF's role will not be discussed.
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markets, MITI guided companies to rationalize production in order to form effective
domestic and export cartels. Yamamura claimed that the number of cartels rose from
162 in 1955 to over 1000 in the late sixties and early seventies. MITI created eleven
laws that allowed the formation of cartels, among them the" Rationalization cartels,
under the Antimonopoly Law," the "Emergency Act for the promotion of the machine-
tool industry," and the "Law concerning the organization of trade associations of small-
medium enterprises" MITI used the policy instrument of "administrative guidance" to
implement the formation of cartels and ex-bureaucrats from MITI, who had migrated to
upper management positions in private corporations whose industries were under MITI's
authority, usually complied with guidance because of their loyalty to their former
ministry. Yamamura claimed that there were illegal cartels as well. (p. 80) Cartels
reduced competition between firms in domestic markets through fixed prices and fixed
production and they also protected industries from imports.
By 1965, Japan's industrial output had recovered to the same levels of industrialisation
that Japan had achieved by 1935 and by 1970 the annual growth rate had reached an
average of ten percent. It was generally believed that Japan's economy was very secure
and that MITI seemed to be in control but Yamamura claimed that weaknesses in the
economy were becoming visible because the character of the economy was changing.
Japanese consumers were beginning to complain about cartels and fixed prices. The
price differential between domestic and imported goods such as television sets angered
many. They were not sharing the new wealth. Also, the industries that had caught up
with Western industries were seeing that large investments in equipment and
technologies did not necessarily raise production efficiency and, indeed, promoted over
capacity. They also realized that Japan could not reasonably sustain growth by
increasing industrial capacity at fifteen percent annually. (1982, p.98) In addition,
industrial pollution had become a problem. The Smithsonian Agreement in 1971 ended
the era of the undervalued yen and introduced the flexible exchange rate. MITI was
starting to lose control:
19
" ...the honeymoon ended. The conditions that were necessary for the continued success of the
MITI policy began to disappear in the mid-sixties" (Yamamura K. 1982, pi 03)
Nonetheless, MITI continued its pro-cartel policies, the larger companies being the main
beneficiaries.
The Oil Shock and the four-year recession that followed impacted severely on the
energy intensive industries on which MITI had focused its long-term policy. MITI was
besieged with bad publicity. In particular its image was tarnished because the media had
divulged that MITI and the petroleum companies had engaged in price-fixing on a large
scale in 1973 (p 99).
Yamamura stated that it had become apparent to MITI critics that:
"...the policies of coordinating investment and reducing risks of investment by cartels had become
counterproductive." (p.99)
Even though new policy was necessary to induce competition between businesses, MITI
could not change its policies because they were deeply imbedded in the institution. MITI
continued to issue guidance to form cartels to protect the energy-intensive industries and
sunset industries (textiles, paper, leather, etc.) Yamamura admitted that MITI's policies
had effectively guided investment to increase production, industrial capacity and exports
but that the continuation of cartels and the protection of markets were no longer
appropriate to Japan's economy where industries should compete among themselves as
well as with foreign manufacturers. Indeed, healthy economic growth depended upon a
freer market place where domestic demand could be cultivated by the reduction of
prices. Yamamura advised the discontinuation of cartels and administrative guidance,
(p. 107)
Richard Katz, senior editor of "The Oriental Economist" lauded Yamamura's paper in
his book Japan, the System that Soured (M.E. Sharpe) as "One of the most far-sighted works" in
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this field. (1998 p.306) He claimed that cartel-like policies still protect domestic markets
even though government claims that many of the import barriers, including tariffs are
gone:
"And yet the numbers show a nation that uniquely imports very little in the way of competing
goods." (p.45).
He suggested that this phenomenon could be attributed to the continuation of the cartel
theme through members of industrial associations such as petroleum, who collude to fix
prices while the Japan Fair Trade Commission pretends not to notice. Some trade
associations such as ones related to the concrete industry will agree to purchase only
from other members or government may instruct industries like textiles through informal
"guidance" to cut back production, (p.45) Katz's conclusions are strengthened by the
mechanisms of MITI retirees assuming posts as directors in these associations and also
assuming postretirement positions in industries managed by MITI, making cooperation
among industries almost a certainty.
As Japan's recession continues for the thirteenth year, scholars are pointing to the
corruption in government and weaknesses in the Japanese political economy that now
are being seen as at the root of Japan's economic woes. Commentators, both Japanese
and foreign, are expostulating on what must be done by the Japanese government to put
the economy right. The Japanese government emphasizes that major political and
economic reforms will take years. The Cabinet of Ministers wrote pamphlets in 2001
that examined the elements involved in restructuring the Japanese political economy.
The most important of these was "The First Steps In Changing Times." Honda Etsuro,
Chief Representative of MOF and Deputy Council General of Japan in New York City,
presented excerpts in his lecture at the Japan Society ofNew York on December 5, 2001.
The paper describes Japan in its present state:
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"1) Deep negativity about the social and economic outlook and pessimism about the aging
population and consequent decline in the labor force. 2) Debt overhang, inefficiency, high cost
structure and 'sheep mentality' of firms and industries. 3) Tendency of the loss of distinctiveness
and vitality of regions. 4) Waste and unfair burdens in the areas of social security."
MOF includes six programs in his blueprint of reforms. 1) Privatisation /regulatory
reform 2) The 'support challengers' program 3) Strengthening welfare and insurance 4)
Doubling our knowledge stock 5) Lifestyle revolution 6) Local independence and
revitalization
MOF preaches that the outcome of economic and fiscal structural reform will result in:
1) "Creation of a society in which the private sector is free to engage in many kinds of economic
activity. 2) Creation of a social system that reward effort and perseverance. 3) Creation of a
streamlined and efficient government in sync with the 21s( century.
Honda claims that "structural reform of Public Administration" will culminate in:
"Radical reallocation of roles and responsibilities to local governments to allocate tasks that can be
achieved locally." MOF's prescription for structural reform for Japanese society is: 1)
Creation of a society in which people can lead safe and secure lives 2) Creation of a powerhouse in
terms of science, technology, and human resources." 4
The Democratic Party of Japan's platform in 1998 called for a decentralized society,
limiting central government's role to foreign relations, defence, judiciary, and pensions.
Local governments would administrate services and bear responsibility for local policy.
There would be fiscal resources for each local government and the role of central
government would entail no more than coordinating finances between regions "based on
clear, firm rules. " (April 27, 1998)5
4 See appendix 6 for "Current Fiscal Conditions In Japan
5 "Our Basic Philosophy and Policies" April 27, 1998
22
To speed up the process, money from the state would be transferred immediately to local
governments. The decentralization of government would be a positive force for
strengthening Japan's economy because the prefectures could plan policy according to
the needs of their residents and business development would take place at the local level
and would not subsidized and controlled by the ministries. This in itself would instil a
healthy competitiveness within local economies. Nevertheless, the time frame for
substantial reform to come about is difficult to predict because the ministries do not want
to part with authority over local government.
On the other hand, foreign commentators and Japanese as well look at the short-term and
predict that Japan will face economic disaster if government immediately does not
implement reforms. Hosokawa Ruichiro, a former managing editor of the Mainichi
Shimbun and a political commentator, wrote in his article for the November 16, 2001
edition of The Japan Times that the economy would fail if reforms were not initiated.
He focused on Japan's public debt that has reached 666 trillion yen. Hosokawa
reminded readers that the government had started issuing bonds twenty-five years ago to
finance the construction of infrastructure work such as roads and bridges. Prior to that
time, public work construction was covered by tax revenue, which was generated by
Japan's economic expansion. He claimed that in 1976 Japan was enjoying a stable
economy and Japanese tolerated the government borrowing money. However, despite
the fact that Japan's economy today was in a recession, both central and local
governments have continued to borrow based on this acquiescence. Hosokawa
contended that in the current budget tax revenue accounted for 50 trillion yen and
amounts up to 30 trillion yen is being financed by deficit-covering bonds:
"If this trend continues, the government will have to finance half its budget with such bonds, leading
the nation into bankruptcy." 6
6
Ryuichiro Hosokawa (November 16, 2001), The Japan Times Online www.japantimes.co.jp
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He pointed to Prime Minister Koizumi's intentions for structural reform, which includes
the reform and elimination of some special status corporations such as the debt-ridden
Japan Highway Corporation, which had used public funds indiscriminately to finance
public works construction. Hosokawa placed the blame for the corporation's debts
squarely on top management who were formerly bureaucrats from the Ministry of
Construction. He cautioned that although Koizumi is intent on reforms, there is stiff
opposition from many LDP politicians, who fear that if the corporation, which handles
the bids from construction firms, is dissolved, the network of highway currently under
construction in Japan will be discontinued. Although Koizumi has paid lip service to the
reform of special status corporations, so far there has been little evidence to confirm any
real move in that direction.
American commentator Richard Katz analysed the political reasons for Koizumi's
impotence as a reformer in his article in the September/October 2001 issue of The
International Economy titled "Koizumi is Blowing It.":
"The LDP's social base is badly divided between those who would benefit from reform and those
who would hurt it." He maintains that Koizumi has chosen the wrong road to reform:
"Koizumi has chosen the budget. This is the wrong choice. The private economy cannot achieve
self-sustaining recovery while it remains tied down by bad debt and bad debtors." (p.38)
In the September/October 2001 issue of Foreign Affairs Leonard J. Schoppa, Associate
Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, put forth that
the reason why the Japanese are not doing anything substantial to right the economy is
not only political but social:
"The answer lies, ironically, in Japan's very success. For the first time in the country's history
individuals and firms now have the wealth and freedom necessary to pursue private solutions to
their economic problems—solutions that make perfect sense from an individual or corporate
perspective but, that actually aggravate economic problems at the national level." (Shoppa L.,
2001, p.77)
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However, the very nature of Japan's society is group oriented and individuals still defer
to group pressures to conform to the will of the majority. Also, numerous government
regulations control start-up companies and corporate expansion, which stifle
entrepreneurship.
Edward J Lincoln, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote about the reasons
for Japan's stagnant economy and why the Japanese cannot seem to move on reform. In
his article "Arthritic Japan: The Slow Pace of Economic Reform" (October 2001 Japan
Policy Research Institute) he contended that even though Japan had been in recession
since 1990 the Japanese still believed in their system because as individuals they had not
felt the effect of the recession, (p. 2) He explained that the change of a few elements in
the system was not sufficient to promote reform because of the character of the system
as a whole, which he called "interconnected." Lincoln also claimed that the vested
interests in the system itself included most of the population and that the process of
deregulation and reform was being controlled by the administrators (i.e. bureaucrats)
rather than by a political process and that corporate restructuring focused on down sizing
and merging and not on structural reforms, (pp. 5-6)
He identified the most significant reason why the Japanese seem unable to move on
reform: social conformity and the reluctance of the Japanese to part with the values in
their system. Lincoln maintained that these factors are interrelated and that together they
will affect the way the Japanese implement change, (p.2)
What You See Is Not What You Get
As Japan's economy grew so did the number of academics and journalists who wrote
commentaries and books that focused on defining the elements that comprised the Japan
'model', a recipe for economic success. The Western world wanted to know why the
Japanese were so successful and to grasp the secret. Everybody wanted to know a third
way to generate money as an alternative model to capitalism and communism.
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Unfortunately, most commentators did not temper their enthusiasm for Japan's 'model'
with a word of caution that Japan's seemingly unstoppable economic growth was
directly related to a system which was comprised of traditional institutions specific to
the Japanese political economy and institutions that had been established precisely for
Japan's industrial resuscitation that are discussed in chapter four. The business
environment in Japan was exceptionally positive for nurturing undeveloped industries
for the short-term but unsustainable for businesses in countries where industries had
matured. Nevertheless, Americans wanted to believe that there was a perfect formula.
Yamamura wrote in 1982:
"Consultants, business writers, and even some business school professors are quick to realize what
the businessmen like to read and hear, and are now seemingly even more anxious to extend the
virtues of Japanese policies, practices, and institutions. Mass media and after-dinner speakers are
only half a step behind the 'experts' and are almost always ready to promise a healthier bottom line
if only the Japanese model were adopted. However, if one carefully examines this recent outpouring
of printed and spoken words praising the Japanese economy, one quickly discovers that most of it is
replete with overgeneralizations, selected half-truths, hefty doses of misinformation, psuedoanalyses
sprinkled with Japanese phrases, and generous servings of cliches." (Yamamura K. 1982 p.77)
Yamamura took exception to the analysis of MITI by one of the leading 'experts' from
Harvard University, Ezra Vogel who, in 1979, wrote glowingly about MITI in his book
Japan is Number One Lessons for America. He stated that the tight relationship
between business and government was a primary reason for Japan's economic power
and that administrative guidance and voluntary cooperation from business was MITI
recipe for success. He explained how MITI cultivated the cooperation from business:
"In the first place, companies know that MITI is primarily interested in the welfare of companies in
the respective industrial sectors. Second, MITI provides superior information and analysis. Third,
within a given industrial sector MITI bureaucrats and company officials at a variety of levels met
constantly, formally and informally, and develop mutual understanding." (Vogel E., 1979, pp.
73-74)
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However, Vogel contradicted his first statement that businesses voluntarily cooperated
with MITI's guidance when he added that companies understood that MITI was more
receptive to the applications for licenses, permits, and tax breaks from companies that
had cooperated with guidance than from companies that had not cooperated: "Even if
MITI eventually grants the necessary permission to an uncooperative company, the harassing
tactics of delaying, requesting more information, raising new questions, and creating uncertainties
are ordinarily enough to inspire companies to be more cooperative, (pp.73-74)
Yamamura, claiming that Vogel advocated the formation of an American MITI, called
Vogel's views misconceived and naive:
"Vogel only described the positive effects seen during the fifties and sixties and ignored the serious
and already visible consequences of addiction to guidance and cartels." (1982, p. 104)
In the 1970s and 80s in order to take advantage of the growing interest in the Japanese
model and anticipating a substantial profit from a higher student population, universities
established centres for the study of Japanese and Japanese culture, business schools
added Japanese -related curriculum and, students, believing that there were careers
awaiting them in Japanese-related fields, studied the difficult Japanese language,
travelled to Japan through government-sponsored exchange programs to see what they
were allowed to see of the Japanese system. Some of the most famous universities such
as Stanford, Harvard, John Hopkins and Georgetown University received substantial
grants from Japanese corporations and state-run government organizations. Japanese
corporations and government agencies also sent staff to receive MBA or Law degrees
from these universities and to build formal and informal networks with academics. A
generation of academics were nourished in these institutions and they learned about
Japan's system from educators, whose perceptions of Japan's economic and social
conditions were influenced by what they saw as outside observers of the system and by
the data released to them by government, corporations and their respective spokesmen.
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Chalmers Johnson's Legacy
MITI and The Japanese "Miracle" The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975 (1982 Stanford
University Press)
Japan's economic "miracle" inspired western scholars to examine extensively the
Japanese political economy. Scholars such as Chalmer Johnson and Karel van Wolferen
wrote books that had significant influence on how westerners perceived Japan.
Johnson's book on MITI generally is recognized by scholars as one of the finest
accounts of Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the English language. The
work, which can be called an encyclopaedia of MITI before 1975, explained how the
ministry functioned, the conditions of the elite bureaucrats who made policy and their
development within the ministry. His definitions of elements that are specific to Japan's
political economy such as amakudari, habatsu, keibatsu, gakubatsu, etc. have become
textbook definitions. Johnson also illustrated the political struggles within the ministry
and the struggles over jurisdictional authority between MITI and other ministries.
Johnson reviewed his book in his article "Japanese Capitalism Revisited" for the Japan
Policy Research Institute(JPRI):
"The primary focus of my work was the evolution and powers of the Japanese state's bureaucratic
apparatus for implementing 'industrial policy.' I emphasized the state's importance because until
that time there had been no serious research on this subject." (Johnson C., 2001, p.l)
Johnson gave the reader an historical perspective of the bureaucracy from the Meiji
Restoration and showed that pre-war Japan's bureaucracy was kept fairly intact after the
war by the Supreme Command because of the threat of Communist expansion in the
Pacific. He documented the development of industrial policy, providing an overall
perspective of the functions of MITI. He discussed in great detail the structure of the
organization and the backgrounds of the civil servants who served in the ministry. He
devoted several pages to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) one of MITI's
Special Status Corporations, which is discussed in chapter seven. Johnson chronicled its
beginnings, pointing to MITI's use of JETRO's overseas offices as surveillance stations,
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as locations for temporary posting (shukko), (p.62) and lobbying for government policy
(p. 231). However, since his book ends at 1975, he could not assess the subsequent
revision of JETRO's functions as export promoter to import promoter nor the
effectiveness of JETRO as a promoter of international economic cooperation. He also
could not analyse JETRO's import promotion programmes or MITEs possible objectives
for expanding operations.
Johnson could be considered the pioneer in presenting to Western readers a detailed
commentary on the ministry he felt played a crucial role during Japan's economic
success. Johnson inspired other scholars to conduct further research and to write about
the subject.
In "The Practice of Amakudari Within the Japanese Employment System" ("Asian
Survey" p. 311) Tuvia Blumenthal touted Johnson as being a pioneer in 1974 when he
wrote about the amakudari system in "The Reemployment of Retired Government
Bureaucrats in Japanese Big Business" for the November 1974 issue of Asia Survey.
Johnson, who was a professor of political science at the University of California,
Berkeley until his retirement in 1992, founded the Japan Policy Research Institute with
Samuel Clemons inl994. The institute gives scholars a platform for their research
papers and encourages further study on East Asian social, political and economic issues.
The members of the board come from diverse backgrounds and include such fine
commentators on Japan as John Dower whose book Embracing Defeat: Japan in the
Wake of World War II won the Pulitzer Prize, the Bancroft Prize and the National Book
Award in 2000.
Johnson claimed that the Japanese had labelled him the "Godfather of revisionism"
because his book on MITI established a foundation for the "revisionist" school of writers
on Japan. (2001, p. 2) Scholars of the "revisionist" school claim that although Japan's
political economy cannot be understood within the same context of Western political
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economies it should not be treated as unique and different in the global political arena.
In other words, the differences should be understood but Japan should not be given
preferential treatment in such instances as trade negotiations nor should the United
States be soft on Japan because of its importance as a military base for US troops.
Johnson's incentive for taking on this monumental task was to show Americans the
political economy of a country that was their closest ally in East Asia and that had
become its chief competitor in global markets. In his JPRI article he gives due credit
for Japan's rapid economic development to America's willingness to accept large
quantities of exports because it needed to maintain Japan as a safe haven for its military.
He writes:
"Japan also enjoyed privileged access to the American market because it was the United States
primary military political and military satellite in East Asia—an aspect of the relationship that was
taboo to discuss." (p. 2)
However, as the US trade deficit with Japan grew so did American demands in the early
1980s that Japan end protectionist policies and deregulate markets.
Johnson believed that Japan's rapid economic growth hinged on bureaucratic guidance
by the economic ministries, namely the Ministry of Finance (MOF), MITI with its
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and a very strong industrial policy. He argued that
the Japanese economy was neither a plan-rational market nor socialistic nor Anglo-
American but was in the process of developing into a capitalistic economy or
'developmental state' (CDS).7
7 "One view, championed by economists like Hugh Patrick, portrays Japan as essentially a free-
market economy, not unlike the United States...At the opposite pole stands Chalmers Johnson. He
sees postwar Japan like its prewar predecessor, as a 'developmental' state in which bureaucrats rule
and all other interests are subordinated to national economic development," Richard Katz (1998),
JapanThe System That Soured p. 81
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Yamamura Kozo defines the term "developmentalism": "I refer to a political-economic
system in which institutions are shaped by the belief that a developing economy can best achieve its
goals of becoming a developed economy ('catching up') by adopting a wide range of industrial
policies that will enable its manufacturing firms to adopt successfully new technology as rapidly as
possible in order to increase, over time, their productive capacity and efficiency." (February 23,
1997 p.296)
Johnson believed that Japan was not unique because South Korea and Taiwan followed
similar paths and accomplishing similar results.
Johnson contended that although exchange rates did affect prices, Japan's competitive
edge in the 1960s and 1970s was:
"...not primarily in prices. Japan's trade surpluses and the worries they created in the United
States was caused by it developmental state—easy access to capital for exporters in designated
strategic industries, research and development consortia, the blocking of foreign investment and
sales in Japan, governmental efforts to separate foreign technology ownership rights, and other
industrial policy measures." (p. 2)
In other words, MITI was protecting Japanese industries by using heavy protectionist
measures in an effort to develop the economy.
In his article for JPRI Johnson quoted a telegram from the American Embassy in Japan
that was sent to the U.S. Department of State on June 24, 1960:
"Our economic policy accorded Japan a fair and reasonable share of our market as premise and
precondition for U.S.-Japan relationships in political and security fields and has led to substantial
expansion of Japanese exports, making possible Japan's present economic prosperity." (p.4)
Johnson contended that the policy still stands and that 43,000 American troops (as of
2001) were stationed in Japan:
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"Japan still takes its due privileged access to the American economy and protectionist barriers
against American sales and investment in the Japanese markets." (p.4)
The United States trade policy with Japan is influenced by its perceived need to keep
military bases open in Japan. This policy includes sales of military hardware to Japan
for its armed forces.
Johnson introduced an interesting premise regarding the reasons for Japan's economic
downward spiral. In his book he pointed to the growing power of the Liberal
Democratic Party as the bureaucracy began to weaken after Japan's rapid growth period
ended. In his JPRI paper he blamed Japan's recession on too little bureaucratic control
rather than too much regulation. He pointed to the problems in the late 1980s when
MOF failed to adequately supervise bank lending to chief clients thus leading to careless
speculation:
"Japan's subsequent failure was not caused by the economic bureaucracy's intervention in the
economy but by the economic bureaucracy's loss of autonomy to implement policies in the face of
vested interests." (p.9)
He also put the responsibility on the shoulders of the LDP, which he maintained was
artificially put into power in 1955 and still continues to rule due to the continuation of
U.S. policy.
Johnson disagreed with the current consensus that deregulation is vital for bringing
Japan out of a depression, contending that more bureaucratic regulation not less is
necessary to control Japan's developmental economy. (2001 p. 9) However, providing
the ministries with more power to regulate the economy implies that the ministries will
also have the power to continue to inhibit the process of implementing such structural
reforms as the streamlining of Special Status Corporations and public corporations.
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Japan's political and economic system can be described as a bi-product of the Cold War,
an economy, which has been manipulated by both the United States and Japan to serve
mutual vested interests. It is suggested that reforms could be initiated politically if
certain conditions existed: 1) the end to the domination by the LDP, the party that has
sanctioned bureaucratic policy since 1955, 2) the United States withdraw all troops from
Japan, leaving the Japanese free to assume their own military responsibilities, including
footing the bill for all military spending, 3) the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) treats Japan under the same conditions as its other trading partners.
Japanese in government and academia were strongly critical of Johnson and proponents
of his 'revisionist' theory, calling them "Japan-bashers." The term "Japan Bashing"
originated in the early 1980s when Detroit automobile workers, incensed with the
success of Japanese automobile imports to the American market and fearing future job
losses, bashed and burned a Toyota in midtown Detroit. In the 1980s, the United States
tried to deal with Japanese trade surpluses through agreements based on rules and
regulations or Voluntary Export Restrictions (VERs) rather than demanding numerical
quotas. As the trade surplus grew and Japan failed to open its markets to insurance,
securities, construction material, etc. the United States began to approach Japan in a
more realistic fashion. Johnson explained the change in attitude in his JPRI article:
"The new idea coming from the U.S. that Japan, in fact, constituted a different kind of economy and
that the focus of negotiations be on results rather than rules (as in trading relations with command
economies) constituted a threat to Japan's continued surplus. The idea that Japan was different had
to be discredited." (p. 2)
The Executive Director of Research and Planning at the New York branch of the Japan
External Trade Organization8 (JETRO New York) and Executive Editor of the
publication "Inside/Outside Japan", Washio Tomoharu, objected to the attitude of the
USTR towards Japan at trade talks in February 1994. He wrote a letter to the editor of
8 The Japan External Trade Organization is one of MITI's primary organizations. It is said to be a
promoter of exports and international economic cooperation and is discussed in detail in the final chapter
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the New York Times and it is an appropriate example of the Japanese government
defence against USTR demands. It began:
"The 'failure' of the latest round of United States-Japanese trade talks shows the simplistic and
self-centered approach of the United States often takes towards the 'most important' international
trading partner: unrealistic demands such as numerical targets, failure to obtain agreement or
fulfillment, followed by threats to retaliate or a retaliatory action. Watching these spectacles, now
too familiar, one wonders if United States negotiators understand the complexity of economic
mechanisms and the workings of Japanese society. The overall impression is that the United States
is good at working out a conceptual image of, let's say, Japan; it then takes the image to be reality.
When it finds out that reality differs from an image so conceived, instead of changing the image, it
vents frustration." 9
Washio was angry about the fact that the USTR avoided negotiating with MITI officials
and had taken its case directly to the Japanese foreign minister. He claimed that this
action illustrated one "administration official's" contention that the Japanese
bureaucracy was the "enemy" of the United States. Washio maintained his government's
line that Japan was intending to implement political reforms but that the Japanese
society is complex and that changes take time. He then took the offensive with the line
that his government often used to defend its position; America must reduce its budget
deficit.
In his paper for JPRI in 2001 Johnson claimed that in comparison with the other
industrialized powers Japan's bureaucracy was more powerful than the other two entities
of the "ruling triad," business and parliament. He denied that in MITI and the Japanese
Miracle he had indicated that the bureaucracy was the only influential player in the
economy but that he wanted to emphasize that elite civil servants took on major
responsibilities in managing Japan's economy. He achieved this in his book through
explaining in great detail the elite bureaucrats' lives inside the ministry, including
internal political struggles as well. He provided the resumes of two famous MITI vice-
9
(February 28, 1994) "U.S. Trade Delegates, Alas, Oversimplify Japan" Letters/ The New York Times
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ministers, Imai Zenei (1963-1964) and Sahashi Shigeru (1964-1966) (pp.339-340) and
cited former vice-ministers throughout the book. He was not entirely swayed by their
opinions. He tempered the comments by elite officials about the reasons for Japan's
rapid economic development by adding his own. For example, when discussing how
certain elements ("institutions") specific to the Japanese political economy acted
together to induce Japan's rapid economic development he referred to what Japanese
call "the three treasures"—lifetime employment system, the seniority wage system and
enterprise unionism. He cited two former MITI vice-ministers:
"Amaya Naohiro of MITI, for example, cites these three institutions as the essence of what he terms
Japan's uchiwa (all in the family) economic system; the former MITI vice-minister Ojimi Yoshihisa
referred to various 'typically Japanese phenomena' that had helped Japan to obtain its high-speed
growth—the phenomenon again being the three sacred treasures." (p. 11)
Johnson stated that their view was simplistic and that the "three treasures" were not the
only "special institutions" and, indeed, not the most "sacred." Johnson included the
personal savings system, amakudari, keiretsu and state-run financial institutions such as
the Development Bank of Japan and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (FILP)10 as
institutions that also aided Japan's economic development before 1975.
Johnson, who still favours strong ministerial controls, credited MITI elite like Sahashi
Shigeru, who entered the ministry in 1937 and retired as vice-minister in 1966, for
engineering Japan's industrial rebirth. Sahashi was an influential vice-minister and was
called "Mr. MITI." He was a devoted fan of his own ministry. Johnson tried to
illustrate Sahashi's moral values by pointing to Sahashi's resistance to the normal
amakudari track taken by most retired vice-ministers. He refused to enter private
enterprise because long-time employees would resent him if they should be passed over
for promotion. He was disillusioned with politics and he did not want to enter a state-
run corporation because he did not want to receive orders from other vice-ministers.
10 FILP's functions are defined in chapter 5, p 154
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Sahashi opted to bide his time and write books on economics for six years but finally
decided to enter the Leisure Development Center, an association managed by MITI.
Johnson described his meeting with him:
"When I met him in 1974, he was the very model of an international tourist executive: ensconced in
an office surrounded with tropical fish in tanks, recently returned from a visit to the South Pacific,
and dressed in a white safari suit, he answered my questions frankly and passionately defended his
beloved MITI." (p.272)
Sahashi gave Johnson some good quotes, which Johnson used freely to punctuate his
points. For instance, Sahashi on industrial policy:
"It is utterly self- centered [businessman's! point of view to think that the government should be
concerned with providing only a favorable environment for industries without telling them what to
do." (pp.9-10)
Johnson added that the occasions when industry "revolted" against government edict
were relatively few.
He wrote that after Sahashi Shigeru's retirement in 1966, MITI was pressured by
business to liberalize regulations and to end the use of the policy instrument
"administrative guidance". MITI also faced public criticism of collusion with big
business and problems such as industrial pollution and the depopulation of rural areas
like Shimane Prefecture. On top of that there was the beginning of the era of trade
friction with the Japan's biggest trading partner, the US. However, Johnson claimed that
the Oil Shock in 1974 brought new life to the ministry: Johnson wrote that after the Oil
Shock, along with a change in its industrial policy, MITI restructured itself, brought in
new personnel and started grooming staff for international duty. Perhaps influenced by
his dealings with elite officers, who undoubtedly were highly intelligent and well-
educated individuals, he represented MITI as a powerful institution.
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"MIT! again found a call for service—to lead third-stage knowledge-intensive industrialization and
to correct many abuses that had accompanied the renewal of self-control." (p.274)
In other words, MITI's long-term policy that had been planned since the 1950s for
energy-intensive industries were scrapped and new industries related to information
systems were targeted thus giving MITI new jurisdictional authority.
However, Yamamura and George Eads contended that MITI began to experience the
loss of power after the Oil Shock and that MITI bureaucrats exercised less control over
industries because they had less policy tools to work with:
"Although it is difficult to determine the extent of alterations in the Japanese government's
bureaucratic capabilities in the post-1973 period, there can be no dispute that the bureaucrats,
whatever their skills, prestige, and discretionary power, had fewer industrial policy tools to work
with." (Yamamura K and Eads G.,1987, p.452)
Yamamura also claimed that MITI was unable to change its protectionist policies
after1973:
"...the virtues and strengths of MITI, which...so unqualifiedly praised were like a potent drug that
is effective at the cost of serious and lasting side effects, one of which is inevitable addiction."
(Yamamura K., 1982, p.104)
To control production, prices and to protect markets, MITI continued the use of
"administrative guidance" for the formation of form cartels. (1982, p 89)
At times Johnson was overly enthusiastic in his evaluation of bureaucratic controls as
aids to the continued development of Japan's economy. When he discussed the policy
instrument "administrative guidance" he stated that the power to 'administrate guidance'
was not given according to law or according to orders from the Diet or Cabinet but given
at the will of officials, who had been granted the authority to issue guidance. Johnson
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likened these MITI officials whom he called "economic officials" to military
commanders. Johnson contended that their power gave them the freedom to:
"...respond to new situations rapidly and with flexibility, and it gives them the scope to take the
initiative." (p. 272)
A more straightforward way of putting this is that any elite official can issue guidance ad
hoc, unfettered by law. Johnson also predicted that administrative guidance, would
always be in MITI's kit of tools:
"given the public's awareness of Japan's economic vulnerability and its acceptance of the need for
government coordination of economic activities." (p. 274)
The Japanese feel vulnerable as a nation because they rely on foreign sources for most
natural resources and on foreign markets for exports of manufactured goods. In other
words, their dependence on foreign economies for their survival creates a reliance on the
ministry that plans trade policy, manages the entire manufacturing sector and, in
cooperation with the private organizations, controls the distribution of energy resources.
Yamamura's and Ead's theory conflicts with Johnson's because he contended that more
controls prevented a developmental economy from developing into a market-driven
economy:
"Although such protectionism may help absorb excess labour and distribute income more equitably,
it clearly runs counter to market forces, perpetuates inefficiency, exacerbates inflationary pressures
and erects de facto barriers against the imports of foreign products. Hence, the economic costs of
the Japanese industrial policy in the retail distribution sector are substantial, and they contradict
MITI's professed commitment to the principal of market efficiency." (Yamamura K. and Eads
G. ,1987, p. 450)
This raises an important question of whether the Japanese themselves actually wanted
more controls or whether consumers wanted the option to purchase Japanese goods for
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lower prices and imports at affordable prices such as leather goods, building materials
and home electronics. Until the 1988 citrus and beef GATT agreement was
implemented, a single navel orange cost one pound or more. Foreign residents, who
were used to drinking a glass of orange juice daily, were surprised to find that one glass
of freshly squeezed orange juice sold for three pounds sterling. (Carpenter S.1993 pp. 5-
6) Due to the pressures from Japanese citrus growers' associations prices rarely fell to
levels that competed with domestic citrus. Imports of products such as leather goods,
home electronics and computers that were competitive with Japanese goods were two to
three times as expensive than in the country of origin, forcing the Japanese to purchase
"made-in-Japan' goods, even though they may have wanted to buy a foreign import.
When Japanese travelled abroad they invariably shopped for goods they craved but
could not afford at home giving foreigners the impression that they were wealthy
"economic animals."
Johnson praised bureaucrats like Sahashi for: "not their 'control bureaucrat' mentality but
their having shown the nation how to change its industrial structure in order to meet changes in the
economy." (p. 274)
His tome to MITI can be regarded as exaggerating the role that MITI played in Japan's
rapid economic growth period. Johnson stated unabashedly:
" Thanks to MITI, Japan came to possess more knowledge and more practical experience of how to
phase out old industries and phase in new ones than any other nation in the world." (p. 274).
Johnson was alluding to such energy-intensive industries as aluminium, petrochemicals,
steel and shipbuilding and such "sunset industries" as textiles and paper manufacturing.
However, MITI's policies for the industries listed above were unabashedly protectionist,
using cartels and providing subsidies. On the other hand, the policies allowed MITI to
maintain a hold on these industries because administrative guidance was easier to
implement due to the postretirement positions (amakudari) that ex-MITI officials served
in companies and associations related to these industries.
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Johnson praised the high calibre of elite ministry officials. He asserted that opposed to
the civil service in the United States where political appointees from the private sector
are among the most talented in American government, the finest talent found in Japan
are the elite bureaucrats, (pp. 20-21) He presented the ministries of Finance,
Construction, Agriculture, Transportation, MITI and the Economic Planning Agency
(EPA) as the agencies that attracted the best minds in Japan. He described them as the
policy-makers in Japan, controlling the national budget (MOF) and drafting all laws.
Nonetheless, what Johnson perceived as strengths in the bureaucracy also can be seen as
factors that promoted more insularity and rigidity in Japan's political economy. For
instance, after he counted the attributes of elite bureaucrats and their powers, he added:
"Equally important, upon their retirement...these bureaucrats move from government to powerful
positions in private enterprise, banking, the political world, and numerous public corporations—a
direction of elite mobility that is directly opposite to that which prevails in the United States. The
existence of a powerful, talented, and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy is a natural corollary of
plan rationality." (p.21)
Johnson was stating that the propensity of ex-bureaucrats to take postretirement
positions in both the public and private sectors (amakudari) was instrumental to Japan's
economic success and that having bureaucrats in high places in business and politics
made the Japanese system more powerful. He omitted stating that amakudari was the
mechanism that promoted ties between vested interest groups, thus inhibiting the
correction of economic miscalculations and the adoption of new methods of
administration.
A simple example of what Johnson touted as strengths in the ministries may also be
construed as weaknesses in the bureaucratic system is the importance that a law degree
from Tokyo University plays in the career of an elite office. Johnson wrote:
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"Even among the Todaibatsu, [Tokyo University clique] there is the batsu of all batsu—the alumni of
the Tokyo University Law School." (p.59)
He explained that historically, the top career bureaucrats graduated from Todai and that
they ranked above graduates from other universities for promotion to the upper echelons
in MITI and in the other ministries as well. The Todai legacy goes back to 1886 when
the university, formerly known as Tokyo Imperial University was founded by the Meiji
government in 1886 for the purpose of educating civil servants. Even the entrance
exams for career officers, the "Higher-Level Public Officials Examination, has changed
little since pre-war days. According to Johnson in 1977 out of 53,000 applicants only 1,
300 passed, (p.37)
It is generally recognized in Japan, that the level of college education in Japan is inferior
to education at universities in the West. Although the college entrance exams are very
difficult and students spend most of their high school years preparing for the
examinations, once they enter a university, they can relax. Students may spend less time
studying than their Western counterparts. This poses the questions of whether Japanese
elite administrators have enough training for their positions and, also, whether they were
admitted to the ministries simply because they continued the Todai lineage and were
able to pass a very competitive exam.
It is commonly believed among Japanese that the Todai clique creates an insular
mentality within the ministries but that the ministries discriminate against graduates with
the same skills from other universities.
Another example of what Johnson deemed to be a strong point of the ministry is its
vertical organization, stating that Sahashi felt that it cultivated a feeling of "family" and
"solidarity" within MITI:
41
"Given its semilifetime employment system and its vertical organization, each ministry must create
sufficient public corporations, affiliated associations of clients (gaikaku dantai), and colonial
outposts for its retired and soon-to-be-retired seniors. These commitments cause a ministry to
become a 'welfare community,' which has become an object of affection for its members and not
merely an impersonal office." (p78)
Johnson did not temper Sahashi's statement by adding the information that the
organizations received public funding and could be used by the ministries to perpetuate
their own interests. Instead, he simply gave the information that had been contributed
by a government source that the ministries used public corporations to ensure loyalty
among staff.
A third example is Johnson's referral to the ministries constant battle for territorial
jurisdiction:
"The struggle for nawabari (literally 'roped-off areas') is one of the passions of the Japanese
bureaucracy. However, this may be one of the hidden, if unintended, strengths of the Japanese
system." (p. 78).
He qualified this by citing the theory which Leon Hollerman stated in the August 1979
"Journal of Asian Studies" that if ministerial powers overlapped then the bureaucracy's
powers would therefore be reinforced. The "sheer ambition for status" among the
agencies also produces an extreme rivalry and protectiveness of territory. The
competition for power ultimately will counteract the dangers of the bureaucracy holding
too much power.
Strangely enough Johnson did not insert the quote from Sahashi that he gave in a later
chapter, which would have given readers a more realistic understanding of Japan's
bureaucracy:
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"Bureaucrats are officials of the various ministries first and only second are they servants of the
nation." (p.74)
Sasashi's statement is a universal truth but it takes on a different dimension in the
behaviour of Japanese bureaucrats because he was referring to the ministries on-going
battle for territory in order to secure more amakudari positions. A decrease in territory
implies a decrease in postretirement positions.
"Tradition and circumstances thus produce an intense 'territorial consciousness' (nawari ishiki)..."
(p. 74)
Japanese bureaucrats' work involves the maintaining and expanding of territory, work
that can include the establishment of affiliated associations and special status
corporations. Although Johnson contended that MITI was revitalizing itself after the Oil
Shock and becoming stronger as a ministry, he failed to recognize one significant factor
that in itself would weaken not strengthen his MITI. That factor was the changing
values of the new elite bureaucrats. They had come to enjoy the respect and power of
their positions and they had experienced an easier life than their predecessors, savouring
the fruits of MITI's success. They wanted such institutions as amakudari to continue
and those opportunities to assume postretirement positions to increase in order to ensure
security for themselves and their families.
Johnson pointed to non-career officers as being more vulnerable to corrupt influences.
He claimed:
"Actual corruption among higher officials in Japan has occurred but is uncommon. In general, the
Japanese public places greater trust in the honesty of state officials than in the honesty of politicians
or business leaders. Such petty corruption as does occur—gifts from businessmen, golf club fees,
dinner parties, junkets—is more common among noncareer officials than among higher
bureaucrats." (p. 68)
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Since the elite control the bureaucracy as well as the information released to the public,
Johnson was forced to rely heavily on elites for his information. His perspective of
corruption among career officers versus non-career officers was based on what he was
told.
It is regrettable that Johnson did not examine the roles of the non-career officers and
career officers, who, although they are not in the elite class, are vital to MITI operations.
Non-career officers do not have the same opportunities as their elite colleagues for
amakudari positions and other rewards that elites receive because of their elevated rank.
Elites are in the envious position of making interpersonal connections within the
ministry and with big business such as marrying into the families of wealthy business
people and influential politicians. Although a few non-career officers may be posted
abroad as support staff for career officers, they ordinarily do not receive education
abroad and they are not sent abroad more than once.
As the recession continued, the Japanese began to closely scrutinize the corruptive
influence of amakudari and the type of corruption Johnson alluded to. Gillian Tett
wrote in the May 19, 2000 Financial Times that government had written a code of ethics
that would regulate the types of gifts that bureaucrats could receive from businesses:
"In the past, foreign and Japanese companies have often entertained bureaucrats through dinners,
golf outings, or evenings at venues such as a 'no pan' (no panties) restaurant, where the bill could
top 300,000 yen (1, 480 pounds sterling), 'everyone did this,' admits one foreign banker."
The target of the new rules was the Ministry of Finance and MITI, the two ministries
that manage the banking and manufacturing sectors respectively.
Japan Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (1995 W.W. Norton& Company)
The theme of Johnson's following book, released in 1995, is that there are two types of
capitalism—the American and the Asian and that the Asian has proven more successful
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in the wealth-generating system. The United States must deal with Japan from the
perspective that Japan had become the economic superpower in the Pacific. Johnson felt
that America must compete with Japan in order to survive in the global economy and
recommended a stronger industrial policy for the United States.
His contention that Japan's system was more effective than America's was an indication
that he had not yet come to realise the depth of Japan's serious economic condition and
social problems that had developed in this distorted environment. More bureaucratic
control would only serve to continue a governing system that had proven too rigid to
successfully push Japan into a solid position in the global economy.
As he did in his book on MITI, Johnson defined the elements of Japan's ruling system,
which he called a bureaucracy. The Japanese agree that the bureaucracy is the strongest
force in Japan's governing system (see Part II) He also examined Special Status
Corporations in detail and the important role they played in providing postretirement
positions for bureaucrats. He wrote:
"Even though non-Japanese scholars have hardly touched this subject in their research, no
appreciation of the full extent of the bureaucracy's powers is complete without mention of it. "
(p.134)
He cited Sahashi, who was working in a MITI association, as claiming that ministries
established Special Status Corporations simply to expand jurisdiction and for amakudari
positions. Johnson pointed to concerns that ministries used Special Status Corporations
to control local governments' operations and certain aspects of daily life. However, he
attributed the term "30% autonomy" (sanwari jichi) in part to this control mechanism (p.
134) when it actually defines simply the level of independence that local government has
from central government in terms of their budgets. The prefectures generate
approximately 36% of their budget and must rely on central government for subsidies
for infrastructure work, for health and welfare, for education and so forth. (The political
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and economic relationship between central and local governments is discussed in
Chapter six) Johnson and his 'revisionist' colleagues as well as commentators, who
predicted great successes from the Japanese system, did not seem to fully recognise that
if the Japanese government did not execute structural reforms the economy would
depress further. They did not seem to realise that Japan's rigid socio-political system
can neither sustain global growth nor can it accommodate reforms. The fundamental
reason (to be discussed in chapter six) that can be attributed to this rigidity is that the
political economy is mired in a network of personal connections between people in
government, business and politics.
Johnson's works inspired other scholars to examine Japanese elite civil servants, their
role in administering Japan's economy, and their amakudari system.
Spin-offs Of The Elite Amakudari Theme
The Japanese have written extensively about the amakudari system, and recently about
amakudari in Special Status Corporations, which has become a popular topic. While the
Japanese authors looked at amakudari as an institution that was at the root of corrupt
behaviour among elite who took advantage of the system (i.e. serving in more than one
position at a time, thus receiving several salaries simultaneously) and that it frustrated
efforts to reform the economy, Western authors looked at amakudari from an entirely
different perspective. Their articles were simple explanations of how the system worked
in terms of the facilitation of government controls over industry and analyses of how the
system aided to tie government objectives with corporate interests. Some academics
have even suggested that amakudari was a positive force behind Japan's economic
expansion. The following papers represent this perception of the system.
"The Practice ofAmakudari Within the Japanese Employment System" (March 1985
Asian Survey xxxv. No. 3)
Tuvia Blumenthal, an associate professor of economics at Ben Gurion University in
Israel, undertook this study of amakudari. Taking up the gauntlet from Johnson, but
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giving far less detail and less analysis, Blumenthal described the system and the process
of gaining postretirement positions in private corporations. She stated that the close
relationship between business and government seemed to be one of the causes for
Japan's economic success and that such policy instruments as administrative guidance,
executed mainly by MITI, was an illustration of government controls over business. She
credited amakudari as one of the connections between businesses and government. She
described the system as an incentive for bureaucrats to enter the ministries and that it
was:
"...well-integrated into the framework of the Japanese employment program." (p 321)
She exhibited data that was issued by the National Personnel Authority to show that the
system was continuing with the number of positions increasing as well. Blumenthal
credited this to the need of ministries to retire bureaucrats by the age of fifty-five to
make room for younger staff.
Blumenthal was not familiar with Special Status Corporations, identifying them as non¬
profit institutions that were "close" to the ministries and were sources for amakudari.
Blumenthal produced data from the MOF "White Paper on Amakudari" published in
1981 that showed that 78.6% of the directors in all of the Special Status Corporations
were ex-bureaucrats and that since 1974 the largest number of amakudari directors had
come from MITI. (p.314) This data did not include information on other posts in special
status corporations available to retirees as well. She also did not mention that the
ministries established Special Status Corporations and associations for expanding
territory, a fact that Chalmers Johnson pointed out in 1995.
Blumenthal summed up her paper by giving amakudari a positive assessment:
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"The practice makes for better communication between government and business through personal
contacts and eases the flow between the two sectors. Moreover, it can be regarded as an efficient use
of skills and experience gained by officials in their long training in government." (p.320)
It could be argued that Yamamura Kozo, who had published his paper on
"administrative guidance" three years earlier, would have disagreed with Blumenthal's
analysis. The personal contacts between bureaucrats and their former colleagues who
have migrated to jobs in private industry help the ministries in the use of the policy tool
"administrative guidance" to implement policies easily
"Elites in an Equalizing Role Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese
Government-Business Relationship" 1989 (1989 Comparative Politics Vol. 21; PT4)
At the time of publication Kent E. Calder was an associate professor of Politics and
International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He
described the dynamics of the amakudari system in business, Special Status
Corporations and politics. Compared to the Blumenthal article it is very ambitious and
delves deeply into the subject.
Calder asserted that businesses hired ex-bureaucrats to provide a stable political
environment for doing business. In other words, ex-bureaucrats have strong connections
with their ministries and former colleagues, enabling them to lobby on behalf of their
firms to dissuade government from planning rules and regulations that would put
companies at a disadvantage in the marketplace. Also, ex-bureaucrats pursue
government contracts for their firms. Firms that employ ex-bureaucrats feel confident
that their presence will "equalize" the competition with other firms both large and small.
Small firms are particularly vulnerable when dealing with big business and government.
To put it another way, having an ex-bureaucrat is like owning an insurance policy.
Calder's focus is on the amakudari system in small businesses. Most studies on
amakudari do not look at this area, preferring to look at the large corporations. Calder
contended that Japanese small businesses depended more on ex-bureaucrats for
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intelligence gathering than larger businesses because they had less access to central
government than larger businesses:
"Bureaucrats move with the greatest frequency to relatively small, non-Tokyo-based, non-keiretsu-
affiliated firms with relatively small proportions of elite Tokyo University graduates in top
management." (p.399)
Calder described the function of the amakudari system. He stated:
"•Amakudari through its "equalizing" effects, broadens access to economic policy for those who
otherwise could not easily afford it. " (p.397)
Calder's analysis of the various forms and functions of amakudari raised some
interesting points. 1) Although the very large corporations hired ex-bureaucrats, smaller
firms involved in the construction, telecommunications and transportation industries
where the markets were more competitive tended to hire more ex-bureaucrats. Also,
smaller firms in the provinces and further from Tokyo, the seat of central government,
hired ex-bureaucrats to provide a pipeline to the central ministries. Smaller businesses
were usually more isolated than larger businesses and the former civil servants served as
"intelligence gatherers." 2) Calder counted 200 ex-bureaucrats in industrial
associations, many representing small business. 3) 130 ex-bureaucrats in the Diet:
"...where they tend of political necessity to be sensitive to the interests of small business, a pivotal
'swing vote' group." (p.383) 11
.4) Calder contended that ex-bureaucrats tended to migrate to medium and larger firms
that did have "establishment ties" with government. These ties could be any related to
personal contacts between owners of firms and elite civil servants or connections
through marriage, etc. 5) Firms that had graduates of Tokyo University at the helm
tended not to hire ex-bureaucrats as frequently as firms that did not have Todai
11 Calder could have included in his analysis that 99% of all business activity in Japan is small to medium
sized business and that government heavily subsidizes small businesses
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graduates in management positions 5) Elite ex-bureaucrats moved to the larger firms that
were positioned below the higher ranking companies 6) Ex-bureaucrats in the Diet tend
to represent the poorer prefectures. 7) Special Status Corporations supply the
overwhelming number of positions for ex-bureaucrats, many of the corporations related
to small businesses (Calder counted 300, using 1976 statistics).
Calder did not mention that MITI manages the small business sector and owners of
small businesses will hire MITI retirees to have a pipeline to MITI to access subsidies
and loans from MITI Special Status Corporations.
Calder stated that from the mid-seventies due to trade friction overseas, Japanese
companies that were involved with foreign trade began hiring a large number of MITI
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retirees, posting them in overseas branches where
they accessed the latest information on foreign trade policies and to forge closer ties
with foreign governments to ensure supplies of raw materials. MITI uses Japan External
Trade Organization to serve the same function.
Calder explained that French ex-bureaucrats migrate to business but not as many as in
Japan. The reasons he gave were that Japanese businesses were willing to pay higher
salaries than their French counterparts and that since economic and political information
is more readily available French companies did not feel compelled to hire retirees from
the inside. Also, in comparison with Japan the political economies of both the U.S. and
France is more transparent and businesses have an easier time accessing information.
Calder's analysis of the amakudari system showed how ex-bureaucrats helped
businesses by gathering economic intelligence and dealing with an unpredictable
political environment. He acknowledged that amakudari stifled deregulation, calling it
the "veto effect." He recognized that amakudari produced a "rigidifying" effect in the
formation of economic policy, citing MITI's inability to develop a policy to phase out
certain energy intensive industries adversely affected by the Oil Shock in 1973.
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Ooyama Kosuke, an associate professor of Social Sciences at Tsukuba University,
wrote in his book Study of the Political Economy of Administrative Guidance/Gvosei
Shido no SeiiikeizaiGaku that Calder's hypothesis that ex-bureaucrats equalize big and
small businesses ability to access to intelligence is still to be proven. Ooyama questioned
whether amakudari served as a means for businesses to government to exchange
information. This could suggest that communication between ex-govemment officials
and their former colleagues is difficult to qualify because it is done often through
personal contact. Ooyama felt further investigation had to be done to determine the
validity of Calder's theory that ex- MITI bureaucrats who take postretirement positions
in firms cannot be considered actual employees of the firms because they come from
MITI. (p.38)
Since Calder did not supply the source of his information nor the method he used to
determine the number of ex-bureaucrats migrating to small businesses, his claims cannot
be substantiated easily. Also, it is likely that he would have would difficulty accessing
this data unless he was employed in small businesses or in Special Status Corporations
and associations that catered to small businesses. Gaining entry into small businesses to
do research is difficult unless facilitated by a state-run institution such as the Japan
Finance Corporation for Small Businesses, a primary lender to small businesses. In
addition, communication may be difficult because small business owners and their
employees ordinarily do not speak foreign languages. Even then, owners would be
unwilling to divulge such information unless they trusted researchers to be objective in
their analysis of the data.
Calder's article was published in 1989, one year before Japan's "bubble economy" burst.
When he wrote the article, small enterprises were doing relatively well because of the
extended economic boom during the later half of the 1980s. When the recession hit
12 Tsukuba University is a State university that focuses on the sciences and receives significant funding
from government for research.
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bankruptcies among small enterprises escalated dramatically along with the debts
incurred from the bankruptcies. In his book The Contemporary Japanese Economy
Matsuba Masafumi, Professor of Economics at Ritsumeikan University, who defines
small enterprises as having capital of less than 30 million yen, claimed that the debt of
bankrupted small business in 1991 was 6.36 trillion yen:
"This was three-fold the value of the previous year and the highest of past years. As a result, the
debt value per bankruptcy increased greatly to 597 million yen (approximately 2.5-fold of that in
the previous year." (Matsuba M., 2001, p. 178)
The November 15, 2001 edition of The Japan Times Online announced:
"The nation's prolonged recession forced more small and midsize firms into bankruptcy in October,
with the number of failures surging 11.7 percent from a year earlier to 1,911, the worst since the
nation's asset-inflated bubble economy burst a decade ago, a credit research firm said Wednesday.
It was also the third-highest number of corporate bankruptcies in a single month in post-war Japan,
according to Teikoku Databank Ltd."13 There is no recorded data that shows the rate of
failure among small businesses that employed ex-bureaucrats.
"Government Elites and Amakudari in Japan, 1963-1992" (July 1995 Asian Survey)
At the time of publication the authors, Chie Usui and Richard A. Colligan were
professors of sociology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis and Dusquesne
University respectively. They agreed with Chalmers Johnson that the bureaucrats not
politicians governed Japan, a "network state and network society" and a rational
capitalistic economy. They characterized the relationship between state and business in
the same mode as the above authors:
"...mutually dependent, obligatory, trusting, reinforcing parts to the whole. Noteworthy are the
informal policy networks and interpenetrations of government and business serving to reconcile




They pointed to amakudari as the most basic form of "interaction and interpenetrations"
of government and business. The authors looked at the system in terms of placements of
ex-bureaucrats in business over a thirty-year span, often citing such academics as
Johnson and Daniel Okimoto, who is the co-director of the Northeast Asian Institute at
Stanford University where MITI retirees regularly lecture.
Charting the increase in the numbers of ex-bureaucrats in amakudarijpositions in
business between 1963-1993, which they divided into three periods, the authors
attempted to show the "interpenetration" of government and business. By calculating
the extent of ministerial power according to the number of postretirement positions in
the private sector, they suggested that the decrease during the period of 1960 to 1985 in
amakudari for some ministries might indicate that deregulation had occurred in the
industries under the jurisdiction of those ministries. They cited the deregulation of the
telecommunication industry administered by the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications as an example. They cautioned, however, that further research was
still required before a firm conclusion could be made.
Usui and Colligan suggested that due to the decrease of amakudari positions for MITI
since the 1960s indicated that MITI's powers were decreasing, contradicting the notion
of some academics that MITI was the dominant among the ministries. They looked at
MOF as the strongest ministry because of the highest level of amakudari positions and
predicted that in the 1990s, MOF would become stronger because of its efforts to correct
the damage done during the "bubble" economy.
Usui and Colligan stated that their findings could not support a prediction of the future
of amakudari but there was reason to believe that the direction of amakudari was in
public corporations and industrial associations, although more study was necessary to
determine if there was indeed this trend. They stated that other academics felt that the
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route of amakudari had shifted from the private sector to public institutions and
foundations after 1985.
Perhaps further research could be conducted to ascertain whether the loss of amakudari
positions in the private sector is making Special Status Corporations and public
corporations more valuable to the ministries as places for postretirement positions.
Blumenthal, Calder, Usui, and Colignon discussed the amakudari system and how it
connected business to government. It is interesting to note that the authors referred to the
others' works as well as to Johnson's and Okimoto's. Their definitions of the various
manifestations of the system were accurate but in a very narrow sense.
There was no reference by any of the authors to the fundamental effect of the system on
the Japanese and their political economy. Undoubtedly, the connections formed through
amakudari act to facilitate the implementation of industrial policy and "equalize"
competition between businesses. However, most significantly, the connections produce
a mutual protection mechanism that inhibits the dismantling of old structures of
institutions because the players in these institutions protect their own interests by
protecting the interests of players in other institutions. It also perpetuates a defensive
attitude among the players because there is the constant worry that, even though
connections may have been forged through the same ministry, loyalty cannot always be
guaranteed. Consequently, the most outstanding influence that amakudari has on
Japan's economy is that it does not direct nor promote economic growth but locks the
economy within a stagnant environment perpetuated by ex-bureaucrats in business
trying to influence the administrators and the administrators controlling ex-bureaucrats
in businesses. It is a subtle political game that can be seen from the inside of the system
where ex-bureaucrats and bureaucrats engage in a ritual of "give-and-take" to protect
mutual interests.
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Perceptions of Japan's Political Economy by Kent E. Calder and Karel van
Wolferen
"Domestic constraints and Japan's foreign economic policy of the 1990s" (Autumn
1991 International Journal XI. VI)
When Calder wrote this article he was the Director of Programs on U.S.-Japan
Relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public And International Affairs. His
perspectives regarding Japan's economy was almost certainly based on research he had
conducted from the outside. This is apparent when he enthusiastically described Japan's
economy
"Japan is approaching a scale of international wealth, relative to its partners in the international
system, rivaled only by the United States in the late 1940s or Victorian Britain in 1900." (p.608)
He credited the strengths of Japan's economy to Japan's decade-long surplus of $50
billion, $300 billion in external assets and the overall portfolio of external investment, a
rise of direct foreign investment from $4.7 billion in 1980 to $12.2 billion in 1985 to
$22.3 billion in 1986 to over $67 billion in 1989. He also pointed to the rise of Japan's
offshore security investments from $87.8 billion in 1987 to $113.2 billion in 1989. In
1989 Japan invested $104.4 billion in the U.S., $10.4 billion in Indonesia and $5.9
billion in Brazil, (p.609)
Calder's argued that due to Japan's emergence as the world's largest lender and since
the U.S. economy had been lagging since 1985, it was necessary for Japan to begin
planning policy that gave it a more active role in the global economy. He contended that
Japan had not developed the ability to do so because it had no central coordinating
authority. He stated that in contrast to Japan the French had a government with a strong
executive and political authority to control the bureaucratic struggles over jurisdiction.
He agreed in principle with Karel van Wolferen's revisionist analysis of the structure of
government (stated below) but he asserted that van Wolferen's conclusions that the
Japanese political system was not able to make structural changes were exaggerated.
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Calder predicted that MITI and MOF would take the lead and steer Japan into the global
community:
"Japan's elite bureaucracy will no doubt be the chief architects of their nation's expanding role."
(P- 612)
His insistence that Japan had a dynamic economy at the time he wrote his article shows
that along with most Western scholars he did not see the signs of Japan's pending
economic melt-down. The fact that he credited MITI and MOF elite for joining together
to plan Japan's future role in the world economy also revealed his perception of the
behaviour of bureaucrats in protecting their territory from the other ministries.
There were clear signs in 1988 that Japan's economy was overheated. The Japanese
were referring to their economy as a "bicycle economy" (jitenshakeizai) because it had
to be peddled constantly in order to keep it going at such a fast pace. The competition
between domestic firms to produce new products in order to woo consumers away from
the others could be seen simply by going daily to various marketplaces. If a product did
not meet with consumer acceptance within the first three months after launch, it was
pulled from the shelves and replaced with a new product. (October 1993 Inside/Outside
Japan pp.4-5) Publishers launched magazines that were discontinued after the first issue
if they did not sell immediately. Manufacturers invested in new equipment, with the
expectation that there would be an upsurge in demand. Borrowing from banks was easy
but where the real money was coming from and why banks were allowing manufacturers
to refinance loans using the same collateral they had used to finance the previous loan
was a mystery.
Japanese companies invested heavily in highly visible real estate in the United States in
the late 80s and early 90s such as the Rockefeller Center, the Empire State Building, the
Chrysler Building and Pebble Beach Golf Course, paying far more than the value of the
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property. Japanese love American pop culture, especially movies and Sony Corporation,
seeing a lucrative market, bought Columbia Pictures, which was a wise purchase.
However, Matsushita Corporation, in its efforts to imitate Sony, miscalculated when it
bought Universal Pictures. First, Matsushita had to sell off the concessions at Yosemite
National Park because of flack from Americans who were not happy about a Japanese
company owning a piece of a national park. Then there were difficulties with American
management and movies that failed at the box office, resulting in significant losses.
Matsushita rid itself of Universal a few years after purchase.
During the past five years, corporate losses among multinationals have forced the sale of
real estate that had been purchased a few years earlier such as Rockefeller Center.
Another image of Japanese economic prowess was the "internationalisation" of not only
big businesses but smaller businesses as well. Japanese companies started to expand
operation in the United States in the 70s but easier access to loans in the late 1980s gave
more firms the incentive to open plants overseas. The strategy seemed logical because
of the anticipated rise in Japanese consumer demand for products ranging from
processed foods to automobiles and because raw materials were cheaper in the U.S. The
United States also was the most desirable area for investment for small firms who saw
profits from supplying larger Japanese firms that were already operating in America.
However, by 1991, the firms that opened operations at the beginning of the 1990s were
quickly experiencing difficulties. According to a JETRO survey, released in the March
3, 1993 issue of Inside/Outside Japan more than 50% of Japanese affiliated companies in
the United States were in debt. The survey was conducted in the Fall of 1992 and sent to
1,724 manufacturing plants throughout the United States, excluding North Dakota but
including Puerto Rico:
"Among the respondents, the number of plants that started operations showed as steady yearly
decline in the 1990s—145 in 1990, 58 in 1991 and 19 in 1992. ..Two out of three plants exported their
products. A tally of the figures provided by Japanese-affiliated manufacturing plants as exports to
Japan totaled $1,882 million, or an average of $6,450,000 per plant. " (p.6)
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The losses were primarily related to over-production, resulting in surplus inventory.
Many businesses were office suppliers and such industries as travel and real estate that
relied almost entirely on Japanese corporate accounts. As larger businesses downsized
operations their affiliates pulled out of America, leaving the smaller suppliers no
recourse but to close shop.
The Enisama ofJapanese Power (1990 Vintage Books)
Karel van Wolferen is not an academic. He is a Dutch journalist, who lived in Japan for
a number of years. A "revisionist," he wrote his best seller, The Enigma of Japanese
Power, in 1989 and managed to capture the character of Japan's political society better
than most western commentators. Like Johnson, he warned that Japan, as an economic
power, must be reckoned with and that it was vital that the world should understand how
Japan works in order to deal pragmatically with problems arising from trade imbalances
and a renewed nationalism. Like Johnson he saw Japan (which he called a "phoenix")
as a country that recovered from the devastating effects of war to become an economic
power but he worried about Japan's relationship with trading partners:
"The phoenix has soared majestically for the entire world to see, and has drawn deserved applause
and expressions of awe. But it is burdened with an inherent defect that deteriorates it. The defect
is, of course, in its steering mechanism, in its inability to adopt alternative methods and aims,
because of the absence of an individual or unified group with the power to make decisions to shift
goals." (p.407)
Van Wolferen was concerned about Japan's inability to redirect its export-driven
economy to an economy that invited direct investment and more imports in order to
alleviate friction between itself and its trading partners, namely the United States.
He went beyond Johnson in his analyses of Japan's way of governing, which he believed
was neither controlled by a single institution nor led by an executive body that took sole
responsibility but rather it was an interaction of mechanisms that he called a "syste," a
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system that did not resemble western governments. Van Wolferen contended that
"accountability" suggested that there was no "center." Since there was no central force,
he felt that the term "system" was a less confusing way of describing the Japanese style
of governing. His definition was very appropriate:
"It denotes little more than the existence of a set of relationships, with reasonably predictable
effects, between those engaged in socio-political pursuits. The term 'system' is also frequently used
to suggest an arrangement of inescapable forces against which the individual is helpless without
resorting to violence. It hints at something beyond the range of potentially corrective powers of
democratic politics, it is something that cannot be reasoned with—although it can occasionally be
duped." (p.43)
Through his commentary on the Japanese political economy readers can see that the
Japanese system is resistant to change.
His eloquent definitions of components in Japan's governing system show that he
understood essentially how the Japanese ruled themselves and how they perceived
themselves in relationship to the system. By defining those ties that bind the system
tightly together, van Wolferen showed why promises of political reform usually amount
to little more than promises:
"The Japanese political system should impress us for what it does not try to accomplish in areas
where, action appears sorely needed and where, in other states, governmental co-ordination would
be taken for granted." (p.81)
The Japanese themselves enjoy his works because they feel that he portrays their social
system correctly.14 Nevertheless, for all of his savvy insights on the Japanese system,
14
His book The Japanese Social System That Does not Make People Happy (Ninsert wo Kaifukuni Shinai
Nihon no Shakai Shisutemu) was a best seller in Japan. A professor of electrical engineering at Waseda
University thinks that van Wolferen expertly described the darker aspects of Japanese life such as the
lifetime employment system that Japanese endured but simultaneously felt suffocated by it. "He
explained to us why we were not fully happy...He emphasized 'human' aspects or 'quality of life'
aspects as factors which make people happy, an in that sense, he seemed to us to represent
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van Wolferen miscalculated the Japanese economy in the late 1980s, stating that thanks
to the "creation of paper wealth" (p. 439) the MOF and MITI and businessmen invested
vast funds in new production capacities and that Japan was pumping out an
inexhaustible supply of funding for domestic and international investments. He did not
see the signs that Japan's economy was based on severe asset inflation, was overheated
and heading for a meltdown.
Unintentionally, van Wolferen pointed to one of the fundamental reason for Japan's
recession when he touted Japan's high-riding economy:
"The highly increased nominal values of real estate and stocks held by large corporations are used
as collateral against which various financing methods are applied that reduce the real cost of capital
to very little or, in some cases, almost nothing." (p.440)
Van Wolferen was convinced that there was no danger of a collapse because of the
interpersonal connections (jinmyaku) that bound the political system together:
"The elaborate jinmyaku interpersonal networks, whose members can be relied upon to behave
predictably, prop up this money manufacturing technique and prevent the kind of calamity that
would be the inevitable results of such a technique in any genuine market economy." (p.440)
However, it was precisely this jinmyaku that prevented not only early recognition of
Japan's economic woes but that so far have prevented effective reforms in banking and
politics because of vested interests of members.
European viewpoint, which is different from Americans. To many Japanese, American values,
which is starting o dominate the world, seemed to lie in quantifiable success, such as money earned,
rankings obtained (No. 1, No. 3 whatever), etc. European values seemed not to be quantifiable
(beauty, love/hate, noble, etc.) which looked more appealing to us. European values seemed to us to
emphasize values from the 'individual' point of view (self-satisfaction, self-fulfillment, etc.), while
Japanese values lie more in relation-oriented values, such as duty and honor in a groupish society,
which, as I said before, is becoming unbearably stifling." (Waseda University February 2002)
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Van Wolferen had emphasized in an earlier chapter that "informal human networks"
(p.l 10) were found throughout Japanese society and were vital for success in the society.
He described the Japanese as in a state of perpetual indebtedness to each other: "One of
the main characteristics of Japanese life is an unremitting trade in favours." (p. 110)
Interpersonal connections are in the fabric of the society. These connections between
businessmen and government officials can include: "...school ties, one-time-favours, shared
experiences and intricate back-scratching deals."
Van Wolferen emphasized that jinmyaku played a far more important role in Japanese
society than the Old Boys network in the West. He pointed to marriages between the
children of politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats that forged connections between
elite. He gave as an example the Takanawa-kai, a group of a thousand women graduates
from top universities, who are introduced at formal parties to elite MITI and MOF and
the Foreign Ministry. According to van Wolferen the introductions have produced
hundreds of marriages between elite couples (p. Ill)
As stated above, the Japanese have few natural resources, which makes them dependent
on other countries, a dependency that makes them feel vulnerable as a nation. Their
connections are a resource that they can depend upon. On the other hand, these
connections frustrate the implementation of reforms.
The "give-and-take" relationships and mutual obligation in interpersonal connections
can sometimes serve to conceal graft and other forms of corruption because of mutual
vested interests. For example, a Japanese employee, who sees that his "connection's"
objective may be dubious will prefer to ignore rather than to question, often because his
or her "connection" also has links to other "connections" that ultimately may prove to be
valuable to them. The accumulative effect of these interpersonal links is a mutual
protection mechanism that defies constructive corrections in the economic and political
system. These connections are further enhanced by the amakudari system, which is
examined in chapter 6. Since these links are personal and private, in order to understand
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the full effect of this organic dependency it is beneficial to enter into various
organizations as an employee for first-hand observation.
However, the accurate assessment of the conditions in these organizations that are based
on the consequences of these "connections" can be made only if the observers
themselves have their own connections within organizations. This is achieved through
creating relationships with pertinent individuals through whom information can be
accessed.
"The Japan Problem Revisited" (1990 Autumn Foreien Affairs Vol. 69 No.41
Karel van Wolferen wrote his paper at a time when Japan and the United States were
engaged in heated trade talks. He maintained that misunderstandings between America
and Japan arose because America still considered Japan a "remade version" of the
United States. From afar, post-war Japan looked American because the Occupation
Forces had transformed the imperial government into a governing system that appeared
to be democratic. The Japanese were also embracing American pop culture that gave
Japan a Western fa9ade. Misunderstandings also occurred because bureaucrats and
businessmen were not open to divulging the structure of their economy and its
interaction with the "informal power system." (p. 42) Van Wolferen claimed that the
United States was examined in depth because it was the world's most important
economy but Japan, the second largest economy in the world, had received little scrutiny
in comparison. He blamed this on the Japanese and foreign media for not reporting
enough about Japan. He also blamed Japan's bureaucracy and business interests for
muting the press and the press as well for censoring itself because of vested interests
with the bureaucracy and business.
In his effort to explain the Japanese political economic system van Wolferen repeated
what he had stated in The Enigma of Japanese Power; that the human networks and
informal personal tied the system together. He contended that the United States
erroneously perceived Japan's ruling elite as having "villainous motives" in their
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dealings with the United States. He denied this by explaining how Japanese elite looked
at the rest of the world:
"Japanese power brokers grow up in a social setting where the law does not ultimately regulate
affairs or provide the means for resolving conflicts. Nothing in their experience at home gives them
any assurance that treaties or agreements with foreigners can in the end be reliable. Instead they
seek international 'relationships' comparable to the domestic highly informal jinmyaku, as
protection and to maintain maximum control through economic self-sufficiency." (p.47)
However, van Wolferen was unable to estimate their true intentions in dealing with the
rest of the world. He admitted:
"Japan's political elite is resolutely uninterested in discussing how its system of informal
relationships and transactions produces the politically protected economic might that affects other
countries." (p.49)
Japan's political elite effect connections with foreign government officials through
formal and informal networking but they primarily do it for the vested interests of their
ministries in order to establish territory abroad. Businesses, independent of the
bureaucracy, establish their own networks, hiring foreign ex-government officials to
lobby their interests.
Van Wolferen put MITI and MOF on a pedestal, claiming that they were attempting to
make the world "safe for Japan." He pointed to these ministries' overseas dealing as
"...being in the business of national security." (p 48) He reassured readers that these agencies
were not involved in a conspiracy to take control of the world's economy but that the
power: "...was a result of the unequaled skill of individual Japanese power clusters in seizing the
opportunities for their own advancement. "
However, van Wolferen, who likened MITI and MOF and Japanese trade organizations
to "elite military organizations like the U.S. Marine Corp," greatly overstated their
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mission. He claimed that these institutions had a "quasi-sacred purpose" and the "need to
impress society with the merits of the institution." (p. 48)
Van Wolferen credited the ministries for Japan's economic "vitality" but also pointed to
the bureaucracy as one of the great weaknesses in the political system because no one
body has a mandate to make binding decisions. However, he did not point to formal and
informal relationships and networks as preventing any one body from taking control and
this very fact has prevented Japan from truly internationalising. The tie-up between
business and the bureaucracy through the amakudari system puts pressures on
businesses to conform to policy and likewise on bureaucrats to protect businesses'
interests. An example of this is the use of "administrative guidance" and cartels, which
effectively protected Japan's markets from foreign competition, thus insulating Japanese
industry from external pressures and competition.
A second example is the continued closed nature of Japan's markets, which is also a
product of formal and informal networks between government and big businesses.
Citing JETRO's 1992 White Paper, Matsuba Masafumi showed that inl990 outward
foreign direct investment from Japan was the highest in the world and that it was forty-
eight times higher than inward investment. (2001 p. 58) Direct investment in Japan is
difficult for foreign companies because of the multitude of regulations and
administrative rules that also affect imports as well. Matsuba writes that, although the
rules affect Japanese businesses as well, foreign businesses feel the restraints more,
especially in such industries as insurance, mining, construction, securities, finance,
electricity, gas, water which
"On the internal side of the closed nature of the Japanese market, there are many official
regulations unsuitable for the demands of the present era in Japan." The present situation was
examined by trends in the number of administrative permissions and appraisals and it was found
that there were 10, 054 cases in 1985,10,169 cases in 1987,10,441 cases in 1989,10,717 inl991 and
11,402 cases in 1993." (p. 46)
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The consistent increase in the regulations clearly points to heavy bureaucratic controls.
On average the regulations which are unsanctioned by law cover 42% of all value added
in Japan. Under the same regulations, for the insurance, mining, construction, securities,
finance, electricity, gas and water industries it is 100% of the value added. Matsuba put
MITI at the top for administering 1, 986 cases in 1993. The Ministry of Transportation
came in second with 1,893 cases. (Matsuba M. 2001 p. 46)
Conclusion The Real Story: The Problems of Accessing Information
Chalmers Johnson, Yamamura Kozo, Karel van Wolferen and Kent E. Calder agreed
that the core elements of Japan's governing system are the bureaucracy, the politicians
and business. They agreed that the dominant body is the bureaucracy that controls,
without legal sanction, the political economy at both the national and local levels
through the implementation of its own regulations.
Chalmers Johnson, who believes (2001) that Japan needs strong bureaucratic guidance,
wrote prolifically about Japan's bureaucracy from an historical perspective. He credited
MITI's post-war elite officials in 1982 for engineering Japan's rapid industrial growth.
He also contended that MITI renewed itself after the Oil Shock in 1973 by targeting new
industries for development. In 1995 Johnson continued to express his belief that Japan's
bureaucracy as Japan's ruling body.
Yamamura Kozo, on the other hand, claimed in 1982 that although MITI did indeed plan
Japan's rapid industrial growth, it was impossible to quantity the success of its policy
because other variables had to be taken into consideration such as the industriousness of
the Japanese themselves, the undervalued yen and free technologies, all vital to Japan's
economic recovery. Yamamura maintained that MITI continued to plan the same kind
of protectionist policy post after 1973 as it had before the Oil Shock because it could not
adapt to a new environment. He contradicted Johnson's claim that MITI resuscitated
itself after 1973, contending that MITI's power began to erode after the Oil Shock
because the number of policy tools at its disposal were decreasing, industries were
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becoming more independent of bureaucratic guidance and gradually politicians in the
Diet were becoming more influential. He warned that MITI's protectionist policy
would pose serious problems to Japan's future economic dynamism. Yamamura
continued to criticize ministerial controls over Japanese economic development during
the next fifteen years but in 1998 he conceded that the bureaucracy would continue to
control Japan's economy.
Karel van Wolferen described Japan's governing system in 1989 as a network of
connections between bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians. He regarded Japanese
political society itself as a network of connections that could not adapt to changing
environments. He agreed with Johnson that MITI was a powerful ministry and that
along with MOF it would plan Japan's economy in the 21st Century.
Kent Calder also felt that MITI was the powerful ministry that would play a vital role in
Japan's future economy. Along with Johnson, Yamamura and van Wolferen, he
examined the amakudari system and the way it served bureaucrats both in terms of
postretirement positions and control over industrial sectors. Although the authors
admitted that the system served the interests of the ministries, none of them indicated
that the system rigidified the political economy thus preventing the Japanese from
initiating dynamic change to meet the needs of a matured economy.
Although the authors knew a great deal about the system, it could be argued that they
greatly overestimated the strengths. They, as well as most Western commentators, did
not predict Japan's economic crisis, perhaps because they were not privy to the inner
workings of the organizations they were examining. The efforts of academics and
journalists to access comprehensive and correct data about Japan's economic state of
affairs are complicated by the insularity of organizations and the reticence of
organizations to divulge information, preferring to use special representatives to
communicate with both Japanese and foreigners. Given these circumstances it is
understandable why commentators would not be able to predict Japan's recessions and
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the Japanese's inability to initiate reforms that would spur an economic recovery.
Yamamura Kozo admitted in 1999:
"In many ways I saw the problems coming but I, like others, did not anticipate the problems being
so grave and so lasting."15:
The extent of mismanagement in the ministries in the 60s and 70s would have been
difficult to calculate because first, the Public Disclosure Act did not go into effect until
1999 (discussed in chapter 5). The government still conceals information and media
withholds facts that would otherwise reveal such things as mismanagement in
government and corruption because of government pressures to do so. Benjamin
Fulford of Forbes Global writes:
"Japan's half-a dozen or so big morning newspapers and their affiliated TV networks have deep
knowledge of systematic links between government officials, corporations and criminal
organizations but they refuse to let the public know, according to more than a dozen senior
Japanese reporters and editors." (February 4, 2002)16
Since the Japanese are not forthcoming with information, neither among themselves nor
with foreigners (as discussed in chapter 3), gaining a real understanding of a given
situation can be difficult. First of all, there is a language barrier to deal with and
secondly, unless they are a part of the organization or institution they are researching,
foreigners must rely on information given to them by government and corporate
spokesmen who van Wolveren identified as "buffers." He wrote:
"Resident foreign diplomats and businessmen usually deal with the Japanese intermediary
community of English-speaking, 'internationalized' Japanese who absorb the shocks of an
unpredictable outside world might deliver to their institutions. These buffers can be amazingly
frank, can convey genuine understanding of the foreigner's difficulties and create the impression of
willingness to cater to his needs. Japan has a handful of super buffers who spend much time




traveling the globe, troubleshooting and explaining the Japanese case at international conferences."
(1986/87, p 294)
Researching a social economic system that continues to remain relatively opaque can
show the limitations of theoretical evaluations. Yamamura wrote in 1997:
"When we search, as the scholars among us must, for theories that can help us analyze and
understand the significance of as many as possible of these developments, we are rewarded with
useful insights but there is no theory that that does not have serious shortcomings." (Yamamura
K„ 1997 p. 295)
The foreign news media in comparison with Japanese media is at a distinct disadvantage
when pursuing a story not only because of the language barrier but also because most
foreign journalists do not have a network in Japan that helps them access reliable
information. For example, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) chose to rely upon
the facilities and staff of Tokyo Television to facilitate Bill Whitaker, the chief
correspondent in Japan for CBS News from 1989 tol993 could not speak Japanese and
had to rely on interpreters to get his story. He encountered difficulties getting stories
about the bureaucracy:17
"Japan is certainly not as open as here. I do think that the bureaucracy controls the information,
not that they would necessarily manipulate the story but what they chose to reveal and when they
chose to reveal it and then how they chose to reveal it. They play it close to the vest. If they should
not want it to get out, it pretty well won't get out. Whereas in the United States American reporters
have different attitudes and different ways of getting at the information out of the bureaucracy. It's
not as closed. It's more porous. You can find someone who is working with someone who has
access to some information, who might be willing to talk in order to get this information out. Then
you go back to the guy at the top and ask, 'What about this?' Whereas in Japan, I think that if the
bureaucracy decides that the information stays within the bureaucracy, my god, that's where it
stays."
17
September 1994 interview JETRO New York
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All journalists are assigned to press clubs that are allowed to cover certain bureaus only.
When Whitaker wanted to cover a story regarding another bureau, he met barriers.
"As for press clubs that covered a different bureau, if the secretary said, 'No, you are not going to
get the information' that was the end of it. The journalists did not press another button to try to get
around it and try to find out the facts."
Whitaker lived in Japan for four years. He did not feel that Americans knew enough
about Japan. Although he had studied about Japan before his assignment he was not
prepared for what he was to experience:
"You have to live there to know it. There's nothing in a book that's going to prepare you for life in
Japan. I think that what fools you, what is seductive but in the surface is that it looks so familiar.
You've got tall buildings, freeways, subways and western dress and all those sorts of things that can
lull you into believing that this is a place that you can relate to and understand. But if you're there
for a while, you begin to realize that it is just a very thin veneer and that the real Japan is behind or
underneath that thought, that western thought. It sort of felt like we were beating our heads against
a brick wall trying to make them understand us and for us to understand them."
The Japanese themselves also have difficulty entering organizations for the purposes of
conducting research. Many believed or wanted to believe what elite bureaucrats were
telling them about the strengths of their system and that their economy would continue
to expand.
Part 2: Japan's Bureaucracy and Amakudari: Japanese Commentaries
Commentaries Before 1992
Kanryo Daikenkyu/In Debt Research of the Bureaucracy (1990 Chikuma Shobo)
The literature prior to 1992 regarding the bureaucracy tended to be more positive than
current commentaries and amakudari was generally referred to as being an extra
incentive for bureaucrats to work more diligently. Ebato Tetsuo's book is in this
category. It is a chatty volume covering four ministries: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Defence Agency, and
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MITI. Ebato has a degree in economics from Tokyo University, worked for Mitsui
Bank before taking leave to freelance as a writer.
Ebato's previously published works included books on the bureaucracy (Kasumisaseki
no Kyobo- Okurasho, Yuseisho, Keisatsusho, Gaimusho/Kasumisaseki's Ups and
Downs-the Ministry ofFinance, the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunication and the
18
Ministry ofForeign Affairs) and (Shosetsu Okurasho/The Ministry ofFinance, A
Novel)
Even though he pointed to the fact that MITI no longer was as powerful as it had been
during the first two decades after the war, Ebato's account of MITI is upbeat. He
explained that since 1987 other ministries were referring to MITI as "aggressive MITI"
because it pursued their jurisdictional territory. To illustrate he quoted an unidentified
kacho from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to illustrate how the other ministries viewed
MITI:
"They have vitality. But their fate demands that they must be extremely resourceful and pound out
new strategies or else they will have nothing to do. If they don't run around debating they will lose
their vitality. When we work together to cope with economic friction, they never back down from
dealing with complications but move to take countermeasures. There is no other ministry here that
does this and it is amazing." (p.218)
Another unidentified kacho from the Ministry of Transportation claimed that his
ministry had tangible sectors to deal with like taxis and trucks but MITI's world was
different:
"Those guys don't have anything to work with...They must pull out all the stops to pump up actual
needs for industry." (p. 219)
18 The national ministries are located in an area in Tokyo called Kasumigaseki
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Ebato admitted that the two kacho expressed some cynicism but they genuinely admired
the energy of MITI staff.
There were two extreme views held regarding MITI's current state in Japan, one by
Japanese and one by foreigners. A young MITI kacho told Ebato that the old guard
bureaucrats believed that MITI had been strong during the twenty-year rapid economic
growth period when there were many regulations with which to control industries but
now the ministry has no power and no budget. At the other end of the pole was the view
of some foreigners like Johnson who perceived MITI as "notorious MITI," a term used
to show MITI as the ministry was the chief guide of Japan's economy. The kacho felt
that the truth lay somewhere in between.
Ebato's description of "administrative guidance" was in terms of cooperation between
industry and MITI but that this instrument was no longer used as much as in the past.
He cited a kacho who explained that administrative guidance was a necessary evil. He
said that he met regularly with companies in the evenings to exchange information and
to hear their opinions. Ebato did not mention how amakudari functioned to facilitate the
implementation of "administrative guidance."
In his conclusion, Ebato quoted an unidentified friend, who was an officer in a ministry,
"Bureaucrats work for themselves not for their country." (p. 169) Ebato felt that his friend's
attitude was cynical. He compared bureaucrats with businessmen. Although
businessmen worked for promotion in their companies, their work also translated into
profits for their companies. Likewise, bureaucrats who worked hard to protect and
expand their ministry's territory profited as did their ministry and their countrymen.
Commentaries After 1992
After 1992 there were a number of books that contradicted Ebato's conclusions. In
particular, from 1992 onward books and articles, which called for political and
bureaucratic reforms, increased because of the sudden change in the political climate.
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The Liberal Democrats had ruled Japan continuously for thirty-eight years, supporting
the policies of the ministries. However, the recession and the acknowledged need for
action to ignite Japan's lagging economy triggered a struggle among the factions in the
Liberal Democratic Party for power resulting in some members exiting to create two off¬
shoots the New Japan Party (Shin Nihon)) and Sakigake, both of which have since been
dissolved. In 1993 Hosokawa Morihiro, former governor of Kita Kyushu, a member of
the LDP and the leader of the Shin Nihon, won the office of Prime Minister and raised
the hopes among Japanese that the government was going to take care of the recession
by releasing several fiscal stimulus packages. He resigned because of political scandal.
In June 1994 Murayama Tomichi, a Socialist, who ran on the Shin Nihon ticket, became
Prime Minister and formed a coalition Cabinet composed of members from the Shin
Nihon, LDP and Socialist parties. Politicians began to push for a review of bureaucratic
powers and to attempt reforms of the political system itself in order to end the
relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, bringing Japan into the
same league with the other developed economic powers. The result was a power
struggle between politicians and bureaucrats. The continuing recession frustrated
Murayama's efforts for structural reforms and eventually members of the Shin Nihon
Party returned either to the LDP or entered long- established opposition parties.
Although Hashimoto Ryutaro, leader of an LDP faction, succeeded Murayama as Prime
Minister and the LDP again dominated the Diet, the process for reform had begun and
the Japanese were no longer as reticent to express their assessment of bureaucrats and
politicians.
Secondly, although the ministries are very protective of operations and leaks on internal
political turmoil are rare, revelations on corruption in ministries and the dismissal in
April 1994 ofNaito Masahisa, an elite MITI official, who had been designated for the
position of Administrative Vice Minister in MITI, prompted a profound interest in the
internal operations and politics of the ministries and in elite bureaucrats.
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Nevertheless, Japanese academic research on Special Status Corporations is sparse
because scholars receive support for research projects primarily from government
funding. These fund are often distributed through Special Status Corporations or public
corporations, foundations and associations that are directly connected with Special
Status Corporations. Since research on Special Status Corporations would entail
investigation of ministerial conduct, academics are still reticent to engage in work that
would be considered politically sensitive.
Nowadays commentaries on the bureaucracy may also include commentaries on Special
Status Corporations and public corporations. In general, these commentaries are similar
in the portrayal of facts regarding ministerial objectives for establishing these
organizations and the use of these organizations. Some commentaries include public
surveys on the effectiveness of the civil service and such issues as amakudari in public
corporations and the continuation of the system.
Kanryo Kishimu Kyodai Kenryoku/The Bureaucracy A Creaking Giant Power
(Editorial StaffofNikkei Shimbun 1994 Nihonkeizai Shimbunsha)
The book is a compilation of a series of articles by the editorial staff of Nikkei Shimbun
that appeared on the front page of the newspaper earlier that year as well as interviews
that were conducted during the first half of 1994 with politicians and bureaucrats. The
book began with the words of a former MOF administrative vice-minister, whose words
characterized the way older elite bureaucrats saw their role in Japan's political economy:
"When you investigate the motivations of elite civil servants you are looking at their belief in
democracy." (p.i) The forward contended that young officials of MOF and MITI
understood that their ministries must change and that the relationship between the
bureaucracy and politicians must be made more transparent.
The book reviewed for readers the standard reasons why bureaucrats were more
influential in Japan's governing system than politicians. It was emphasized that most
Japanese did not believe in their politicians' abilities to plan effective legislation and that
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ihere was no real leadership in the Diet. This pointed to the fact that politicians were
subservient to the whims of special interest groups and that there was ongoing friction
between political factions. Also, since bureaucrats had been given the power to draft
laws since the Meiji Period, politicians did not have the background and expertise to
plan effective policies.
The book looked at the relationship between the bureaucracy and the Diet and the power
of the bureaucracy. It related the continued struggle by the ministries to retain power,
illustrated by interviews with politicians and elite bureaucrats. Ironically, some of the
elite bureaucrats who had postretirement positions in Special Status Corporations
regarded amakudari as a system that would be difficult to eliminate. For example, there
is an interview with a former vice minister in the Ministry of Construction, Takahashi
Susumu, who retired in 1990 and became the managing director of the Home Finance
Corporation, managed by his ministry.19 (pp 245-246) Takahashi stated that the
relationship between politicians and the construction industry was a very tight.
Questioned about connections between the construction industry and his ministry and
amakudari, he admitted reluctantly that there was indeed a relationship between
ministries and industry. However, he emphasized that to deny bureaucrats
postretirement positions in industry was unrealistic because bureaucrats had to retire
earlier then corporate executives and they had to continue to earn income. Nevertheless,
he was disturbed that OBs received civil service benefits while they were earning
incomes in postretirement position. He felt that positions in Special Status Corporations
and other public corporations was limited. Takahashi did not go so far as to suggest that
the amakudari system be abolished on the condition that elite bureaucrats are
compensated with wages that are similar to corporate executives possibly because
amakudari also plays an important role in bureaucratic controls over industrial sectors.
19 In 1984 when he was an officer in his ministry, he established the Association for Vision in the
Construction Industry, an association managed by the Ministry of Construction He is now chief
economist at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd.
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There is an interview with Naito Masahisa, the MITI official who had been dismissed a
few months earlier, (pp. 251-254) It was only the second time in MITI's history that an
officer had been fired (the first time was in 1952). Before his dismissal from MITI,
Naito was the Director-General of the Industrial Policy Bureau and next in line for
Administrative Vice-Minister. Kumagai Hiroshi, the Minister of Commerce, Trade and
Industry in Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's cabinet, who demanded Naito's
dismissal, was himself a MITI officer until he resigned in 1976 (Director General of
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency) to run for political office on the LDP ticket,
winning a seat in the Upper House of the National Diet. He later defected in the early
1990s with other LDP members led by Hosokawa to form the now defunct Shin Nihon
New Party of Japan. He is currently Secretary of a major opposition party, the
Democratic Party of Japan whose platform concerning Special Status Corporations is
cited in chapter 5, p. 167. The reason given for Naito's dismissal was that he had
created a position in MITI for his friend's son in order to round out his resume so that he
could run for a seat in the Diet of his home prefecture on the LDP ticket against a New
Party candidate. Naito's friend was Tanabashi Yuji, former MITI administrative vice-
minister (retired 1991),21 and who was Naito's partner at the semi-conductor
negotiations with the United States Trade Representatives in Washington, D.C.
The account ofNaito's dismissal as reported in Shindoromu Kasumisaseki/The
Kasumigaseki Syndrome (reviewed below) states that Kumagai, in keeping with the
platform of the New Party, wanted to reform the ministries. When Naito asked when he
should resign, Kumagai allegedly replied, " This month or next month. The process has
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already begun." (1994 p. 46) Kumano Hideaki, the administrative vice-minister, who
was responsible for dealing with the dismissal of personnel, pleaded with Naito to resign
quietly but Naito refused. Kumano had no choice but to fire him. Kumano offered his
20 See chapter 7 for excerpt of Naito's speech Naito was posted at JETRO New York in the mid-1980s
21 Tanabashi Yuji is referred to in chapter 6 "Amakudari and shukko in Research Institutes"
22
It must be emphasized here that Kumagai and Naito had been enemies at MITI and that Kumagai's
motivations for demanding Naito's dismissal could be perceived as being politically motivated.
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own resignation and left MITI the following June. Naito later was reinstated in M1TI in
June as a 'special advisor." The Nikkei book covers in detail Naito's dismissal,
revealing turmoil among MITI personnel (pp. 38-45) and a power struggle between
politicians and bureaucrats.
Even though Naito was reinstated he still had to contend with other accusations from his
colleagues. According to the March 1996 issues of Sentaku March 1996, a suspicious
document was circulated around MITI questioning how Naito financed a restaurant
business that his wife was operating in Karuizawa. (p 47)
In his interview with Nikkei Naito stated that although bureaucrats were servants of their
country, after spending some time at Kasumigaski, they regrettably became isolated
from society and forgot their mission. He asserted that bureaucrats operated
independently from politicians. When asked if he thought that politicians and
bureaucrats could work together at Kasumigaseki, Naito answered that there would be
the danger of conflict of powers but if politicians planned strategies and bureaucrats did
the actual legwork, it might be feasible. Naito was implying that administrators knew
more about industry and economics than politicians.
He denied that the many rules and regulations served to control industry but that most of
the regulations were related to ensuring industrial safety. He contended that trust
between bureaucrats and private businesses was the way policy was implemented rather
than by regulation.
There is an interview with Kumano Hisashi who was Administrative Vice Minister in
MITI at the time of the Naito incident 1994 and who was charged with the responsibility
of dismissing Naito. As mentioned above, Kumano resigned from MITI a few months
later. His interview was conducted before he resigned, (p.270)
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Kumano opposed the downsizing of MITI and he denied the interviewer's suggestions
that MITI was going after MOF's territory because MITI was executing duties that
usually fall under MOF's jurisdiction and also was monitoring MOF. The interviewer
called MITI the number two Ministry of Finance (dainiji okurasho). Since MITI's new
name is Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade, the interviewer's questions were a
prophecy of the ministry's additional role.
The book carries the results of a public survey that was conducted by Nikkei Shimbun in
1993 regarding how Japanese regarded their bureaucracy and civil servants. Their
responses (pp. 421-424) reflected their reaction to recent disclosures of scandals in the
ministries. Their image of bureaucrats was: 1) they had a strong elitist mentality, 2) they
were irresponsible, 3) they were shrewd, 4) 22% answered that bureaucrats were cold
and uncaring, 5) 3% felt that bureaucrats should be entrusted to administrate
independently, 6) 70% felt that bureaucrats and politicians should join forces to make
policy.
However, the survey also revealed that despite their negativity regarding bureaucrats the
Japanese still relied on elite bureaucrats for administering their economy. 42% answered
that politicians were unable to take responsibility for planning policy. Although 70% of
people surveyed felt that the ministries should consolidate operations thus downsizing
the bureaucracy, 44% would permit their children to have careers in the ministries.
Although 50% felt that amakudari was not necessary, 43% answered that the system
allowed an exchange of information between businesses and government. In addition,
when asked whether the bureaucracy would weaken during the Murayama
Administration 60% answered a flat "no." In fact, 22% felt that the bureaucracy would
become stronger.
Kasumisaseki Shindorumu/ The Kasumisaseki Syndrome (Editorial StaffofMainichi
Shmbun 1994 Mainichi Shimbunsha)
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The editorial staff of Mainichi Shimbun also entered the fray with a book that focused
more on amakudari in both private and public corporations. It is a surprisingly frank
account of the deterioration of values among bureaucrats in terms of establishing public
corporations and research institutes for the sole purposes of providing postretirement
positions for retirees. There are accounts of ministries placing conservative elite retirees
into management positions in private and public corporations in order to maintain
control over their respective sectors. There are chapters on Special Status Corporations
and how ministries used them to distribute funds to companies for such things as
contracts for infrastructure work (Ministry of Construction) and how amakudari not only
facilitated the tie-up between ministries and companies but, also, facilitated a connection
between businesses and ex-bureaucrats who first migrated to Special Status
Corporations before moving on to positions in the private sector.
The book's most significant contribution to Japanese readers was the reporting on how
amakudari and the temporary posting of elite bureaucrats in Special Status Corporations
in the prefectures (haku-tsuke) served as a means to monitor local government policy.
The bureaucratic hierarchy places central ministry officers above local government
officers, forcing an automatic acquiescence by local government officers to central
government administration. There was also criticism of the temporary posting of
bureaucrats in local governments because often the positions became permanent.
The book looked at amakudari to political office especially the tendency of ex-
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Home Affairs to run for the offices of governor and
vice-governor in the prefectures.
Mainichi Shimbun also conducted a public survey similar to the Nikkei in 1994. Again,
as was the case of the survey conducted by Nikkei Shimbun the responses reflected
negative reactions to the scandals in the ministries, (pp. 296- 308) Although 77% of the
people questioned credited bureaucrats with Japan's rapid economic growth, 41%
regarded bureaucrats in the 1990s as greedy for power, 29% believed that bureaucrats
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craved promotions, and 22% thought that civil servants were greedy for money. 31%
answered that bureaucrats worked for the benefit of their ministries while only 18% felt
that bureaucrats worked for the benefit of their respective industrial sectors. A mere 7%
felt that bureaucrats were industrious and only 3% considered bureaucrats to be sincere
and honest.
Regarding amakudari, 60% of people tallied wanted to abolish the system while 12%
wanted to maintain the system. 38% wanted to abolish amakudari in political office and
43% polled wanted companies that hired ex-bureaucrat subjected to strict conditions.
Interestingly perhaps because of the strong push by politicians to grab power from
bureaucrats and because of the negative press on ministries in 1993 and 1994, 49% of
the people polled answered that politicians were more powerful than bureaucrats and
that politicians should be the decision makers in government.
Kyodai Shocho AmakudariFuhaiHakusholWhite Paper on Corruption Amakudari in
the Great Ministries (2000 Kodansha)
As Japan's economy continued to stagnate the books that revealed ministerial use of
Special Status Corporations and public corporations for postretirement positions took on
a harder line. Tsutsumi Kazuma, who is the second in command at the Coalition of
Labour Unions for Special Status Corporations, was in the perfect position to scrutinize
not only how Special Status Corporations and public corporations served the ministries
for amakudari but, also, how many other state-run organizations that had not been
designated for reform by government served the purpose of amakudari as well. His
book detailed the routes that elite bureaucrats take after leaving their ministries,
concentrating on Special Status Corporations and publicly funded organizations. He
charted the postretirement careers of bureaucrats from all of the ministries showing
clearly that elite bureaucrats can first migrate to Special Status Corporations or other
state-run institutions while still officially on-salary at their ministry before moving on to
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the private sector. Some of the bureaucrats surveyed remained as employees at Special
Status Corporations or other government funded organizations.
Besides the charts and the insider information on how ministries establish corporations,
Tsutsumi's most significant contribution is the evidence that ministries use their
industrial associations and other institutes for amakudari. He totalled MITI's
9-7
organizations at almost 900. (p. 140)
On November 13, 2000, Iwanami Booklet No. 425 carried an interview of Tsutsumi
titled "Kanryo Amakudari Hakusho" ("White Paper on Amakudari in the Bureaucracy").
In the interview, which was conducted by Yamaguchi Jiro, Tsustumi presented a new
proposal for the elimination of amakudari which he called "a hotbed of graft and
corruption." The proposal called for the elimination of early retirement for bureaucrats,
setting a fixed retirement age. Tsutsumi wanted amakudari to profit-making enterprises
halted and for dissolution of all Special Status Corporations, public corporations and
industrial associations. In addition, there would be no amakudari by elite bureaucrats to
Special Status Corporations and bureaucrats would be required to wait from three to five
years after retirement before running for political office. Tsutsumi wanted the career
paths of bureaucrats equalized so that there would be no further discrepancy between
career and non-career officers.
Nilton wo Kuitsuku KiseichuTokushu Hojin, Koeki Hojin wo Zenhaiseyo! / The
Parasite That Will Consume Japan Let's Abolish All Special Status Corporations and
Public Corporations! (2001 Michisha)
Iishi Koki is the vice chairman of the Tokyo branch of the Democratic Party of Japan
(Minshuto), an opposition party. Iishi won a seat in the House of Representatives three
times. Among the positions he has held is the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for the
Management and Coordination Agency (soumucho).
2j See chapter six, p. 178
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Iishi has written books on corruption in the ministries. His book Bureaucrat Heaven The
Bankrupting of Japan (1999 Michisha), is about amakudari. Although his book on
Special Status Corporations would appear to be an effort on behalf of his party to press
government to implement structural reforms in the public sector, his report is balanced
and poses pertinent questions regarding the rapid escalation of the number of public
corporations that are established by Special Status Corporations and by government
agencies as well as the employment opportunities for ex-bureaucrats in these
organizations, (p.80) In his introduction Iishi claims that Prime Minister Koizumi is
approaching reforms in the wrong sequence and that structural reforms will not progress
until Special Status Corporations and public corporations, institutions, used for
amakudari and using public funds and tax revenue have been eliminated, (p.5) He
claims that there are 8,059 public corporations and that 8,000 of these receive a total of
well over 1 trillion yen in support from central and local governments, making them
"dishes for money trusts." 21,072 civil servants work in managerial positions in these
corporations. Iishi also maintains that 1, 850 public corporations have subsidiaries and
that these organizations numbered over 7,000. (pp. 80-81)
Iishi calls the subsidiaries of Special Status Corporations "family enterprises." (p.26) He
points to MITI's Special Status Corporations as a breeder of "family enterprises." For
example, the World Economic Information Service is a JETRO "family enterprise,"
employing nineteen staff. Since JETRO staff research economic conditions out of its
eighty overseas offices and release information regarding this research, this "family
enterprise" would seem to be extraneous.
Another MITI Special Status Corporation, the Corporation for the Development of
Electricity has as its "family corporation" the Corporation for Electricity Generating




The commentaries written about the bureaucracy before 1992 were more positive than
commentaries written after 1992. Prior to Japan's economic crisis the majority of
Japanese preferred to ignore such issues as amakudari and the establishment of Special
Status Corporations and public corporations because they generally believed that their
bureaucrats were impervious to failure and abuse of the amakudari system and preferred
to avoid looking at the problem of Special Status and public corporations and the fact
that they served to provide postretirement positions and to extend ministerial power over
industry and local governments. Since bureaucrats had planned Japan's rapid economic
recovery by 1965, had helped industry through two Oil Shocks and a recession in the
1970s, they believed that their elite bureaucrats were beyond reproach, relying entirely
on their administration.
However, from 1992 onward the stagnation of Japan's economy coupled with the
revelation of collusion between the construction industry and the Ministry of
Construction, the banking industry and the Ministry of Finance and the misuse of funds
by Special Status Corporations triggered political movement to initiate reforms in the
private and public sectors (e.g. stated-run banks, Special Status and public corporations).
Both Tsutsumi Kazuma and Iishi Koki pointed out that M1TI (after the Ministry of
Education) has the second highest number of publicly funded organizations at 900. The
fact that Japan's ministries have been able to continue using their Special Status
Corporations for controlling local policies and for postretirement positions despite
public disproval illustrates not only the extent of power of the bureaucracy but the
continued deference of the Japanese to the bureaucracy.
The Western and the Japanese commentators believed that the bureaucracy is the
strongest force in Japan's governing system. The following chapter traces the history of
the modern bureaucracy and the modern governing system and some of the factors in
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THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN'S SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM
Introduction
The chapter discusses the power of the bureaucracy and the attitudes of bureaucrats from
an historical perspective. It examines some of the factors within the Japanese socio¬
political system that have given the bureaucracy the power to continue operating Special
Status Corporations and other public corporations as well as perpetuate the amakudari
system in these corporations. Two case studies of workplaces in a large Japanese
corporation and in an overseas branch of a Special Status Corporation are given to
illustrate those factors.
Defining Japan's Governing System
Political science tends to look at a democratic government in terms of a distinct division
of power between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary branches. The
legislature makes laws, the executive implements the laws and the judiciary ensures that
the laws are implemented and abided by correctly.
To Western observers the source of power in the Japanese governing system can seem
nebulous, particularly because Japan's post-war system hinges on an American-style
constitution that was initiated by the Occupation Forces and a parliamentary system that
resembles the United Kingdom's.
The Japanese themselves describe their government as a "ruling triad" of politicians,
bureaucrats and big business (sei kan zai). (Kawamura 1,1994, p.iv) Murakami Hyoe and
Johannes Hirscheiemer state: "the country's power elite is a triad of conservative politicians,
leading businessmen, and high-ranking bureaucrats." (1979 p.80) These institutions are
bound together by elements inherent in the Japanese socio political system and this will
be discussed in the fifth chapter.
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Chapter 3 discussed the Japanese government's efforts to restructure the ministries for
the purpose of producing a more efficient system. This effort is also intended to give the
prime minister's office more executive powers. It is still too early to predict how it will
affect the source of power in government.
Johnson defines the governing system as:
"the concrete hegemony of a covert elite working within a formal system of legality and popular
sovereignty." (1995 p. 48).
The Japanese populace in general still support the methods of governing by the elite.
Kawamura feels that the Japanese people do not have any significant influence in policy
decisions and that the missing word in the ruling equation is "the people" (kokumin),
(1994, p. iv) The Japanese remain relatively isolated from politics and prefer not to
discuss political issues openly.
Taking into consideration the above definitions it can be said that Japan's post-war
socio-political system is characterized as a bureaucracy that has strong ties to business
and to a single political party that has dominated the Diet since 1955. The system is not
entirely a product of post-war Japan. The seeds of the modern bureaucracy were sown
after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the end of feudal rule by a military regime. The
ties with big business can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century when
government, with the support of the large family-owned combines converted a
technologically backward nation into an industrialized economy to rival the already
industrialized western powers by 1928.
The Meiji Restoration, the Birth of the Modern Bureaucracy and the Roots
of the "Ruling Triad"
Suzuta Atsuyuki believed
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"The warped psychology of the bureaucrat calls to mind Bushido, the way of the warrior. As
illustrated by the old saw that 'the samurai betrays no weakness even when starving,' true devotion
to one's lord is defined as the ability to endure. Devotion to one's lord is akin to love, and the
endurance expected of a loyal samurai is similar to that of a burning love that goes unspoken unto
death. This is an ideal that the average person would find it most difficult to comprehend, yet it is
this abstruse Bushido that was the ruling code of the samurai society. The elite think differently
from the common people, they make their own rules, and they constitute a special order of their
own. Although the warrior class and Bushido were officially abolished shortly after the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, Bushido lives on in the spiritual heirs within the bureaucracy." (Suzuta A.,
1981, p. 197)
Suzuta, whose article originally was published in 1975 (reprinted in 1981 Inside the
Japanese System edited by Okimoto and Rohlen), was referring to the bureaucrats who
were working to restore Japan's war-devastated economy. Many of them had been
bureaucrats during the war and devoted themselves to their mission of engineering
Japan's economic recovery. For them it was not only a matter of restoring Japan's
economy but, also, national pride as well.
Their attitudes are not as apparent in today's bureaucrats because the younger officers
have had the opportunity to study and work in Western societies and this exposure has
given them a different attitude regarding their duties. They are as diligent but they view
life from a wider perspective. However, Murakami Ichiro who wrote his book in 1994
agreed with Suzuta that the elite abide by their own set of values.
Prior to the fourth century Japan was made up of small independent states that were
gradually unified and ruled by an aristocracy based in Yamato (today's Nara Prefecture).
The current imperial family's lineage can be traced to these rulers. (Biso and Abe p.2) .
Chinese Buddhist monks travelled to Japan to establish large monasteries in the seventh
and eighth centuries. They brought with them the Chinese written language, transmitted
through Buddhist scriptures, which became the base of the Japanese written language.
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The concepts of Confucianism and Buddhism, also imports from China, shaped the
governing system. (Totman, C. 1981, p.21)
Japan's aristocratic bureaucracy began in the seventh century when the imperial family
gave responsibility of administration of government to members of the aristocracy. In
603 Empress Suiko defined the Twelve Official Ranks for administrators and in 604, her
nephew Prince Shotoku set the Seventeen Article Constitution, which indicated the
desirable mental attitude of national bureaucrats. The Imperial Family came to rely
upon several clans to protect their lands from marauders thus nurturing a new breed of
soldier-retainer.
The beginning of a military regime (bakufu) was marked by the Kamakura Period (1192-
1333). (Biso and Watanabe p. 8) The emperor appointed a general (shogun) from his
army to serve as second-in-command and granted him the power to name his own
vassals to protect the provinces and to administrate his lands. These administrator-
soldiers were known as Samurai. Biso Masahide and Watanabe Akio write that the
appointment of a general led to the formation of a feudal political system:
"At the same time, government officials were still appointed by the imperial court and the
administrators of private estates by owners. Thus, the political structure of the Kamakura period
was dualistic—imperial court and shogunate existing independently. " (Biso and Watanabe p. 8)
The emperor lived in Kyoto while the shogun and his descendents lived in Kamakura.
During their administration, Kamakura became the Mecca for Zen Buddhism and
samurai joined monks to meditate and study the Buddhist scriptures in large monasteries
as a part of their military training.
An attempt by the imperial army to topple the shogunate brought the end of the
Kamakura Period. The last shogun's administration was corrupt1 and his men indolent,
1 The last shogun bred Pug dogs in elaborate kennels, owning more than one thousand animals.
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paving the way for their defeat by the imperial army at the famous battle on the beach of
Inamuragasaki. Raging civil war ensued and the "Age of the Warring States" saw the
collapse of the old state order and the growing power of the samurai class.
Two lords, referred to as daiymyo, brought peace to Japan by unifying the country under
one authority by 1590. The Tokugawa Period, named after the two daimyo, marked two
hundred and sixty-four years of political stability, preserved by military rule. The
modern-day banking system was a product of this period, which W.G. Beasley described
as:
"an embryo of capitalism, which was the prerequisite of Western-style industrial growth. It shaped
in a definitive form the national tradition of culture and ideas, on which subsequent generations
were to depend, or from which they were to detach themselves." (Beasley W.G. 1990, p.2)
During the Tokugawa Period (bakufu), the social order was rigid with samurai at the top
of the social pyramid, followed by farmers, artisans and merchants. (Stockwin J.A.A
1975, p. 13). The samurai, who had been serving their lords as soldiers during times of
strife and as farmers during the intervals of peace, gradually became more involved in
the governing process. Stockwin writes:
"In every castle-town there was a multitude of posts to be filled from the making of policy to the
administration of a rural district, from supervision of finance and archives to service as attendants
and messengers. All were filled by samurai, in most cases, samurai of a specific rank." (p. 13)
Some of the progeny of these samurai officials formed the Meiji Restoration
government.
The Tokugawa regime resorted to taking some extraordinary measures in order to ensure
political stability and control over their unified nation. Portuguese and Spanish Jesuit
and Franciscan missionaries, who had been sent to Japan to convert the Japanese to
Christianity, were expelled for corrupting Japanese values. Christianity was banned and
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Japanese Christians were persecuted. The shogun also feared that a foreign military
would join forces with Japanese dissidents and challenge the Tokugawa government.
For two hundred and fifty years Japan was closed to foreigners and, with the exception
of a few port cities, to foreign commerce as well.
When the American Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived unannounced at the port of
Uraga in 1853, demanding on behalf of his president that the Shogun open his country to
foreign trade, the Japanese were taken completely by surprise. The xenophobic policies
of the military regime had isolated the populace from contact with foreigners and until
Perry's sudden appearance with his "black ships" the Japanese had assumed that they
were impervious to invasion. The Shogunate, recognizing that Japan was unable to
defend itself against a Western military power, signed a trade agreement the following
year. Other trade agreements with Great Britain, France and Russia were signed within
a few years.
By the time of Perry's visit, Japan was already experiencing political unrest. After the
American ambassador to Japan set foot on Japanese soil, followed by diplomats from
Great Britain and France in 1857, ten years of turmoil ensued. The realization that the
military regime was unprepared to deal with foreign aggression coupled with the
trepidation of being occupied by a western country (as its neighbour China) was the
decisive factor in the overthrow of the shogun and in bringing the end of feudalism and
the beginning of land reform. Aristocrats together with samurai engineered the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, restoring the Imperial Family as constitutional monarchs, forming a
cabinet in 1885, writing a constitution in 1889 that resembled Prussia's and establishing
a parliament with a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The titular head of
the government was an aristocrat but the most influential members were samurai from
the clans in western Japan. Among the leaders were Saigo Takamori, Okuma Shigenobu
and Okubo Toshimichi. (Storey R. 1965, p.164) Okubo and his colleagues were keenly
aware that compared to the Western industrialized nations, Japan was conspicuously
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behind in most technologies. If the Japanese were to protect their own interests, they
would have to become as powerful economically and militarily as the West.
The cabinet formed agencies to implement land reform and to guide the Japanese
through the process of bringing their country into the twentieth century as a fully
industrialized country. Okubo, who became the head of the Home Office, Japan's first
ministry to be established and which oversaw land reform, is credited by many Japanese
for giving the bureaucracy extraordinary powers. The ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Finance, Army-Navy, Justice, Education and Agriculture and Commerce were also
established. Central government kept a tight control over the provinces, which as W.G.
Beasley writes:
"...became part of a bureaucracy, which depended upon national not local connections, and drew
its personnel from a variety of sources; former samurai officials of domains and Tokugawa estates."
(1990, p. 66)
B.C. Koh described the civil service as part of the "ruling elite in pre-war Japan." He
credits the constitution for providing the bureaucracy with its powers and prestige.
"Article 10 of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 stipulated 'the emperor determines the organization of
the different branches of the administration and salaries of all civil and military officers...The
positions of the bureaucracy vis-si-vis political parties and the Imperial Diet was bolstered by the
constitution and practice alike." (Koh B.C., 1989, p. 14)
The Japanese regarded the elite class of civil servant in the same way they related to the
Shogun—with a mixture of awe, respect and trepidation. The source of power of elite
civil servants can be traced to this time.
Business, the Bureaucracy and The Industrialisation of Japan: 1890-1914
The government could be described as pluralistic because powers were dispersed among
the various administrating bodies so that the office of prime minister did have substantial
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executive powers. Muramatsu Michio explains that the government was formed from:
"...among numerous clan oligarchs and the genro and was pluralistic to some degree. But in the
period was shared among the various elites." (Muramatsu M.,1993, p.54)
The slogan of the Meiji Era was: "Prosperous Country, Strong Military" John Sager
writes that the primary purpose of government policy was: "the promotion of Japan's
economic interests." (2000)
The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (MAC) was a major player in guiding
industrial development. To achieve government's objectives, the ministries together
with the family-owned-combines (henceforth referred to as zaibatsu) imported
technologies from the western industrialized nations such as Germany, America and the
United Kingdom. Technical support was imported as well and Japanese were sent
abroad to study engineering, mining, commerce and agriculture. (W.G. Beasley,1990)
Zaibatsu ("wealthy cliques") such as Sumitomo and Mitsui were merchants during the
Tokugawa Period. Sumitomo began in copper mining while Mitsui engaged in banking
and retailing. Others such as Mitsubishi began during the Meiji Period, engaging in
foreign commerce, shipbuilding and heavy industries. The zaibatsu cooperated closely
with government in the industrial development of Japan with large capital investments.
MAC managed the construction of the first hydropower station in 1907 that was built by
the Tokyo Electric Light Co. MAC also oversaw the construction of subsequent power
stations. The new supply of electricity increased factory output, while encouraging new
business start-ups. There were many small and medium-sized businesses in operation
during the Meiji Period but the industrial combines, the zaibatu were in an entirely
different league.
The early Meiji economy was supported by rice farming and other industries such as
cotton and silk yarn spinning and tool making. The first industry to undergo rapid
development was textiles. Large companies concentrated on cotton yarn production so
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that by 1897, exports overtook imports and Japan became completely self-sufficient in
cotton material, driving Indian Bombay cotton out of the Japanese market. By 1905
large inventories of fine cotton yarn were being produced and by 1907 large companies
had joined forces to form textile oligopolies, driving British yarn from the domestic
market. (Tsukamoto T.,1996 p.44)
The government managed and regulated the development of the machinery, shipbuilding
and heavy industries. The musket and cannon arsenals built by the feudal lords during
the Tokugawa Period were banned by the Meiji government, which took over the iron
mills in Nagasaki and Yokusuka. The arsenal workers were transferred to the
government-operated mills and retrained by foreign engineers in machinery making and
shipbuilding. Although there were a number of foreign technicians working for the
bakufu before 1868, after the Meiji Restoration, there was an influx of Americans,
Germans, British, French and Dutch, who were hired by government to serve as railroad
and marine engineers, pilots, financial and legal consultants, university professors and
lower school teachers, military instructors and agricultural experts. (Storey R., 1965 p
103)
Mass production of steel commenced at the Osaka Armory in 1890 after the installation
of Japan's first open-hearth furnace. In 1894, Japan managed to produce only 1000 tons
of steel and had to rely on imports that reached 90,000 tons. The state built a steel mill
in order to accelerate production and the steel corporation, Yawata Company, was
established. Tsukamoto Takeshi writes:
"In subsequent years, major steel makers were established one after the other: Sumitomo Steel
Company (maker of rails and railway coach wheels) in 1901. Kobe Shell Co. in 1905, the steel
division of Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co. and Nippon Steel Pipe Co. in 1912." (1996 p.45)
By 1914 through the use of the open-hearth furnace, the new steel companies succeeded
in producing for domestic use 44% of rolled steel and 64% of pig iron.
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Business, the Bureaucracy and the Industrialisation of Japan 1914-1928
The Emperor Meiji died in 1914. The Taisho Period (1914-1926) saw great advances in
the smoke stack industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding. Japan did not enter
World War I and, indeed, benefited economically through the exports of ships, coal and
steel to the Western powers.
The confectionery industry also saw profits from the War. Until the outbreak of the war,
biscuits and other Western confections had been imported from Europe and the UK to
satisfy foreign demand but the war effectively stopped imports because sugar and flour
were consigned for military supplies. Japanese fledgling domestic producers began to
produce similar products to meet the demands not only of foreign consumers but, also, a
growing number of Japanese consumers. (Carpenter S. October 1993 p 5)
The end of the war in 1918 marked a rapid decrease in ship exports. There was a surplus
of ships and depressed ship prices. As orders declined Japan slipped to a ranking of
ninth place among shipbuilding nations. (Tsukamoto T. 1997, p.49)
Reacting to the recessive market, shipbuilders developed a diesel engine to make their
ships more efficient and diversified into general machinery, aircraft and automobiles.
The Ishikawajima Shipbuilding Co.'s automobile division became Izuzu Motors Co.
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. developed into Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. and
Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co. became Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co.
Not only did shipbuilding suffer a recession but, also, the entire Japanese economy fell
into recession in 1925. These events promted a split-up of MAC into two separate
agencies, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MCI). The recession continued, triggering the Panic of 1927 causing MCI to
form the Commerce and Industry Deliberation Council, an organization made up of
private industry and in cooperation with the council. MCI planned policy to protect
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industry from the effects of the depression. In his book Trading Places Clyde V.
Prestowitz, Jr described the function of the council.
"This forerunner of today's Industrial Structure Council introduced the concept of 'industrial
rationalization' which has become the backbone of Japanese industrial policy." (1988, p.229)
Regardless of the recession, Japan received worldwide recognition as an industrialized
nation in 1928. MCI expanded its control over industries and the economy, writing laws
that allowed MCI to form cartels. The laws were passed by a cooperative Diet.
Prestowitz claims that the laws laid the foundation for the future policy instrument
"administrative guidance." (Prestowitz C,1988, p.229)
The advent of World War II brought new powers to MCI and a closer relationship with
the zaibatsu. The industrial combines produced the armaments as well as most military
supplies and MCI organized and controlled the manufacturing of munitions, undergoing
a change of name in 1942 to the Ministry of Munitions. The ministry regulated industry
as a whole and since the zaibatsu were engaged in all types of manufacturing, and in the
financial sector as well, a close partnership was the inevitable result of the all-out-effort
to win the war in the Pacific. In 1944 the "System of Financial Institutions Authorized
to Finance Munitions Companies" was established. This bill gave government the
power to choose banks to fund munitions manufacturers so that there would be a steady
supply of munitions. Government banking institutions funded the private banks.
Nakamura Takafusa claims that MITI's post-war powers can be traced to these times:
"Japan's bureaucratic structure was so contrived that other financial institutions as well as the
Bank of Japan and the government, were to back the authorized institutions so that they would not
run short of funds. In the post-war reconstruction these relationships were to reappear and become
entrenched in the form of the powerful financial groups known as keiretsu(1977 p.l 8)
In other words, Japan's monetary and industrial policies would continue to be controlled
by a central authority.
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Japan's Post-war Ruling Triad: The Liberal Democratic Party (sei), the
Bureaucracy (kan), and Big Business (zai)
The period of 1945 to 1952 in Japan is commonly referred to as the Allied Occupation.
The occupying countries were the United States, Great Britain and Australia. However,
both Great Britain and Australian sent only a small number of military while the United
States armed forces led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP) commandeered the Occupation. The objectives of the
Occupation were three-fold: Japan's demilitarisation and democratisation, the purging of
war criminals, and Japan's economic resuscitation. (Dower J., 1999, p.28) SCAP issued
orders for the composition of a more liberal constitution that would include the right of
women to vote, the right for labour unions to organize, the liberalization of education
and so forth. The Communist and Socialist Parties were also allowed to organize, having
been banished during the War,
The majority of Japanese did not feel that these reforms were being imposed upon them.
On the contrary, MacArthur and the American military, the distributors of food rations
to millions of starving Japanese, were considered angels of mercy. The Occupation was
scheduled to end by 1948 with a democratic and liberal governing system set in place
but the Communist-backed labour union strikes in 1947 and 1948, Communist
demonstrations and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the beginning
of the Korean War in 1950 made the United States reverse some of the reforms. The
United States needed a strong conservative ally in the Pacific. The San Francisco Peace
Treaty signed in October 1950 formalized the alliance. Communist sympathizers were
purged and the United States backed a conservative coalition party in the Diet. The
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the result of this policy, coming to power in 1955.
The Liberal Democratic Party
J.A.A. Stockwin states that the LDP was formed out of a number of other conservative
parties:
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"It is common to regard this as a turning point marking the establishment of what is often been
called Japan's '1955 political system,' which survived until the LDP lost office in August 1993."
(1999 pi 05)
The Japanese electorate returned the LDP to power in 1996.
The LDP consistently supported MITI's industrial policies so that bureaucrats had the
independence to implement the policies. Daniel I. Okimoto contends that:
2"For certain bureaucracies like MITI, the LDP-bureaucratic alliance had made it possible to retain
an extraordinary degree of autonomy and insulation from partisan politics." (Okimoto D., 1988,
p.316)
There are several key reasons for this unwavering support, both related to the human
network of bureaucrats throughout Japan's socio-political system..2 One reason is that
ex-bureaucrats will seek political office on the LDP ticket both in the National Diet and
in local governments. (This is related to the amakudari system and will be discussed in
chapter 6). The second reason is that the LDP receives substantial support from special
interest groups that are represented by ministries vis-a-vis associations and agencies.
For example, MITI oversees the small and medium-sized business sector, which
constitutes 99% of all business activity in Japan and employs 78% of the work force.
Okimoto points to the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, which is under MITI
management, (p.324)
Okimoto describes the LDP as being pro-business and consistent in its support for
economic growth:
2. See Chapter 2 Part I Karel van Wolferen's Enigma of Power
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"Japanese firms have had the luxury—experienced almost nowhere else—in operating in a highly
predictable and favorable business environment." (Okimoto D., 1986, p. 47)
Big business and business federations make large contributions to the LDP campaign
coffers. The LDP gets votes and large donations from traditional support groups such as
small local businesses and businesses that engage in construction, transportation and
telecommunications in exchange for contracts for public works projects. A recent
example of this kind of "pork-barrel patronage," as Okimoto terms it, (p. 47) is the
allotment of the stimulus packages released since 1992. The first stimulus package
released by government in August 1992 was described in the September issue of the
New York JETRO publication Inside/Outside Japan.
"The main components of the $86 billion economic aid program that the Japanese government
announced on August 28 are $69 billion for public works, and 17 billion for small business and
capital investment. The government expects the package to push up economic growth by 2.4
percent in the coming year."3
The money from fiscal packages is distributed through Special Status Corporations,
which, in turn, dole it out through contraction contracts to out local businesses. This is
discussed further in chapter 5.
The Bureaucracy
Johnson feels that Japan's post-war bureaucracy was merely a continuation of the pre¬
war bureaucracy because the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP), in an
effort to promote a speedy economic recovery reinstated many of the pre-war civil
servants to manage the recovery:
"Japan's bureaucratic structure was one aspect of Japanese life that Douglas MacArthur failed to
reform. Instead of chopping away at the base of the bureaucratic pyramid, he simply chopped off
3 The GDP for 1993 was 1.3%, much less than government had anticipated
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the apex, by purging key wartime Government officials. In due course, the pyramid grew a new
apex, by renewing a dismembered limb and the bureaucracy continues unchanging from the prewar
days." (1994, p. 120)
The United States, reacting to a perceived threat to Communist expansion in East Asia,
needed a strong ally in the Pacific where it could base its military forces and hardware.
John Dower explains that the Occupation Forces did not speak the Japanese language
and, therefore, could not understand Japan's social system well enough to operate
independently. SCAP was forced to:
"... govern indirectly through existing organs of government. This was unavoidable. For all
practical purposes, General MacArthur's supergovernment relied on the Japanese bureaucracy to
carry out its directives, creating in effect a two-tiered mandarinate. When the Americans departed,
the native mandarins carried on, stronger than they had ever been during the war." (1999, p.27)
Dower agrees with Johnson that there was no essential reform of the bureaucracy:
"When Cold War considerations took over and the 'reverse course' in occupation policy was
launched, it was the Americans who promoted the administrative 'rationalization' that resulted in
the even greater concentration of bureaucratic authority. The creation of the powerful Ministry of
International Trade and Industry three years before the occupation ended was the most visible
example of this." (p. 560)
However, Yonekura Seiichiro claims that Johnson used the continuity of staff in the
post-war bureaucracy to promote his theory that the wartime economic system prevailed
after the war. He suggests that the continuity was not so much in the economic system
but in the continuity of the experiences of the bureaucrats who managed industry during
the war and who then were reinstated after the war. (1999 p. 194)
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Yonekura gives a number of examples that reveal this continuity of wartime MCI
officials, who, as members of the ministry, planned industrial policy after the war:
"In 1942 Takayuki Yamamoto of the general Affairs Bureau (Soumu Kyoku) of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry was responsible for product expansion. He remained in his post at the end
of the war, and was later appointed Administrative Vice-Minister (Jimu Jikan) when the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) was established. His case is one of the most typical
illustrating the continuity into post-war office of those who ran the wartime controlled economy."
(1999, p. 193)
Yonekura also cites the cases of Kishi Nobusuke and Shiina Etsusaburo:
"For example, at the time of the ministry's introduction of price incentives in 1942, Nobusuke Kishi
was serving as Minister of Commerce and Industry and Etsusaburo Shiina was Vice-Minister.
Twenty years later we find that Kishi had resigned as Prime Minister in 1960, while Shiina had been
appointed Minister of International Trade and Industry in 1961, so both served higher ranking
positions after the war." (1999, p. 193)
The nature of bureaucratic rule and the character of the bureaucracy remained intact
because the officials who planned Japan's post-war industrial recovery were former
officers of MCI
Paul Baily feels that because of the continuity of pre-war officers in post-war positions
in MITI, the officers had the advantage of knowing how to regulate industries.
"MITI not only drew on personnel from the former ministry—until the mid-1970s all top officials
in MITI came from the pre-1945 bureaucracy—but also, ironically, was to attain more extensive
controls over the economy that had ever been envisioned by militarists and renovationist
bureaucrats before 1945." (1995, p.60).
The officers were also comrades during the war with a strong attachment to each other
and to their former ministry.
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Suzuta's description of the psychological make-up of bureaucrats relates directly to the
MCI officials, who administered Japan's post-war rapid economic recovery. These traits
are less apparent in the officers who joined the ministry in the late 80s and 90s because
they have no memory of the war, they have had an easier life compared to their
predecessors and, through travel and education in western countries, they have been
exposed to alternative management styles. Nevertheless, the power in the ministries is
squarely in the hands of an elite class of officers. In 1994 Murakami Ichiro wrote in the
introduction of his book:
"Currently among Japanese civil servants there are more than 100,000 bureaucrats who work in
Kasumigaseki. Among them there are only 20,000 officers, the "career" officers with special
qualifications. Among the 20,000 career officers there are only approximately 1000 with law
degrees4 and only a small number among them manage most of the ministries. They are
overwhelmed by the illusion that they can suppress the other career officers and run the ministries
alone." (1994, p.iii)
In his book The Enigma of Japanese Power Karel van Wolferen compares France's
bureaucracy with Japan's. He first points to the fact that, like Japan, France has
historically had a strong central bureaucracy that maintains control over local
governments, education, public works, courts, etc. He points also to the similarities
between the cultivation of the elite in the ministries and the fact that there is movement
by bureaucrats into the private sector and into politics in both countries.
Van Wolferen then goes on to explain the differences in the education of French and
Japanese elite bureaucrats. The Japanese emphasize memory retention while the French
emphasize intellectual dexterity, articulateness and a liberal and well-diversified
education. Before they enter the ministries the French elite civil servants study in one of
five institutions for further training in diplomacy, finance, accounting, engineering and
4 To be discussed later in this chapter. Almost without exception elite officers have law degrees from
Tokyo University. The elite bureaucrats draft all laws that are passed in the Diet.
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home affairs. Van Wolferen states that French civil servants are more mobile than their
Japanese counterparts because they can serve temporarily in top management positions
in other ministries, private banks and businesses and state-run organizations. On the
other hand, Japanese elite never leave their institution and are rotated to divisions within
their ministry, perpetuating a strong institutional affiliation: "...to the extent that is
detrimental to the functioning of officialdom as a whole." (1990, pp.155-156)
On occasion, they will change ministries if their experiences are warranted valuable to
the ministry extending the invitation. For example, the current president of JETRO
New York, Okamura Jun, was a career officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before
moving to MITI.
Big Business
One of the punitive measures ordered by SCAP was the dismantling of the zaibatsu.
The zaibatsu that were in operation before the war were Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi
and Yasuda. The zaibatsu that were formed during the war because of close cooperation
with the military were Nissan, Asano, Okura, Nomura, Nakajima and Furukawa. SCAP
first dissolved the holding companies so that the family-owners no longer had the
controlling interests. Although the "economic purge" of the executives who had
directed the companies during the war was delayed, the Antimonopoly law passed in
1947. Ultimately, in January 1947 fifteen hundred executives resigned. In July 1947
Mitsui and Mitsubishi trading companies were dismantled. (Dower J.,1999, p.532)
Many other large companies were slated for liquidation but the Cold War and the threat
of communist expansion in the Pacific persuaded SCAP to take a far more lenient course
so that the large companies could join with the ministries, namely MITI and MOF, to
rebuild Japan's economy.
The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1950 saw the abandonment of the
reform that forbid zaibatsu families to own shares of stock in their firms. Cross-
shareholding between firms also was allowed. Although four of the zaibatsu regrouped
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after the Occupation, the initial modification of the punitive reforms perpetuated the
close alliance between the bureaucracy and big business. The zaibatsu became known as
keiretsu groups. Keiretsu is a term that applies to the businesses that are subcontracted
by the large companies to supply parts and services. These businesses are generally
small to medium-sized. The system can be traced to the war effort when small
businesses were contracted by the zaibatsu as suppliers. The system of subcontracting
continued after the war, although in a modified form. Some of the subcontractors are
owned entirely by the parent company while others are partially owned or totally
independent.
The companies within each keiretsu group specialized in a single industrial sector such
as shipbuilding, banking, insurance, chemicals, real estate, retail, trading and so forth. A
firm in one group had the advantage through inter-corporate shareholding of partnering
with firms in other keiretsu groups. Prestowitz gives examples of inter-corporate
shareholding by the keiretsu.
"Toyota, for instance, is affiliated with the Mitsui Group, even though it has assembled a group in
its own right. Nissan is affiliated with the Fuyo Group, while Hitachi, which has a group of its own,
is affiliated with both Fuyo and Sanwa Groups" (1988, p. 298)
Okimoto contends that these affiliations through inter-corporate shareholdings is:
"...a distinctive feature of Japanese capitalism, also facilitating the administration of industrial
policy by relieving companies of the tyranny of following strategies for short-term profit
maximization." (1986, p.47)
Okimoto's perception of the keiretsu system was popular during the 1980s, however,
the system locks in the corporate sector so that there is no domestic competition.
Keiretsu and cross-shareholding makes the corporations mutually dependent and there is
no capacity for restructuring. There is no source of dynamism, only stagnation. In
many cases, the companies have provided postretirement positions for elite bureaucrats
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(amakudari), paving the way for the effective use of the industrial policy instrument
"administrative guidance."
The ties between the bureaucracy, big business and politicians serve to create an ideal
environment for ministerial controls over Japan's political economy. The elements
explained below are found within the Japanese social system and also serve to create an
environment that pressures individual compliance to group authority and discourages
social movement to initiate reform
Factors in the Japanese Social Order That Inhibit Individualism and
Intensify Group Pressure
In modern Japanese society, the group sets the standards for individual behaviour and
individual identity is defined in terms of being a member of a group. Nakane Chie
writes:
"In group identification, frame such as 'company' or association' is of primary importance: the
attribute of individual is secondary. The same tendency is found among intellectuals; among
university graduates, what matters most, and functions the strongest socially, is not whether a man
holds or does not hold a PhD but rather, from which university he graduated. Thus the criteria by
which the Japanese classify individuals socially tend to be institutional unit (such as school or
company) is in fact the basis of Japanese social organization." (1988, p. 8)
The elements to be discussed here tie the Japanese to their rigid system, because, first
and foremost, the Japanese identify themselves culturally as members of organizations,
corporate divisions, hometowns and so forth.
Karel van Wolferen explains the system as a:
"...a hierarchy, or rather a complex of overlapping hierarchies, is maintained but it has no top.
There is no supreme institution with ultimate jurisdiction over the others. There is no place where,
as Harry Truman would say, the buck stops. The buck keeps circling." (1986/87, p.290)
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Wolferen sees the system as having a high degree of regimentation and conformity:
"...that systematically instilled submissive attitudes." (1990 p. 248)
Although Japanese below the age of forty may not to be as controlled by a rigid
hierarchical social order as were their parents, they are still subject to values that are
inherent to this system, especially in the workplace where they are members of tightly
knit divisions (e.g. groups).
Identification with the Group
Nakane Chie writes:
"A cohesive sense of group unity...is essential as the foundation of the individual's total emotional
participation in the group; it helps to build a closed world and results in group independence or
isolation." (1988 p. 8)
The Japanese organization is structured to give a Japanese a sense of security both
physically as well as emotionally. In general, when workers are asked what they do for
a living, they will refer to their company ("I work for Sumitomo") before referring to
their responsibilities in their company. Also, when speaking of their employer to friends
and colleagues they will refer to their company not by name but by "wc/zz no kaisha,"
which, when translated means "the company I call my home" or " the company that is
like my family." This is, in part, related to the lifetime employment system indicative to
the Japanese corporate system.
Organizations are structured hierarchically. B.C. Koh credits Nakane Chie with
creating the phrase "ta/e shakai" or "vertical society" to emphasize the fact that vertical
relationships take on more significance than horizontal relationships:
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"In organizational terms, this idea implies the development of a strong sense of identification with
the organization and intense feelings of solidarity among all members of the organization." (Koh
B.C., 1989, p. 27)
Although employees identify with their employer, their primary allegiance can be with
their division (e.g. group) and their division chief. A negative aspect is that this loyalty
may hamper the sharing of pertinent information with other divisions and with upper
management.5
The Group
The seniority system still prevails in most Japanese organizations. The president and
CEO are usually among the oldest of the employees and have worked for their entire
careers in the same organization. Presidents and CEOs run the organizations but daily
operations are in the hands of divisions (jigyobu), division managers (bucho), and the
section managers (kacho), who are ranked by age and by the length of time they have
served in the company, although there are some exceptions to this rule. Generally there
be three kacho per division, depending on the number of employees, which ordinarily
range from ten to twenty staff Kacho are directly responsible to their bucho and the
support staffs are directly responsible to their kacho. Loyalty of subordinates to the
group leader is vital in the group hierarchy. The working method in a division referred
to as "bottom-up." When top management request information or when a new project is
initiated in a division the bucho delegates the job to his kacho, who, in turn, delegates
the task to subordinates. The subordinates begin the job and pass it upward to their
kacho, who will make revisions and then pass it up to the bucho, who finishes the task,
putting his seal on it before passing it on to the vice-president or CEO.
The Group Within the Group and Group Insularity
When Japanese are asked if they enjoy working for Japanese organizations, instead of
answering in the affirmative or negative, they may choose to say, "Eluman relations are
5 See Mercian study in this chapter
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trying" (Ningen kanke). The fear of retribution from management or from members of
the group controls an employee's external expression of disagreement with his superior.
Ronald Dore writes:
"Although it may not be immediately evident to the casual observer, the subordinate's behaviour is
indeed controlled by the concern that his superior's generosity will be influenced by his attitude. If
the worker is considered to be uncooperative or unobliging, he may experience disfavor but in a
covert way, recognizable to himself and a few co-workers. If his superior is displeased, the other
members of his division may well detach themselves from him and he will become isolated. "
(1985, p.202)
The fear of displeasing his division manager and retribution from members in his
division controls a staffs outward expression of disagreement with his supervisor. He
or she may propose an alternative solution to a problem or a different method but he or
she will rarely disagree openly with his superior. In fact, any behaviour that is
considered to be out of order may provoke ostracizing by group members, who will
move to protect their superior with the hope that he or she will look with favour upon
them for their loyalty and reciprocate in the future.
The rotation system common in Japanese organizations can present difficulties for
employees when they move from one division to another. Japanese managers are
trained to be generalists in their firms and, therefore, are rotated every three years to a
different division. The purpose of the rotation system is to make managers familiar with
all aspects of their companies. However, due to strong group unity the exodus from one
division and the entrance into another can be a wrenching experience even if the new
division is located in the same area as the old division and everyone knows everyone
else. Once the employee has left his old division he is considered an outsider. Members
of the old division will throw a farewell party (sobetsukai) and the farewell can be
emotional even though the manager knows that he will see his former colleagues daily.
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Group Exodus And Re-entry
The tensions that employees face returning to their company after having served for
periods of three to five years at company facilities overseas is yet another example of
group insularity. Japan is ethnically homogeneous and relocating to another culture can
be stressful for many Japanese but returning to their society after a long absence can be
even more stressful than living outside Japan.
Most Japanese covet overseas duty as much for the respite from the workplace as for the
foreign experience. Nevertheless, upon returning to Japan they will experience
difficulties re-entering corporate life and being accepted again by former colleagues.
More often than not, they are not respected for the valuable lessons they received from
their experiences overseas but perceived as employees, who have escaped the pressures
of the workplace. In an interview in 1994 a vice-president of the North American
headquarters of Sumitomo Corporation, who had previously been posted for three years
in San Francisco and then for a subsequent three years in Chicago expressed his
frustration:
"Even after spending five years in the States, once rotating staff land at Narita Airport, the minute
they go through the door at Narita, they must force themselves to forget everything they
experienced during the past five years. They are real Japanese. That's what it means to reenter
Japanese society. I think that this is still the case in our company. There is also jealousy so we must
forget everything. So for Japan, there is no positive effect in rotating staff for four to five years. No
matter how many times the employee is posted in the U.S. it won't amount to anything. No matter
how many thousands of workers are sent to no matter how many countries the Japanese will not
develop an international point of view. They will not internationalise." 6
Suzuki Yoshinori, the Executive Director at JETRO New York from 1992-1995, agreed
with the vice-president in his interview regarding the difficulty of the Japanese to
mentally go beyond their borders: "Internationalisation is talked about but as I said before,
Japanese go abroad and have experiences and then return to their way of life. Unfortunately, things
6
January 11, 1994 Interview at Sumitomo Corporation, New York
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from the outside will not enter Japan smoothly. 1 really don't understand what internationalisation
is but I have the feeling that it is difficult for the Japanese to get to the level that they will be able to
negotiate with various nationalities and to interact." 7
In their interviews both men spoke about the difficulties Japanese have in
communicating in a foreign language, which in itself promotes insecurity among
foreigners and defensiveness. The Japanese language is spoken only in Japan and
Japanese know that when they leave their country they will meet few people who speak
their language. Also, although Japanese are adept at utilizing foreign technology
quickly they need a longer period of time to assimilate western concepts. The Japanese,
who are posted overseas for five years try to adapt to these concepts and learn the native
language and although this effort should make them invaluable to their organizations,
they find that they are regarded as having become different from the rest of the members
of the organization and can feel a sense of rejection and sometimes jealousy as well.
Although they may hope that their newly acquired skills and knowledge will be utilized,
in many cases, ex-patriots find upon their return that in order to integrate fully into their
company and their division, they must forget their foreign experiences.
Cliques As Groups
University Cliques
Cliques are found in most societies. Cliques (batsu) in Japanese society serves to
intensify the connection between individuals. In Western cultures, cliques are generally
related to wealth and social status but in Japan the most important clique is made up of
members who have graduated from prestigious universities. The gakubatsu plays a
significant role in tying together elites in the ruling triad. Johnson writes how the
university clique ties together members of the bureaucracy:
"...gakubatsu is without question the single most important influence within the Japanese state
bureaucracy. The cliques of university classmates are inseparable from bureaucratic life but
because it is their university degrees and their success in passing the Higher-level Public Officials
7
January 1994 Interview at JETRO New York
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Examination that set bureaucrats apart from other elites in the society. Graduates also form as an
'old boys' network throughout the society as a whole." (1982, p. 57)
The Japanese place great importance on education and graduating from the right
o
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university is of paramount importance. Nakane Chie writes:
"The ranking order among institutions is likewise of immediate concern to individuals, in that
individual status and prestige go according to this ranking as well as according to the individual's
rank within each institution...The Japanese are not so much concerned with social status as with
institutional affiliation. Since the hierarchy of each field is so clearly perceived and widely known,
and since there is a hierarchy within the individual institution, taken together they offer a fairly
distinct picture of where the individual can be fitted." (1988, p. 13-14)
As was pointed out in Chapter 29 candidates for career positions in the ministries are
favoured over graduates from other universities if they have a law degree from Tokyo
University. Prestowitz writes:
"In place of the term gakubatsu, some Japanese analysts prefer Todaibatsu (cliques of Tokyo
University classmates) because of the predominance of Tokyo University graduates in the
bureaucracy and in upper echelons of the banking and industrial worlds. Even among the
Todaibatsu, there is the batsu of all batsu—the alumni of the Tokyo University Law School." (1988,
p. 134)
Tokyo University, formally known as Tokyo Imperial University was founded in 1886
by the Meji government. Its function was to educate administrators in the new
government. Although other public university graduates took the High Level Civil
Service examination, the majority of applicants accepted as career officers came
primarily from Tokyo University. This is still the case, although graduates from such
8 In Japan entrance into universities is based on the meritorious system. Before the war, Japanese of
wealth and high social ranking were favored candidates for the top universities (as is the case in Great
Britain) but reform of the educational system after the war made entrance accessible to anyone who passed
the exams.
9 "Chalmers Johnson"s Legacy
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universities as Keio, Kyoto and Hitotsubashi are gradually gaining acceptance.10 Before
1996 with the exception of one vice-minister, who graduated in law from Okayama
University, all vice-ministers in MITI graduated in law from Tokyo University (Todai).
(Murakawa I., 1994, p. 135) The Japanese see their bureaucrats as the lawmakers in
government, drafting all legislation and regulations, and their politicians as the
supporters of the laws.
Corporate Human Resource Management: Individual Sacrifice, Group Unity and Loyalty
to the Corporation
Susumu Yoshida, the managing director of corporate planning for Sumitomo Chemical
Corporation, explains what he feels is the philosophy of Japan's corporate culture:
"The Japanese have assimilated two principals that constitute essential elements of their thinking:
Confucian 'harmony' and the Buddhist concept of'transcendence of one's ego,' developed by the
Upanishad in ancient India. The latter implies that through a long process of training, reflection
and meditation, an enlightened individual will come to realize that the inner self is identical to the
inner essence of the universe. Such metaphysical identity of man with the universe underlies
Japanese religious beliefs and social conventions. This principle not only serves as a goal of
Japanese spiritual life, but also provides the foundation for the concept of'teamwork' embedded in
Japan's modern corporate culture." (1998, p 569)
Yoshida's theory is a rather idealistic version of modern corporate Japan but one that has
been popularised by two of Japan's greatest industrialists who are Buddhisms.
The late Matsushita Konosuke and Inamori Kazuo incorporated Zen Buddhisjn along
with their own personal philosophies into human resource management in their
companies. (Carpenter S., March 1993, p.6 and May 1993 p. 6). Their management
style in terms of promoting group unity and loyalty to the corporation have, to some
extent, influenced human resource management in other Japanese firms and are often
10 See introduction to Chapter 3 for examples
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touted by western observers as indicative of Japanese corporate management style in
general."
Matsuhsita Konosuke and Corporate Management
Matsushita Konozuke founded his company, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. in
1918 with his first invention, the battery powered bicycle lamp. His company later
became Japan's largest manufacturer of consumer and industrial electronic product.
After the war, Matsushita established his foundation, PHP (Peace, Happiness and
Prosperity) inl946 in an effort to restore the Japanese spirit (as told in the July 1993
issue of "ImadaKara Matsushita Konosuke" The 21 PHP Institute).
"The Institute provided a positive environment in which professional from the public and private
sectors could conduct research, collect data on economic trends, engage in business consultations,
and create educational programs. As president, Matsushita poured his efforts into the program
(which also served as his pulpit), and he thrived on a non-stop lecture circuit until his death in 1989
at the age of 94." (Carpenter S. 1993 p. 6)
Matsushita wrote many books on doing business, work ethics and management
techniques. Many Japanese revered him, likening him to the guru of corporate
management. To mark the occasion of Matsushita's 100th birthday, The 21 , a magazine
published by PHP, released a commemorative edition on Matsushita (July 1993),
including an article that the well-known journalist and television commentator,
Shimomura Mitsuko wrote about Matsushita for Asahi Shimhun eighteen years earlier
titled "Matsushita is Not God" (Matsushita Konosukesama wa "Kamisama' de wa nai!
pp.130-133) In his interview Matsushita talked about his philosophy and how his
religious beliefs influenced his management of his employees in order to encourage
productivity and loyalty.
"_It must be asserted here that devout Zen Buddhists adhere to a strict code of ethics, live in an aesthetic
no-frill environment. In other words, they sacrifice physical comfort for spiritual enlightenment
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Japanese companies own retreats where the recently employed staff is sent for the
purpose of gaining a sense of identity with their corporation, group unity and, also, to
develop a commitment to making a contribution to corporate operations as well. Called
kenshu ("training and study"), the retreats can last from three days to one week and the
schedules can be strenuous with sessions beginning in early morning and continuing to
late evening. Employees will return to these retreats throughout their careers
Mr. Matsushita became a devout Zen Buddhist in his early forties and often he would
prefer sending his employees to Zen monasteries for weeklong meditation sessions
instead of to kenshu because he felt that this practice would inspire team loyalty among
his employees. (Carpenter S., March 1993) Participants eat, sleep and meditate in a
group and, therefore, individual needs are placed secondary to the group. His own
practice inspired a personal ideology that: "...spiritual benefits could be reaped not only from
prayer but from the daily, diligent execution from one's duties. He attended religious retreats at
Buddhist monasteries, prodding employees to participate in order to restore inner peace and to
improve concentration. What was good for the soul was also good for sales. The enthusiastic found
solace but the less willing realized only pain, sitting in crossed-legged silence for eight hours a day."
(Carpenter S., March 1993, p. 6.) Matsushita made large donations to monasteries thus
employees were allowed to join with other lay members and resident monks.
Inamori Kazuo
Inamori Kazuo is the founder of Kyocera Corporation, the world's largest industrial
ceramics producer and KDD1, Japan's second largest telecommunications company.
Invariably articles written about Inamori mention his Zen Buddhist leanings. (Carpenter
S., May 1994 p. 6) In the June 1981 edition of Fortune Inamori's philosophy ("Kyoto
Philosophy") was described as: "...praise-the-lord- and-Pass-the-Automation creed with a Zen
Buddhist flavor." (Bylinsky G. 1981) The cover story on Inamori in the June 3, 1993
edition of the Far Eastern Economic Review is titled "Samurai Socerer" and describes
his philosophy as: "...a ruthless emphasis on efficiency with dollops of Zen Buddhism and Max
Weber." ( Friedland J., June 3, 1993, p.61)
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Through his company, Inamori publishes booklets that put forth his ideals, which
emphasize individual sacrifice on behalf of others (i.e. the individual versus the group):
"Pursue material and spiritual happiness and the welfare of mankind." Another precept is:
"Too many people think only of their own profit. But business opportunity seldom knocks on the
door of self-centered people. No customer ever goes to a store to please the storekeeper."
When Inamori announced that he would retire in June 1997 and become a monk for one
month in a Zen monastery, the April 2, 1997 edition of The New York Times ran the
two-page article, "Eyes on Higher Things And on the Bottom Line—Not the Usual
Retirement Ahead for a Master of Corporate Zen." Andrew Pollack, who described
Inamori as one of Japan's greatest entrepreneurs since World War II wrote that Inamori:
"...runs his companies like religious orders and is revered as almost god-like." Pollack balanced
his appraisal by adding:
"He is short-tempered and extremely demanding. 'He treats his management like they're children,'
said Rodney N. Lanthorne, president of the San Diego-based Kyocera International Inc., the main
American subsidiary, referring to Dr. Inamori's strict discipline and tongue-lashings." (April 2,
1997)
The State-Approved Approach To Corporate Management
Matsushita and Inamori's ideologies on Japanese corporate management and human
resource management are also to be found in The Rise of the Japanese Corporate System
Matsumoto Koji wrote his book for Japanese readers in 1983 while he was a MITI
official. Although he made a disclaimer that his opinions did not reflect those of his
ministry, his book should be viewed as an officially approved account because the
English version, printed in 1991 and again in 1993, was distributed to American opinion
leaders through the New York branch of the Japan External Trade Organization, one of
MITI's largest Special Status Corporations. It was an effort to portray his ministry and
corporate Japan in a positive light.
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Matsumoto holds a degree in economics from Tokyo University. In 1987, four years
after the publication of his book, he was appointed Counsellor in the Japanese embassy
in Canberra, Australia and in1990 he was appointed General Director of the General
Administration Department of the Japan National Oil Corporation, a MITI Special
Status Corporation, which is described in the following chapter.
Matsumoto believed that Japanese corporations were a product of an economic system
that had developed during the first decade of Japan's rapid economic growth period. In
his forward Matsumoto wrote:
"Although not widely recognized yet, a new economic system has developed and been nurtured in
Japan inside a shell of capitalism. The new system differs greatly from traditional capitalism, but
that does not mean to say it has drawn close to socialism." (p.vii).
Matsumoto attributed Japan's economic success to Japanese corporate culture and
corporate structure while downplaying government controls over the economy
"The issue in the new system is not the degree of government interference in the economic process,
or the relationship between government and corporation. Rather, it is the new elements that have
appeared in the structure of the corporations-the basic units of the economy—and the economic
conclusions these elements have brought about." (p. vii)
The "new" elements Matsumoto described in Japan's corporate restructuring have
actually been an integral part of the Japanese corporate system since the end of the war:
the lifetime employment system in large businesses, corporate management autonomy
and stockholders' acquiescence to the reinvestment of profits into corporate expansion.
Chalmers Johnson, who admires MITI elites and who gave the book positive reviews in
California Management Review synopsised:
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"Japan is dynamic because its managers devote themselves to competing with other companies at
home and abroad, without having to serve the parasitic interests of shareholders or the passive
interests of workers, who have no stake in the viability of the company." (Johnson C.1993 p 60)
Matsumoto tried to reassure readers that his government's role in Japan's economic
development was small compared to the role of the Japanese individual:
"...most of IMITI's functions do not result from infringements on the freedom of private companies,
and in the end it is not possible to truly appreciate MITI's role if one sets it solely in the framework
of freedom or control. Indeed, in the limited sense of applying such a framework, one must say that
the Japanese allow a greater latitude of freedom for corporations than do the government of
western free nations. Despite being able to make such comments about the relationship between
government and companies in Japan, this should not be immediately interpreted as meaning that
Japan is more liberal than Western nations. In other words, the small role of government in Japan
is not a reflection of a larger role played by the individual." (pp 225-226)
Matsumoto tried further to justify his stance that Japan's economy is neither planned nor
controlled:
"Some proof of that can be seen if one looks, for example, at the small number of personnel MITI
has assigned to its sections in charge of four important Japanese industries. Certainly it must be
clear that such a small staff cannot design and carry out major programs of centralized control that
'would make a good capitalist cry.' (p. 222).
To prove that the number of MITI staff was small he drew a chart showing that, as of
July 1989, there was 11 staff in automobiles, 13 in computers (electronic policy), 13 in
iron and steel manufacturing and so forth. However, he omitted the important fact that
MITI used other means besides officers to implement policy: 1) bureaucrats can control
industry through their relationship with former colleagues who had taken top
management positions in private industry (e.g. amakudari). 2) MITI's Special Status
Corporations and public corporations can be vehicles to implement policy (as is
discussed in chapter 6, p. 173). In 1990 Yamamura Kozo claimed:
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"Many formal and informal institutions, created and maintained in previous decades to actively aid
the economy in 'catching up' with and overtaking the Western industrialized economies, are still in
place and continue to shape the behaviour of all political and economic actors." (Yamamura,
1990 pp. 300-301)
Matsumoto claimed: "The new corporate system is the source of the might of Japanese economy.
It provided the propulsive energy that enabled the Japanese economy to expand fifteen-fold between
the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s, and to this day it remains the source of the Japanese economy's
strong vitality."
In 1983 Japanese readers may have believed Matsumoto's claims of the strengths of the
Japanese corporate system because Japan's economy was doing well as opposed to the
American economy that was in recession. However, they surely would have questioned
his declaration that MITI did not "infringe on private companies" and that the "role of
government in Japan is not a reflection of a larger role played by the individual." MITI
spokesmen often try to reassure both Japanese and foreigners alike that MITI allows
Japanese companies leeway to operate with relatively little interference and that,
compared to western capitalistic economies, the Japanese government's role is small in
the regulation of businesses. Daniel I. Okimoto, professor of political science at
Stanford University, wrote in 1986, three years after Matsumoto's book was published,
that MITI had:
"...an unusually broad scope of its jurisdictional authority" and that the ministry also had:
"extraordinary latitude to decide whether, when, and how to intervene, and in these situations when
it decides to do so, the structure, means, and specific policy instruments, by which to protect its
power." (Okimoto D., 1986 p. 49)
Japanese readers, who were working for large corporations may have considered
Matsumoto portrayal of employer-employee relations overly enthusiastic. Matsumoto
explained how workers were integrated into Japan's corporate system
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"Japanese corporations are able to consolidate the total energy of their employees toward corporate
objectives, a feature not found elsewhere. They can do so because of the special corporate system
found in Japan, wherein corporate employees are integrated into the corporate structure and
assume shares of corporate risk to become the main standard-bearers for carrying out company
operations.... the career employment system binds the individual's destiny, in terms of his working
life, to the rise and fall of the company's fortune." (p. 65).
Matsuba Masafumi, professor of economics at Ritsumeikan University took a more
realistic view, explaining that the integration of employees into those corporations is
supported by the following factors:
"1) the sweeping exclusion of the political left from companies; 2) military discipline and
organization of human relations within the companies; 3) remarkable differentials of wages and
labor conditions between large corporations and medium and small enterprises; the lack of rights
and low wages of part-time workers and contingency workers in so-called 'middle' or 'peripheral'
labor markets; 4) the feeling of identification of employees belonging to large corporations with
their companies through satisfaction with their high income and fringe benefits; 5) employees of
large corporations have been organizing themselves in enterprise unions (moreover, only of formal
employees) and have lost the sense of social and universal solidarity; 6) a lack of powerful social
countrprinciples and counterthoughts against capitalism in Japan" (2001, p. 93)
Matsumoto claimed that since workers remained in their company for many years their
interests and destinies were tied to their companies. He characterized Japanese workers
as "diligent" and that: "they think about what is most needed for their company and then
personally take the initiative to promote it." (p. 66). He also claimed that Japanese workers
would volunteer willingly to do other work besides their own and that they would gladly
work overtime as well.
However, Matsuba asserted that of all of the factors he listed, the factor that persuaded
employee loyalty to large corporations was the high salary and fringe benefits. He
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raised the question whether employees were compelled to feel loyalty or were they loyal
because they received good salaries and benefits. (2001 p. 93)
In addition, an employee's motivation for volunteering to do extra work and to put in
extra hours may be based on the fear of receiving a poor evaluation from Personnel who
may question workers loyalty to the corporation. Also, it can be argued that the
restriction of "the ability of workers to move from one company to another," has given
management tremendous control over workers if they choose to leave their employers
and enter another company they can expect to lose seniority privileges and a decrease in
salaries. It may be difficult to change midstream since exiting from one group (to whom
they were supposed to have a sense of loyalty) to enter another group raises suspicion
concerning the reasons for departure.
In 1991 Western readers reacted enthusiastically to Matsumoto's book. On the back of
the book jacket there are some reviews from the first printing in 1991. The Financial
Times stated: "this is an exceptionally powerful book. Koji Matsumoto has developed a theory of
the Japanese Corporation."
Chalmers Johnson wrote in the Journal of Japanese Studies:
"an excellent, well-documented guide to the 'Japan is different' literature as it existed in the early
1980s in Japanese... It is a pioneering work, typical of the best minds at MITI."
When Japan was experiencing a high rate of economic growth there was much interest
among Western observers about the Japanese corporate management style. In 1988
Chalmers Johnson wrote about Japanese management techniques as used in American
affiliates. In "Japanese Style Management Techniques in America" for California
Management Review he described some of the practices he perceived as being specific
to the system, which promoted the cooperation among staff. He pointed to the old
practice of all members engaging in a short exercise program before beginning their
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daily work, morning pep-talks by supervisors, loyalty among staff to company is given
high priority by management who granted bonuses for good work, no direct orders given
to staff "but lots of internal communication," overtime is expected of all staff, decision
making is "bottom-up," staff congregated after work to go drinking in order to further
company loyalty, company trips and retreats to further integrate members into the
corporate family and no in-house lawyers because lawsuits by staff against management
is not tolerated. (April 1988)
Johnson's understanding of Japanese corporate management-style as seen from the
outside is, in part, correct but it does not fully reflect the actual conditions of the
workplace. These conditions are difficult to see without working in a large Japanese
corporation among Japanese. The writer worked for three years for Mercian Inc., a
traditional Japanese corporation alongside Japanese. The writer chose this type of
environment because it was an effective way of observing traditional Japanese
management style methods and Japanese who had not been previously exposed to
Westerners.
The elements in the Japanese socio-political system that have been defined in this
chapter as serving as mechanisms to pressure individuals to submit to the will of the
group was reflected in the company's employee-management relationship as well as
employee-employee relationship The following study of Mercian, Inc. is given to bring
further insight to Johnson's analysis.
STUDY OF MERCIAN, INC.
1 ?
Mercian, Inc. is a subsidiary ofAjinomoto, whosefounder invented a process to
manufacture monosodium glutamate, commonly known as MSG ("Ajinomoto, "in
Japanese means "the base offlavour") during the Meiji Period. Ajinomoto is a food
and pharmaceutical conglomerate and is knownfor itsfermentation process
technology and biotechnology. Mercian is a good representation ofa large Japanese
12 See appendix 3 for corporate profile and annual report
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affiliate ofa majorfood and drug manufacturer with traditional Japanese style
management.
Mercian, Inc. was established in 1934 as a producer ofJapanese spirits. Known until
1989 as Sanraku, Inc., the company became involved in whiskey and wine production,
feed, pharmaceutical and chemical production as well. By 1988, Sanraku, Inc. had
become Japan's largest domestic wine maker, marketing the wine under the label
Mercian, after its winery in Yamanashi Prefecture. The growth ofwine production
was directly related to thefact that the Japanese, who did not begin drinking wine in
earnest until the 1980s, were purchasing more wine, both domestic and imported.
(Carpenter S., 1997, p. 2)
Tadao Suzuki, a vice-president at Ajinomoto and whose great uncle had invented
MSG, realizing the potential ofa burgeoning wine market, took the reigns at Sanraku
in 1988 with the intention offocusing more on wine production. He also intended to
import and distribute more wines and spirits. Within three years Sanraku had
purchased a winery in the Napa Valley (Markham) and in Bordeaux (Chateau
Reysson). Sanraku also became the sole importer and distributor ofmoreforeign
wines and spirits, including Glenfiddich whisky In accordance with Suzuki's strategy
to internationalise, Sanraku entered into joint-ventures with Italian, German, Spanish
and Australian wine producers.
Sanraku's strengths were in distribution and on-premise sales (restaurants, bars and
hotels) but its weakness was its unfortunate image ofbeing a traditional maker of low-
grade whisky and a vodka-like spirit (sltochu) that is popular among blue-collar
workers. Sanraku's main competitor in the wine industry was Suntory, also a whisky
producer, that marketed itselfas a promoter of the arts (one-third ofcorporate profits
are said to contribute to the arts), thus cultivating an image ofelegance and
sophistication. Suzuki knew that Sanraku had to develop a singular corporate identity
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and initiated a name change. To modernize management at Mercian, which had the
reputation of being a conservative Japanese company, Suzuki hired the management
consultants McKinsey & Co. for one year. According to staff in the wine division, two
McKinsey staffsat with them the entire year but their input was minimal.
In September 1990, Sanraku's name was changed to Mercian, Inc after its winery in
Yamanashi Prefecture. Nine years later in the 1999 Mercian corporate report
"Message From The President read: "For my company, survival in the coming era of
open, global competition will depend on its cultivated core businesses in which it is
assured ofa significant competitive advantage. We have thus positioned wine as
Mercian's primary core business, and will continue to take steps to reinforce our
operations in this area." (pp.3) Despite Suzuki's efforts to create a modern imagefor
his company, Mercian's management style still was traditional influenced by the
elementsfound in Japan's rigid social hierarchy, which were discussed in this
chapter.
Gakubatsu
Before Suszuki transferred to Sanraku Sanraku staffmanaged the company. When
Suzuki entered Sanraku the company moved offices to Ajinomoto's corporate
headquarters and there was a visible effort to replace existing management in some
divisions, including Human Resource and General Affairs with Ajinomoto staff. For
example, the new director of the wine division had been the director of the
mayonnaise and soup division at Ajinomoto. His section chiefaccompanied him,
becoming a section chief in the wine division. The directors ofhuman resources
(jinjibucho) and the liquor divisions also camefrom Ajinomoto. Thefact that Suzuki
and his men had all graduatedfrom Keio University (knownfor its high quality
economics department)13 gave them an advantage over Sanraku employees, who were
generally graduates from technical colleges and provincial second or third class
13 Graduates from Keio with degrees in economics are sought after by Japanese corporations
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universities. Thus not only was upper managementfrom Sanraku's parent company
but, also, their education was considered superior to Sanraku's staffas well.
Human Resource Management
Despite the expertisefrom Mc Kinsey& Co. human resource management in Mercian
did not change noticeably but as the company was expanding wine imports and
domestic production, the number ofstaff in the wine division increasedfrom nine to
twenty-one within two years.
There was lifetime employment and staff received welfare benefits. The tradition that
Suzuki did away with was that, with the exception of the receptionists, employees no
longer had to wear uniforms. Also, there was no morning exercise period (taiso) nor
were there morning pep talks. Mercian sent employees to retreats, usually by division
so that group unity was enhanced. Members would return hoarse and exhaustedfrom
the rigors of these training sessions.
The Division as a Group
In the late 80s and early 90s the wine and liquor related divisions were located on a
singlefloor in one large room. An open floor plan accommodatedfive divisions.
Members ofeach division occupied a long table with the directors ofthe divisions
(bucho) sitting at separate desks at the heads ofeach table. The assistant directors
(fukubucho) sat at the head of the long table and their section managers (kacho)
flanked them. Support staffsat towards the end ofthe tables. Each kacho was
responsiblefor certain work such as sales or marketing or distribution or production.
Support staff worked with each kacho, creating a section within the division.
In his introduction of "Japanese Management Style in America" Johnson contended
that there was much internal communication. At Mercian, which is a good
representation oftraditional Japanese companies, this was not the case between
members ofa division as well as between members ofseparate divisions. Although all
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members ofdivisions sat at the same table, there was little communication regarding
the work these smaller sections were engaged in even when a member ofone section
had information that was relevant to another section.
Johnson contended that there were no direct orders given to staff This was also not
the case at Mercian. The bucho was responsible to Mr. Suzuki, who left the daily
operations in the hands ofhis directors. The bucho discussed the division's work with
thefukubucho. Thefukubucho communicated the information to the kacho. When
the bucho needed a report or information on sales, marketing, production or simply
feedback on a project he would ask either thefukiubucho or the kacho. The kacho, in
turn, would request information or ideas from his support staff, which then did
research and wrote reports. They passed the reports to the kacho, who, after adding
his comments passed them on to his superiors. The support staffs were rarely asked
for their opinions on corporate operations. Although Mr. Suzuki, who was supposedly
consulted regularly by his bucho, in general, he remained alooffrom daily operations.
This is truefor most corporate presidents in any society who act as the representative
of their companies. Their social obligations and business meetings take them away
from the office much ofthe time.
Johnson stated that the purpose ofafter-hours drinking among staff was to instil
company loyalty. In reality, workers (with the exception ofspecial occasions) would
have preferred to return to theirfamilies at the end of the workday. On the average,
the daily commutefor most Mercian employees was three hours but theyfelt pressured
to go drinking with their directors.
Employees did not discuss openly any dissatisfaction they might have had regarding
their treatment by management but there was the ever-present anxiety ofnotfitting
into the group and the need to keep a peaceful relationship with other members of the
group. Occasionally during tea breaks when staffgathered in a separate room, they
would complain about such general issues as thefrustration ofbeing tied to one
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companyfor life. Thefear of retribution from superiors and ostracizing may have
been the overridingfactorsfor this reticence to voice negative views. Employees, who
were seen as being differentfrom the others or who did notfit into a division were
transferred to other divisions. Many ofthem would have liked to have the option of
changing companies or careers but they knew that other companies would be
suspicious of the reasons for their need to changejobs and be wary ofhiring them.
Again, this concern reflects the unity ofthe group and group insularity.
Johnson claims that upper management expect staff to do overtime. At Mercian, Inc.,
this was true if there were deadlines or emergencies. (In general Japanese corporate
etiquette dictates that staffshould waitfor the directors to leave the office before
departing the premises). Even if they had no pressing work, staffmay have wished to
remain after working hours in order to receive additional salaryfor overtime. Staff
would leave the company at 6:00 PM, have dinner and return to their company at 8:00
PM or later and do work that they could have accomplished during regular working
hours.
Group insularity is reflected also when members return after a long absence. This
was illustrated at Mercian when an employee, who had been posted at a winery
overseasfor three years, returned to Mercian headquarters. He was given a seat in
the wine division but no work. He appeared daily and sat at the table trying to be
actively involved in the division but to no avail. The skills that he had acquired while
serving overseas, includingfluency in aforeign language, were not used. After two
months, he was sent to another division where the work did not relate to his overseas
duties.
Group Unity: Communication Between Divisions
The distance between divisions was approximately sixfeet. There was a common Fax
machine and copier. Files were stored in a centralfiling cabinet. Each division
remained autonomousfrom the other and there was little communication between
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divisions or cooperation between divisions. Indeed, there was often a palpable rivalry
between divisions.
At times thefailure ofa division to communicate openly with another division can
lead to unfortunate consequences. A good illustration of this is an incident that
involved a large- scale preparationfor thefirst Beaujolais Nouveaufestival in Japan
in 1989. Mercian along with the other major wine importers and producers marketed
the wine to Japanese through a series ofhotel-sponsored events that were to be held at
midnight of the third Thursday in November when Beaujolais Nouveau was released
in France. Mercian had contracted France's largest negociant to export by airfreight
hundreds ofcases ofthe winefrom France. The procurement division was
responsiblefor the logistics. The wine division was responsiblefor the sales and
marketing ofthe wine. In theory the two divisions were to cooperate closely on the
project. The shipment was expected to arrive in timefor the eveningfestivities at
hotels throughout Japan. However, the shipment did not arrive on schedule, crucial
to the success ofthe Beaujolais Nouveaufestival. The procurement division did not
inform the wine division that the planes were delayed until six hours before the
festival was to begin. Mr. Suzuki was eventually notified but it was too latefor the
festivities and local wine replaced the French. In order to salvage Mercian's
reputation, a mortified Suzuki and his directors travelled around the country to offer
their apologies in person. Surprisingly, after the debacle thefirstyear, a similar
episode occurred thefollowingyear. (Carpenter S. November 1992 p. 5)
The elements that characterise the relationship between management and employees and
the relationship between employees at Mercian, Inc. can be found in most Japanese work
environments. The conservative nature of the Japanese workplace may be less apparent
at overseas branches of multinationals but the hierarchical structure and strong group
identity remains.
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The following study illustrates the same elements that were discussed in the Mercian
study but in a different context. The study is of an overseas branch office of the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO), one of MITT s largest Special Status
Corporations. It has eighty overseas offices. Since representatives from other
government organizations were also posted in the office, the hierarchy in government is
well defined in the cross section of Japanese civil servants.
The writer worked in the New York branch for over six years (1992-1998) in three
divisions giving her the opportunity to observe daily the government officials posted in
the office and their relationship with each other, how they functioned alone, away from
their home organization. There seems to be no literature available that looks at the
operations of overseas offices of Special Status Corporations in terms of personnel
management. .
STUDY OF JETRO NEW YORK, an Overseas Office of a Special Status
Corporation14
The JETRO overseas offices house not only MITI and JETRO staffbut also,
representativesfrom other ministries, public corporations and prefectural
governments, which operate one-man offices under the JETRO umbrella. Officers are
posted at these officesfrom one to fouryears, depending on the organization they
represent. JETRO and MITI staffare postedfor three years to fouryear.
The number and mix ofthese organizations differfrom office to office. For example,
JETRO London houses the representative offices ofNagano Prefecture and
Okyayama Prefecture. The Japan Ship Centre in London, which represents the
shipbuilding industry, although located in a separate building, is under JETRO
management. At JETRO New York besides JETRO and MITI staff there are
representativesfrom other ministries (Health and Welfare and Construction)
prefectures (Kyoto and Fukui) and twelve (at last count) public corporations, among
14 See Chapter 7 for a detailed account of JETRO
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them the Japan Highway Corporation, the Japan Finance Corporationfor Small
Business, the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation and the Electronic
Industries Association ofJapan (EIAJ).
During the 1980s and early 1990s the New York office housed representative offices of
other public corporations and industrial associations that have since dosed shop such
as the Japan Camera Industry Association and the Japan Bicycle Promotion
Corporation. These offices were relatively quiet and when Japan's recession
deepened, thefunds supporting the offices dwindled.
JETRO's New York office is one of the largest overseas offices with approximately
sixty staffand is a good representation of the other JETRO overseas offices in terms
ofmanagement and how staff deals with life awayfrom Japan and their respective
organizations. MITI career officers are at the top ofthe pecking order. They remain
fairly alooffrom the other officers, socializing only on formal occasions such as
farewell parties and otherfunctions that require their attendance. MITI non-career
officers and the representativesfrom the other ministries are second in rank and they
generally congregate among themselves, although on occasion they circulate with the
other officers, whatever their rank. JETRO staffand the other representativesfrom
industrial associations, public corporations rankfourth and local government
representatives are last. In other words, not only does the civil service hierarchy
remain intact outside ofJapan but, also, so do the representatives' institutional
affiliations.
Management
Organizations not related to JETRO payfees to JETROfor support and office
expenses. JETROfacilitates such vital services as taking care of visa applications, tax
identification numbers (for bank accounts etc.) and provides health insurance.
Although the representatives wouldprefer acting autonomously, keeping their
respective organizations' identity separatefrom JETRO, they are considered officially
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JETRO staff. They are expected to cooperate to some degree with management
including participating in research projects. Their office budgets and expenditures are
audited regularly. In other words, MITI is in control.
At JETRO New York, management encourages officersfrom other organizations to
socialize with JETRO staffso that theyfeel included in the group. The officers
reluctantly oblige because theyfeelpressured to acquiesce to management.
Management does not encourage the officers to interact with Americans. Intentionally
or otherwise, during the 1990s a xenophobic atmosphere wasfurther induced by daily
announcements in Japanese about recent crimes committed in the United States that
were circulated to all ofthe officers. The reports were generatedfrom a Japanese
consultingfirm operating in the United States.
Operating Away From the Group
At JETRO New York there are at approximately eleven MITI staffand JETRO staff
numbers are approximately the same. JETRO and MITI officers are in the majority
and, although they may not have worked together previous to their overseas
assignment, they comefrom the same organization, thus there is an automatic support
system in place. The representativesfrom local governments, other ministries and
public corporations are at a disadvantage in terms ofbeing separatedfrom their
ethnically homogeneous society, their organizations and their peers and having to
operate in societies where languages, ethnic groups and culture are very different.
They arrive alone, most ofthem having had little exposure to other cultures and they
are without the physical and moral supportfrom their division. It is generally thefirst
time that they have had to work independentfrom a group and constant supervision.
The preparation for their assignment is minimal— six months of language lessons and
approximately one month's training and instruction on operating in a foreign
country at JETRO headquarters in Tokyo.
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The MITI officers and a chosen few of the JETRO officers, who have attended
foreign universities, adapt to life in unfamiliar environments more easily than do the
other officers. Nevertheless, the initial exposure can be a major shock evenfor MITI
staff An officer, who was sent to study at John Hopkins University, said that he was
unpreparedfor what he saw:
"MITI didn't prepare mefor life in the United States. It should have. Even though I
knew that there were many ethnic groups I was still surprised when I saw the different
kinds ofhair and eyes"15
Although some officers elect to visit theirfuture posts a few months before they are to
assume duty to scoutfor housing and schoolsfor theirfamilies, the majority arrives
two weeks prior to their predecessors return to Japan During a hectic schedule the
new representatives are introduced to the network ofpeople the predecessors have
cultivated during their tenure. There is little time allottedfor the detailing of the
specific duties they are expected to carry out.
For thefirst time in their careers, most representatives experience isolation from their
organizations. Communication with Japan is done through Fax or email or the
telephone. There is no peer pressurefrom their division, no pressure to do overtime
and they can return to theirfamilies at reasonable hours. Some officers relish the
privacy that a one-man office affords them but most officers, who are accustomed to
working as members ofa division find it difficult to manoeuvre as individuals,
especially when it entails making decisions. The isolation makes themfeel vulnerable.
This can be especially truefor the officers, who are sent overseas if they have been
considered misfits in their organization. They may be sufferingfrom mental disorders
or they may be alcoholics. Management in their organizations mistakenly think that
by sending them awayfor three years will not only release the officersfrom the
15 1994 Interview with the Director of EID/MITI JETRO New York.
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pressures of the workplace but, also, the other members of the division will be rid of
disruptive behaviour. Unfortunately, these officers do not benefitform being isolated
from their divisions. In fact, functioning initially in alien societies can be extremely
stressful, intensify the illnesses. For example, a representative ofa prefectural
government at JETRO New York could barelyfunction during his three-year tenure
and he was continuously treatedfor anxiety at a psychiatric institution. JETRO
management did not offer any support. While most officers receive a promotion upon
their return to Japan, he was demoted.
The representative's successor was also unpreparedfor life in the United States. He
settled his pregnant wife andyoung daughter in a three-bedroom home with an
outdoor swimming pool in the New Jersey suburbs. His home in Japan was a one-
bedroom apartment, a substantial contrast in lifestyles. His second child was a girl. A
year after her birth, shefell into the swimming pool. Police rescue teams resuscitated
the child, flying her by helicopter to the nearest hospital. She survived the ordeal but
suffered extensive brain damage. Thefatherfelt keen humiliation because he had
failed to fence off the pool and thus preventing the accident. At the time he was in the
midst ofpreparing a large exhibition for traditional industry from his prefecture,
which would be attended by his governor and members of the prefecture Diet.
Although his daughter was in a coma, he elected to leave his wife at the child's
bedside and continue preparations and direct the weeklong proceedings. Hisfears
that he and hisfamily would suffer the stigma ofhaving a sick child and that he
would have to bear the ultimate responsibilityfor the accident pressured him to put his
dutiesfirst before hisfamily.
It takes at least six months for officers to adapt to their new circumstances. In Japan
their workloads arefar greater and they operate as members ofa close-knit group.
Overseas there is no group pressure, their responsibilities arefar lighter and the hours
are shorter as well. Although the initialfreedom and privacy can be stressfulfor the
officers, they gradually adapt to the luxury ofhavingfewer work hours and being with
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families. Some officers show their individuality by growing beards and longer hair.
However, these signs of individualism disappear three months before they return to
Japan, which can be even more stressful than their initial arrival at JETRO. They
begin to prepare mentallyfor the inevitable trials theyface upon their return to their
organization where they will be expected to work harder than before they left.
Competition Between Divisions
The insularity ofdivisions can lead to rivalry between divisions, especially when
territory is involved. This was aptly illustrated at JETRO New York in 1992 when the
president bypassed the Public Affairs division and chose stafffrom the Research and
Planning division to write and edit Inside/Outside Japan. Normally all promotional
materials and newsletters were handled by public affairs. Also, the president duties
focused on representing JETRO to the public and since Public Affairs handled his
schedule as well, he was expected to cooperate with that division. However, since the
president was ofhigher rank than staff in Public Affairs (who was JETRO staff), he
was in control. The director ofpublic relations, realizing the potentialpopularity of
the paper, was dismayed that his division was not involved and aggressively lobbied
his views to the other representatives throughout the office. The executive director of
JETRO New York, a MITI officer, who was caught in a tug-of-war, supported the
director ofPublic Affairs because tradition demanded it. The president requested
representativesfrom other ministries and associations not related to MITI to
contribute articles to the paper but most of them resisted unless theyfelt pressured to
comply because their organization was related with MITI. However, the paper
survived thefirstyear despite the inter-office turmoil.
Conclusion
This chapter has given an historical perspective of Japan's socio-political system in
order to trace the source of power of the bureaucracy. It has also defined those factors in
the Japanese social system, which can cause the Japanese to acquiesce to bureaucratic
guidance.
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So far the restructuring of the ministries seems to have progressed no further than the
consolidation of some of the ministries and agencies and the changes of names for
others. It may appear that the ministries are consolidating operations and that the
bureaucracy is downsizing from twelve to ten ministries but, in truth, the roles and
territory of the former ministries are in tact and a strong central bureaucracy survives.
The ministries continue to legislate laws and regulations, which are passed by the
National Diet that has been dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955
In most Western countries and the United States no single political party has been in
power long enough to give bureaucrats the liberty to make policy nor are the ministries
unfettered by legal sanction when implementing policy as they are in Japan. Public
surveys reveal that the majority of Japanese would like to see their politicians more
active in the legislation of laws16 and planning of policy both domestic and foreign but
they continue to elect candidates belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party thus
preserving the status quo, which is exactly what the bureaucrats want to maintain.
Restructuring the governing system connotes changing the mind-set of the Japanese
themselves and this will take many years. Although the exposure to Western values and
ideology during the last hundred years has made some impact on Japanese lifestyles, the
majority of the Japanese, who have never travelled beyond their borders, abide by a
value system that has existed for hundreds of years. They belong to a rigid hierarchical
socio-political system that has been in place since the Meiji Period, a system that
contains elements that can be traced back thousands of years, namely the acquiescence
to the needs of the group instead of the needs of the individual and the social pressure to
conform. The Japanese still strongly identify themselves with this system.
16 See chapter 2 for review of Japanese literature on the bureaucracy.
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Since the system supports acquiescence to the bureaucracy and the bureaucracy is
responsible for administering the reforms of Special Status Corporations and public
corporations it is likely that the ministries will continue to maintain their corporations.




THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY (MITI)
Introduction
The Japanese regard their bureaucracy as the strongest force in their governing system
because it drafts laws which the Diet, ruled for most of Japan's postwar history by the
Liberal Democrats, invariably sanctioned. Twelve years ago Japan's economy seemed
to be on the fast track and the Japanese by and large credited their bureaucracy for
planning policies that brought Japan one step behind the United States as the second
largest economy in the world. The two economic ministries, MOF and MITI were
considered the most powerful of the ministries. Most Japanese viewed elite civil
servants as the most influential members in society and viewed them with a fair amount
of trepidation. With the exception of literature published by opposition parties such as
Communist and Socialist, books and articles about bureaucrats tended to be more
positive than negative and although bureaucrats avoided the limelight, Japanese
considered elite with a sense of awe..
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was established in 1949 to
revive Japan's war devastated industry as a consolidation of the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry and the Board of Trade. (Dower J., 1999, p. 541) The Ministry of
Commerce and Industry managed Japan's industrial growth before the war and
controlled industrial production during the war, its name changing to the Ministry of
Munitions in 1942. As was discussed in chapter 1 MITI plans industrial policy. MITI
as well as Japan's other ministries are not subject to legal sanction when implementing
policy as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Chalmers Johnson wrote in MITI And The Japanese Miracle:
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"MITI men are powerful and outspoken, and the Japanese public enjoys reading about them.
Several best selling novels have been written about them...English novelists sometimes choose
bureaucrats as subjects (examples are Maugham's Ashendon or le Carre's Smiley's People), but
economic bureaucrats in America or Britain are rarely as interesting as spies or politicians." (p.81 -
82)
This perception may be relevant to the elite officials who make policy but the majority
of the staff is ordinary civil servants who work diligently at the biding of their superiors.
They work long hours without the benefit of overtime pay (as do all civil servants).
Secretarial staff is minimal and the directors do most of their own administration.
Housing is provided for officers and their families but the facilities in apartment
complexes are cramped. If they can afford it, the officers prefer living in private
dwellings.
Scott Callon describes MITI as: "an awesome brain trust, and its officials work legendary hours
on behalf of its policies." (1995, p. 186)
Callon may have been influenced by Johnson's estimation of elite MITI staff. Although
the Japanese regard elite bureaucrats as talented and good administrators, generally,
skills are not effectively utilized. B.C. Koh quotes Sahashi:
"As Sahashi Shigeru, a former administrative vice-minister of MITI put it, the concept of 'ability' is
totally nullified.' (1989, p.254)
The internal structure of the bureaus is hierarchical. A director-general heads each
bureau. A deputy director-general is second in command followed by directors who
perform various functions. For example, in the Basic Industries Bureau there is a
director-general, a deputy-director general, a director of general affairs division, a
director for basic industries (policy planning), a director of administrative affairs office,
a director for basic new materials policy office and so forth. The nature of management
resembles the military.
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There are two tiers of civil servants: career and non-career. Non-career officers act as
support staff for career officers and are not eligible for promotion to the higher ranking
positions such as vice-minister, director-general, deputy-director general and director.
The elite are among the career officers as was discussed in chapter 1131 and are accepted
into the ministry after having passed the difficult High Level Public Officials Exam and
going through gruelling interviews. Twenty-five candidates considered for elite rank
are accepted as career officers to MITI each year. Only a small number out of the
twenty-five will survive the climb to the upper echelons of MITI. B.C. Koh describes
them as "meritorious elite." (1989, p.253,) However, they soon realize that they must
adhere to bureaucratic etiquette and follow the orders of their superiors' orders without
questioning, concealing any personal opinion so that they will not fall from favour and
be promoted.
• • • 1T9
There is a clear distinction among career officers. As Chalmers Johnson stated ,
officers who have a law degree from Tokyo University are favoured for high-ranking
positions over career officers holding other degrees such as engineering. The Japan
External Trade Organizations (JETRO) is one of MITI's Special Status Corporations. It
has eighty overseas branch offices. MITI elite officers are posted in upper management
positions in these overseas offices and the majority have received law degrees from
Tokyo University. For example, with the exception of one official, who had a law
degree from Kyoto University, the MITI officers who served as executive directors and
presidents at JETRO New York from 1992-2001 held law degrees from Tokyo
University.
During the initial three to five years in MITI, the career officers are rotated to various
divisions to be assessed on their abilities. In their third year they may be sent abroad to
131 See chapter 2 "Chalmers Johnson's Legacy"
132 ibid
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foreign universities to study for one to two years. MITI contributes large sums of money
to such universities as Harvard, Stanford, Tufts and John Hopkins where elite officers
are sent to study law, government and business administration.
Many of them have received education at American universities. For example, the MITI
officer, who served as president of JETRO New York from 1992-1994 was a Visiting
Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and also attended the
University of Syracuse School of Management for eight months. The MITI officer, who
served as president of JETRO New York from 1996-1998 studied at Rice University in
Texas for one year. The MITI officer, who served as the director of EID/MITI at
JETRO New York from 1992-1995 studied at John Hopkins University for one year.
The current president of JETRO New York attended Harvard University, earning a
Master of Comparative Law degree. The MITI officer, who served as executive director
of JETRO New York from 1998 to 2001, graduated from the Harvard Law School,
passing the Massachusetts State bar exam.
At the beginning of their careers, members from the same class are promoted at the same
time. However, through a gradual elimination process only a few members from each
class climb to the top of the ministerial pyramid. Promotion as well as postings overseas
may also be executed according to internal political factors such as belonging to a
certain clique of officers whose superior is particularly influential. The elite are given
three opportunities to study and assume posts overseas. Some officers are sent for three
years as First Secretaries in Japanese embassies. For example, the president of JETRO
New York (1992-1994) was the First Secretary at the embassy in Indonesia. He was sent
to London for a year as a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs
and then to the University of Syracuse Management School for eight months. His
successor at JETRO New York was the First Secretary at the embassy in Pakistan and
president of JETRO San Francisco. The current president served in the Japanese
embassy in Brazil.
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The promotion of the rank and file is based on the seniority system in keeping with the
ministry's hierarchical system. The seniority system makes advancement tediously slow
and the senior members are retired (katatataki or "tap on the shoulder") to pave a way
for junior officials so that they can assume higher positions. As managerial positions
near the top of the pyramid become scarcer, many officials retire if they do not receive
promotions. In MITI the highest positions are administrative vice-minister and vice-
minister of international affairs. Traditionally, both officials, who have entered MITI as
members of the same class, will retire at the same time.
Retirement for civil servants is on the average between the ages of forty-five to fifty-
five, earlier than pre-war civil servants and for employees in the private sector, who
retire at sixty to sixty-five. The majority of MITI employees come from middle-class
families. Some candidates opt to enter because their families do not have the necessary
personal connections to facilitate an introduction to big businesses. The director of
EID/MITI, who graduated with a law degree from Tokyo University, was in this
category:
"I had no idea what my future career would be. My father was a sailor in the Coast Guard and we
did not have connections in the business world. I did not want to become a lawyer. After
graduation I immediately entered MITI."133
Some officers enter the ministry because a family member was an officer. Others, who
would have preferred a career in the military because their fathers were military, may
opt for MITI because it manages the defence industry. A non-career officer posted in
the Industrial Research division at JETRO New York explained his background:
"I originally wanted to be a pilot in the Air Force Academy. However, after the war, all of the
military institutions were shut down and, of course, there was no Air Force. I graduated with a
degree in aeronautical engineering from Tokyo Metropolitan University, a public university. I
entered Toyota because the defence industry was non-existent and the civilian aircraft industry was
133 January 1994 Interview at JETRO New York
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very limited. Many people who had aeronautical engineering backgrounds went to work in the
automobile industry."1 4.
Johnson documents a well-known conflict in MITI between "nationalists" and
"internationalists" in the mid-1960s. He explains: "This distinction used to have policy
implications but in recent years it has boiled down to an argument over 'merit' (the
internationalists) versus promotion based on 'seniority' (the nationalists). Both groups have liaisons
with different groups of politicians." (Johnson C. 1995, p. 228) Yamamura Kozo describes
the "nationalists" as officials, who wanted to maintain the status quo and continue to
promote Japanese industries, and the "internationalists" as officials who wanted to open
up Japan's industrial markets to foreign imports even though major changes in MITI's
policies would be necessary. Yamamura contends that the "internationalists" won a
partial victory but that it:
"...indicated even within MITI—the ministry occupying pre-eminent position in Japan's industrial
policy—internal consensus on policy goals could no longer be taken for granted." (Yamamura
K.and Eads G.,1987, p. 451)
On January 6, 2001 the MITI's name was changed to the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry METI) but since the thesis examines MITI's role before 2001 METI will be
referred to as MITI with the exception of chapter 7, the conclusion.
This chapter examines MITI's old structure and METI's new structure and formal
functions. There is also discussion of the policy tool "administrative guidance" to
illustrate the power that ministries wield over the political economy.
Functions And Structure
The Japanese government, in an effort to make government smaller, to give the prime
minister's office more executive powers and to execute a more efficient management of
Japan's economy, is attempting to consolidate some of the duties that were previously
134 January 1994 Interview at JETRO New York
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recognized as being within one ministry's jurisdiction among several ministries.
However, at this time, the extent of the restructuring seems to apply mainly to the
reshuffling of duties. For example, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications, and the Management and Coordination Agency have joined to
form the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications. The Ministry of Education has taken in the Science and
Technology Agency to form the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has joined with the Ministry of
Labour to form the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Ministry of Transport
and the Ministry of Construction have joined together with the National Land Agency to
form the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry has formally adopted the Economic Planning Agency135 and changed
1 T/-
its name to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Agencies that were formerly within MITI such as the Patent Office, the Small and
Medium Size Enterprise Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency (now the
Ministry of Environment) have been separated from the ministry but they are still under
the ministry's management. Indeed, there is a new agency, the Agency of Industrial
Science and Technology that also fits nicely into the ministry's portfolio of related
agencies.
According to METI's web page, MITI was established in 1951, however, the 1994 MITI
Handbook records MITI's establishment in May 1949.137 John Dower agrees that MITI
was established in 1949. (1999, p 541) The MITI Handbook provides a summary of the
ministries' responsibilities:
"MITI covers a wide range of industrial fields, including basic industries, steel, new chemical
materials, bioindustries, etc., machinery and information industries (electronic equipment robots,
135 The EPA was managed by MITI
136 See appendix 1 for METI history and organizational structure
137 ( )
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industrial machinery, automobiles, aircraft, information processing, aerospace, etc.) and consumer
goods, industries (textiles, fine ceramics, household goods, housing materials, etc.). At the same time
it is in charge of affairs related to foreign trade, high technologies, environmental protection and
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industrial location, energy and other areas."
MITI's authority also extended to all large, medium and small manufacturing firms and
has established industry specific manufacturing trade associations. Before the recent
restructuring there were four 'horizontal' bureaus that managed industrial policy,
international trade policy, international trade administration and industrial location and
environmental protection. Vertical bureaus handled basic industries, machinery and
information industries and consumer products. There were also nine regional bureaus
that provided MITI with data on regional industrial activity. (Osaki R.,1984, p.55)
Although METI's organization has been slightly restructured, METI bears a striking
resemblance to MITI. The new METI intends to take on a broader role in the
management of Japan's economy during the 21st century. As well as the promotion of
commerce and trade, the ministry will plan microeconomic policy for industries,
protection (hojo) of industry and ensuring that there is a steady supply of energy
(including nuclear power). According to Shima Nobuhiko, the particular characteristic
of the new ministry is seen in the word "protection" which - is often used. He suggests
that the "protection" implies that the policy tool "administrative guidance" (to be
discussed later in this chapter) will be used as often as before in order to ensure
compliance with ministerial guidance. (Shima N. 2000, p.48)
Although the elimination of the Consumer Goods Bureau and the Environmental
Protection Bureau brings the number of bureaus from nine to seven, the ministry has
plans to institute five temporary agencies that are apparently not subject to budget and
operation reviews, (see below # 10)
138 See appendix 2 for MITI organizational structure
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METI states that the restructuring effort is for:
"Logical Consideration, Effective Action and Emphasis on Results."
METI's mission statement reads:
"To be a navigator in support of a diverse range of players and to create socio-economic systems for
these diverse players to exercise their capabilities fullest. As its mission METI will propel the
Japanese economy by providing information and analytical insights, creating systems that support
society and the economy, and enhancing Japan's technological foundations, so that companies,
communities, individuals, non-profit organizations, and other players can exercise their capabilities
to the fullest and maximize their potential."139
The restructuring includes the following:
1. A new bureau, the Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, has been established:
"...to integrate macroeconomic and microeconomic policy, research and statistics, and
regional economics."
2. "Establishing a post of Director-General for Regional Economic and Industrial policy and
encouraging greater networking among the eight Regional Bureaus of Economy, Trade and
Industry."
3. "Reorganizing the sections responsible for trade policy and trade relations and establishing
the Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureaus"
4. Reorganizing the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology and bringing industrial
technology policy under the Industrial Sciences and Technology Policy and Environment
Bureau."
5. "Expanding the interfaces with industry in the Manufacturing Industries Bureau."
6. "Shifting from the Information Industries Bureau to the Commerce and Information Policy
Bureau and establishing the Consumer Affairs Department."
7. "Revamping the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy and establishing the Agency for




8. "Reorganizing the Japan Patent Office (JPO) to better support the knowledge based
society."
9. "Establishing a new structure to solve various SME business problems."
10. "Spinning off five organizations as independent agencies." (not subject to annual budgetary
and operational reviews)"
11. "Adoption of the 'unit' system." (to facilitate a faster decision-making process within
divisions)"
METI continues to manage the public corporations set up by MITI, among them the
Japan External Trade Organization, the National Oil Corporation (JNOC), the Japan
Finance Corporation for Small Businesses, the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise, and
the Japan Regional Development Corporation. METI also assumes the industrial
associations that were established during MITI's era. Among these are, the Electronic
Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ), The Foundation for International Trade and
Industrial Cooperation (ITIC), the Institute for Developing Economies (IDE), Japan
Auto Parts Association, Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. (JAMA),
Japan Camera Industry Association, The Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association
(JEMA), Japan Industrial Technology Association (JITA), Japan Information Processing
Development Center (JIPDEC), Japan Lumber Importers' Association, Japan Machinery
Exporter' Association, Metal Mining Agency of Japan, Japan Textile Machinery
Association, Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC) and The Japan Society
of Industrial Machinery Manufacturers.
Mr. Shima states that METI's policies will still encompass industrial production,
commerce, trade, high technology industries, energy, patents, and nurturing small
enterprises, (p. 152)
In comparison to other ministries such as the former Flealth and Welfare (now merged
with the Ministry of Labour), which had over 20,000 employees, METI is small with
approximately 12,381 officers. Nevertheless, the ministry is recognized as having
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significant control over Japan's industrial growth, planning both micro and macro
industrial policy.
Industrial Policy
Yamamura Kozo and George Eads define the objectives of MITI's industrial policy as
resembling the objectives of industrial policies in general.140 The policy instruments
are similar as well (Yamamura K. and Eads G., 1987, pp.423). Nonetheless, a nation's
policy is driven according to the needs of the society. Ozaki states that policy:
"...inevitably reflects the history, culture and tradition" of the society. (1984 p 49) The
methods used to implement policy also are related to the country's culture and tradition.
Yamamura and Eads distinguish the policy tool that reflects Japan's specific system:
"...informal (nonenforceable in the legal sense) ministerial involvement in the corporate decision¬
making process—'administrative guidance' -has been a significant element in Japanese industrial
policy." (1987 p. 425)
MITI has planned post-war industrial policy for Japanese industries. Although MITI's
policies have been credited for Japan's post-war rapid economic growth (1950-1973),
there is no hard quantitative evidence that defines the extent to which industrial policy
contributed to Japan's economic miracle. Thomas Pugel contends:
"Analysis of the role of Japan's industrial policy in contributing to higher growth is hampered by
the extreme difficulty of quantifying efforts." (1984, p. 422)
140 A protectionist industrial policy consists of measures that are employed by government to nurture the
industries deemed important to the national economy. These measures are known as policy instruments or
policy tools. In general, the package of instruments include the regulation of production, the protection of
industry from foreign competition through the use of tariffs, tax incentives to companies that procure from
domestic manufacturers, subsidies for R&D and loans for expansion of operations and so forth. Hugh
Patrick states that the industries that are favored by government: "...have access to resources in degrees
in timing different from what would occur through the normal market place." (Patrick H. 1986
"Japanese High Technology Industrial Policy in Comparative Context" Japan's High Technology
Industries University of Washington Press pp.5)
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Certainly MITI's efforts were greatly enhanced by a number of factors. 1) the fixed rate
of exchange of 360 yen per dollar in 1949, undervaluing the yen so that Japanese exports
could have easier access to world markets, 2) the SCAP purge of communist
sympathizers and the quelling of labour strikes in order to ensure a stable environment
for industrial growth,141 3) antimonopoly legislation revised to allow inter-corporate
share holdings (Dower J.,1999, pp.540-541), 4) access to cheap technologies, 5) the
1964 Tokyo Olympics that marked a spurt in industrial development as the Japanese
prepared for the influx of foreign tourists. The construction of roads, hotels, sports
arenas, airports and new housing also brought improvements to infrastructure in such
metropolitan areas as Tokyo and Osaka, 6) consistent support of policy from the Diet
and business, 7) the successful efforts to internationalise by industrialists such as Morita
Akio (Sony), Honda Soichiro (Honda) and Inamori Kazuo (Kyocera), 8) America's
willingness to accept the surge of Japanese exports in US markets with the objective of
preserving a strong alliance in the Pacific, 9) the industriousness of the Japanese
themselves and their willingness to follow MITI's prodding to save earnings. In 1973 the
Japanese had the highest rate of savings per capita in the world. They still have a
relatively high rate of savings, although behind Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia.
Industrial Policy and Economic Growth
MITI's powers were significant during Japan's period of rapid growth (1955-1973)).
MITI focused on resuscitating the smoke stack industries, coal and steel, in order to
nurture automobile production and the energy intensive industries such as
petrochemicals, shipbuilding and aluminium. Within that period Japan's petrochemical
industry burgeoned.
Foreign trade resumed in 1947. The 1949 Foreign Exchange Law gave MITI the right to
control foreign exchange until 1964. MITI controlled licensing, which favoured
Japanese companies. Japan imports 98% of fossil fuels and MITI also controlled the
distribution of fossil fuels to industries, accommodating the ones deemed crucial to
141 See chapter 3 "Big Business"
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national interests. By 1953 Japan's production, national income and consumption had
returned to pre-war levels. Policy until 1973 was the promotion of exports and capital
investment. (Yoshida S.,1998, P. 572) MITI established the Development Bank of
Japan, the Long-Term Trust Bank and the Japan Import Export Bank (EXIM), setting up
a system through which the banks could invest capital in industries so that companies
could focus on long-term development.
Hugh Patrick describes Japan's economic growth:
"Between 1955 and 1973 the Japanese GDP increased almost six times in real terms. By the early
1970s Japan had become the world's third largest industrial economy (following the United States
and the USSR) with per capita income comparable to Western Europe." (1986, plO)
Japan's economy rose steadily until 1973 despite the fact that President Nixon abolished
the conversion of the dollar into gold ("Nixon Shock") in August 1971, which resulted
in an appreciation of the yen from 360 to 308 yen per dollar. However, the end of the
Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the adoption of the flexible exchange rate system,
appreciating the yen even further, as well as the first oil crisis in October 1973, were two
blows that forced Japan into a four-year recession and an end to smooth sailing for
MITI's policies.
The Oil Shock took MITI completely by surprise. Its long-term plans for the energy
intensive and heavy industries were brought to an abrupt halt. Industries such as
shipbuilding, steel, chemicals, paper, aluminium and petrochemicals suffered structural
problems. By that time MITI had relinquished control over foreign exchange (1964).
Also, cheap technologies were no longer useful to maturing industries. MITI had no
choice but to revise its long-term policy.
MITI's "visions", released every ten years, show the changes in direction of MITI's
industrial policy. A "vision" is defined by Robert Ozaki as: "...the Japanese version of
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indicative planning intended to build consensus opinion among all segments of society concerning
the country's industrial structure, to ensure continuity and stability of industrial policy."
(Ozakil984: p.55). The "vision" indicates the policies that MITI is planning and the
industries that will receive specific guidance. A number of deliberative councils
(shingikai) attached to MITI, the most prominent among them being the Industrial
Structure Council, examine issues related to industry. Other councils include the Export
and Import Transaction Council, Japanese Industrial Standards Council, Consumer
Affairs Council and Small and Medium Enterprise Policy Making Council. The
members are composed of leaders in industrial circles, consumers, academics, and
representatives from national and local government. The members are asked to assess
the direction of the economy and to suggest policy for the coming decade.
MITI's "vision" for the 1960s focused on heavy industrialization. The "vision" for the
1970s, influenced by the two blows to heavy industrialization, switched from heavy and
intensive industries and promoted "knowledge-intensive" industry (e.g. computer). The
'vision" for the 1980s encouraged industry to be "creative,' and the "vision" for the
1990s changed direction from the promotion of industrial growth to "Creating Human
Values in the Global Age." (Tsukamoto, 1994)
"Administrative Guidance" (Gyoseishido) and the Implementation of
Policy Through the Bureaucratic Network
In Japan bureaucratic regulation of industry can be administered through the use of the
policy instrument "administrative guidance." The tool is used ad hoc and at the
discretion of the ministries. There are no laws that limit the number of times this tool
can be used or for what purposes. As Ulrike Schaede states:
"Rules can be implemented or revoked at the discretion of the ministry in charge, and without prior
notice, hence the strong situational character of administrative guidance." (Schaede U.,1995,
pp.301)
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"Administrative guidance" was first used by MITI in 1952 to order the formation of
cartels of industries that were designated as being important to national interests such as
heavy industries and petrochemicals. Nakamura Takafusa explains that the
Antimonopoly Act was revised in 1953:
"...to allow the authorization of depression cartels and rationalization cartels, relaxed restrictions
on such things as stock retention to corporations, interlocking directorships and mergers, and
sanctioned retail price maintenance." (1995, pp. 51)
MITI started using "administrative guidance" to protect industries from foreign
competition even before the law was revised. After the oil shock in 1973 and the
beginning of the recession, the problems with inflation and increased unemployment,
MITI and other ministries sought to use the policy instrument to form antirecession
cartels of such declining industries as aluminium and petrochemicals.
As stated above, the ministries can use guidance unfettered by legal sanctions. Usually
companies will receive 'requests' or 'notifications,' which contain 'recommendations.'
The requests are issued in written form or by telephone, although a law in 1997 formally
curtailed the use of the telephone. Companies rarely reject guidance for a number of
reasons but pressure from peers and acquiescence to elite authority and fear of
retribution such as fines, rejection of permits and applications for patents and subsidies
are primary considerations. Richard Katz writes:
"Indeed, efficient producers were often coerced to make cuts under penalty of government fines and
industry association boycotts." (1998 p.170)
If companies do not comply with guidance they may find that future applications for
licenses, permits, patents or tax breaks may not be dealt with immediately. Ezra Vogel
claims: "...even if MITI eventually grants the necessary permission to an uncooperative company,
the harassing tactics of delaying, requesting more information, raising more questions and creating
uncertainty are ordinarily enough to inspire companies to be more cooperative." (1979, pp.73-74)
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In many cases MITI's guidance is administered at meetings between elite officials at
meetings and upper management in the industries where MITI plans to form cartels.
The management in these industries can be ex-MITI officials, who have parachuted into
those positions after their retirement from the ministry (amakudari: is discussed in
chapter 6) and who were former colleagues of the officials giving the guidance. This
network of elite ex-bureaucrats throughout business and elite bureaucrats in the
ministries (commonly referred to as "old boys" or "OBs") creates an ideal environment
for the use of "administrative guidance" as a policy enforcer.
Johnson contends:
"Who governs is Japan's elite bureaucracy. The bureaucracy drafts virtually all laws, ordinances,
regulations, and licenses that govern society. It also has extensive powers of 'administrative
guidance' and is comparatively unrestrained in any way, both in theory and in practice, by the
judicial system. To find a comparable official elite in the United States, one would have to turn to
those who staffed the E-Ring of the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency at the height of the
Cold War." (1995 P. 13)
The Japanese deference to elite officials in the ministries facilitates the use of
"administrative guidance" but the network of bureaucrats throughout the political
economy perpetuates a rigid system and, coupled with ministerial power to implement
policy with little intervention from the judiciary, can frustrate efforts to reform.
In his article "Success that Soured: Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan"
Yamamura Kozo relates a story about a meeting between MITI officials and the
directors of a steel company that originally appeared in the January 7, 1981 Nihon Keizai
newspaper. The episode, a portion given here, illustrates the method of communication
used when "administrative guidance" is given and how the network of ex-bureaucrats in
business amakudari) and their former colleagues in the ministries facilitates the
implementation of policy.
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"The Iron Steel Building in Nihonbashi, Tokyo. Around noon every Monday, elderly gentlemen
arrive in black cars...They go to room 704, on the entrance of which is a sign reading, 'The regular
Monday Club Meeting.' The members consist of eight major steel producers. They sit at a
rectangular table around the section chief of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, who
is seated at the head of the table.
Ogawa, who heads the Iron and Steel Section of the Basic Industries Bureau of MITI, presides over
the meeting. On his left is Vice President Ohashi of New Nippon Steel and on his right is Senior
Director, Yamaguchi of Nippon Steel Pipe...after coffee the members listen to Ogawa's
presentation. The meeting ends after about an hour. The official name of the Monday club is the
General Session of the Market Policies Committee. It was organized in 1958 and since then has
served as a point of contact between MITI and Industry.
Vice president Ohashi is responsible for coordinating the industry view. Twenty years ago (circa
1960) the current president of the Japan Federation of Economics Organization (Keidanren), Mr.
Imayama, now the chairman of the New Japan Steel Corporation had the job which Mr. Ohashi
now holds. Among the ranks of the senior directors of the major steel firms are former MITI
officers who 'descended from heaven' to these firms. Japan Steel Pipe's Counselor Matsuo (former
MITI vice minister), Sumitomo Metals President Kumagai (former MITI vice minister): Kobe
Steel's Vice President Kamatsu (former MITI vice minister)..."(Yamamura K.,1982, p.81).
Even companies in the giant keiretsu that have refused to comply with guidance
experienced some form of retribution by the ministry that has issued the guidance.
Ozaki gives a famous case in the 1960s:
"In 1965-66 MITI administratively instructed Sumitomo Metals to reduce production, allegedly to
prevent excessive competition. Having just completed a new large-scale plant, Sumitomo refused to
comply with the guidance. MITI retaliated by cutting down the coal import quota for the firm.
Considerable tension arose between the two, although a compromise solution was later rectified."
(1984 pp. 63-64)
Daniel Okimoto claims that the use of "administrative guidance" has decreased since the
1970's.but the policy tool continued to serve MITI well through 1980s. Schaede claims
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that the increase in the number of ex-MITI officials in the steel industry between 1983
and 1988 indicated that MITI used "administrative guidance" to implement the
formation of cartels among steel manufacturers under the Structurally Depressed
Industry Law:
"... steel makers had an incentive to hire OBs in order ensure stable market quotas, access to limited
imports of raw materials, and lobbying with MITI against competing steel makers." (1995, p.310)
Also, although Japan's markets may be in the process of deregulation for some
products, apparently MITI's policy for the steel industry in the 1990s was the continued
formation of cartels and Japanese businessmen supported policy as Mark Tilton
confirmed in the article he wrote about how Japan's steel industry benefits from cartels.
He described a conversation he had with an executive from an electronics firm:
"...he praised MITI's cartels to keep prices high in the steel and chemical industries from which his
companies buy raw materials as 'wonderful. We were afraid that the companies would go
bankrupt." (1994, p.3)
Although it may be construed as informal, guidance can be given by ministries through
their trade and industrial associations whose members feel obliged to follow ministerial
policy such as purchasing supplies solely from domestic producers. Richard Katz claims
that companies fear retaliatory measures if they do not comply. He gives Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries as an example of a company that dared to purchase cheaper steel from
a Korean firm (one-third cheaper than Japanese cartel steel prices) and was threatened
by a cut-off of supplies and other punishments. (1998, p. 45)
"Administrative guidance" has clearly given MITI the power to implement policy and
this power is derived from the network of ex-MITI officials in business.
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Conclusion
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), established in 1949 to revive
Japan's war devastated industry, was a consolidation of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry and the Board of Trade. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry managed
Japan's industrial growth before the war and controlled industrial production during the
war, its name changing to the Ministry of Munitions.
Reacting to the Cold War and the threat of communist expansion in Asia the Supreme
Command wanted a strong and conservative ally in the Pacific. SCAP allowed the
bureaucrats, who had served during the war in the Ministry of Commerce, to plan and
implement policy for industry in order to recover Japan's economy as rapidly as
possible. The ministry was granted extraordinary powers to implement its policies.
MITI's policies during Japan's rapid growth period to 1973 were protectionist in nature,
protecting domestic industries from foreign competition through the use of cartels for
both domestic and export markets. MITI's policy tool, "administrative guidance" was
used to compel industries to adhere to MITI's regulatory policies, particularly in the
formation of cartels. The tool could be facilitated through the collaboration of MITI
officials with their former colleagues, ex-MITI officials, who had parachuted into upper
management positions in the industries that were in MITI's jurisdiction. The ex-MITI
officers usually cooperated with MITI's guidance. "Administrative guidance" now must
be transmitted by written recommendation and can no longer be given verbally, but there
are also ways for MITI to guide industries "informally" through its industrial and trade
association, its Special Status Corporations and public corporations where ex-MITI
officials take upper management positions.
The new METI plans major changes in its future activities, becoming more involved in
regional development and in promoting small enterprises. Although METI's
organizational structure appears to have changed, the internal nature of the ministry will
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remain in tact unless the rigid system that has continued since the end of the war is
changed.
The METI has 903 public corporations, second only to the Ministry of Education. The
ministries are vested with the power to administrate wide-ranging structural reforms,
reforms, which include the public finance sector and Special Status Corporations and
public corporations. Since the ministries rely on these corporations, it is unlikely that
reforms will progress quickly to alleviate further government debt. As will be explained
in the next chapter, the Japan National Oil Corporation, a METI Special Status
Corporation, is slated for dissolution because of enormous debt. However, in reality its






In his book, The Parasite That is Consuming Japan (Nihon wo Kuitsuku Kiseichu) Iishi
Koki contends that if his plans for structural reforms were followed, Japan would
undergo change, (p. 97) Iishi, currently the vice-chairman of the Tokyo branch of the
Democratic Party of Japan, feels that at the center of structural reform is the Special
Status Corporations and public corporations, which he claims are a "swarm of parasites
that is a hotbed of power" for bureaucrats and politicians, (p.22) He calls for the closure
of these "administrative enterprises", (p. 3)
Iishi claims that public corporations employ 3.86% of Japan's population or 4, 900,000
people (p. 19)' He calculates that public funding to Special Status Corporations in 1999
was ¥3,082,154 trillion in comparison with 1990 when public funding was ¥2,308,645
trillion. The total amount received by Special Status Corporations rose from
approximately ¥256 billion in 1999 to ¥258 billion in 2000. (p. 33) His book was
published in 2001 when Japan's public debt had reached 130% of the GDP. It is
expected to reach 140% in 2002.
The October 10, 2001 edition of Nikkei Shimbun ran a front -page article of prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro's intention to reform Special Status Corporations by cutting
government funds to corporations by one-third and closely scrutinizing how loans were
made to Special Status Corporations. His proposed reforms coincide with other
structural reforms that would reduce public debt. However, Koizumi is encountering
stiff opposition from members of his own party, the LDP, and from the ministries
because of vested interests.
' Ishii claims that 49% of the population or 62,540,000 people are not employed (children, housewives,
the physically and mentally disabled, the aged and the unemployed)
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Iishi claims that, so far, there has been little movement toward reforms of any kind. The
reluctance of the ministries to reform Special Status and public corporations, thus
preserving their territory, and the continued support of ministerial conduct by the
Japanese symbolizes the rigidity of Japan's political economic system that inhibits the
implementation of reforms. This chapter defines Special Status and public corporations
and explains how the ministries use them.
Definition
The ministries established Special Status Corporations after the war to aid in the
reconstruction of infrastructure that had been destroyed by air raids and to assist in
Japan's economic recovery. The corporations are in some way connected to the sectors
that the ministries administrate and they are supported entirely or partially by public
funds and tax revenue. After Japan's rapid growth, Special Status Corporations were no
longer necessary and should have been dismantled but the ministries continued to
operate them. (Iishi K., 2001, p. 22) They were established according to "the law for the
establishment of Special Status Corporations" which is neither a civil law nor a law that
pertains to the establishment of private corporations. The Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs and Posts and Telecommunications states that Special
Status Corporations are:
"...corporations that were founded directly through special establishing acts brought about by
special laws which are subject to Article 4, subparagraph 15 of the Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications Establishment Law (Law No. 91 of 1999)."2
(February 17, 1997 Zenkakutsuke Tokushuhojin/Caiegorizing Special Status
Corporations Nikkei Business p 24)
However, there is no clear indication of conditions for establishment and there are no
general lists available for examination. Currently the Japanese government counts the
number of Special Status Corporations at 163.
2 October 2001
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Until recently the terms " public corporation" and "Special Status Corporation" were
interchangeable and Special Status Corporations fit into the general category of public
corporations or koeki hojin. According to a government report released this year (Koeki
Hojin Hakusho/ White Paper on Public Corporations) there are more than 26,000 public
corporations. The national government ministries manage over 7,000 while 19,000 are
managed at the local level. The Japanese categorize "public corporations" as being
foundations (zaidan) and associations (shadan) that can be connected to Special Status
Corporations and can receive funding from Special Status Corporations. Other types of
public corporations that also fall within the classification of Special Status Corporations
are: 1) kosha or publicly-owned utility companies 2) kodan or state-run corporation that
are involved in construction 3) jigyodan or corporations that involve everything except
construction 4) koko or public finance corporations 4) kinko or public corporations
where loans are made from capital supplied from the public and private sectors 5) eidan,
only one which is the Tokyo Metropolitan Transit Authority 5) tokushukaisha or
corporations that are funded with both public and private funds such as Japan Airlines
and the Tohoku District Development Company. (Johnson C.,1995, pp 135-136)
Special Status Corporations receive funds from investments from the Postal Savings
Agency, a state-run banking system.4 The collection agency is the Ministry of Home
Affairs and Posts and Telecommunication. The dispersing agent is the Ministry of
Finance. Since the funding is not made primarily from tax revenue, Special Status
Corporations are not required to make public disclosure of their budgets. However, tax
revenue is also a source for supplementing budgets.5
J November 2001 www.soumu.go.org
4
Many Japanese prefer the Postal Savings Agency because it offers slightly higher interest rates than
private financial institutions. They also feel secure because government controls the institution.
5 March 28, 2002 Asahi Shimbun
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The Special Status Corporations that are involved in construction and finance also
receive funds from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP)6 that is often
referred to as Japan's "secondary budget." Iwamoto Yasushi of the Institute of
Economic Research, Kyoto University defines FILP:
"The term of'Fiscal Investment and Loan Program' first appeared in the 1953 Budget. The
postwar FILP system was based on two laws enacted in 1951. Since the center of FILP was the
Trust Fund Bureau, we call it in the Trust Fund Bureau system. Filp is a financial activity of the
public sector. It is a big financial conglomerate operated by the public sector...The largest part is
postal savings. Another important part is the public pension fund." 7
Various public institutions receive funds from FILP. Among them is the Japan Highway
Corporation the other highway construction corporations. Gillian Tett, reporter for the
Financial Times wrote in the March 29, 2000 edition:
"The Japanese will need to inject about 5,000 bn yen (30bn pounds) of taxpayers' money into state-
run infrastructure projects to cover hidden losses, the Ministry of Finance has estimated. Those
needing subsidies include the Japan Highway Corporation, the Road Building Agency, and the
Housing Loan Corporation, the state mortgage leader. This 5,000bn yen project marks a striking
break from the past, since until now the ministry has usually denied that these projects would need
subsidies. This is because they were funded by postal savings deposits, through a system known as
the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP), and were supposed to be completely safe. And
although FILP projects play and important role in the Japanese economy, their accounts have
remained opaque."
As public debt spirals upward (130 % of 2001 GDP) FILP is facing a drastic
downsizing. In the 2002 budget FILP is estimated at ¥26.79 trillion or a cut of 17.7%,
marking the biggest reduction in its history.
6 FILP report available at www.mof.go.jp/zaito/zaito2001 .html
7
Kyoto University Symposium on the Changes in the Japanese Economy Facing the New Century
(November 2001 University of Edinburgh)
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Demands for the Reform of Special Status Corporations and Public
Corporations
The February 1997 Nikkei Business article on Special Status Corporations was published
when media was focusing on corruption in the ministries, particularly in regards to
funding of Special Status Corporations and the amakudari system in Special Status
Corporations and public corporations. The article claimed that, although Special Status
Corporations are founded on the precept that the work executed serves the interests of
the nation, the exact opposite is true. Among the reasons given were: 1) Special Status
Corporations receive funding from sources that are difficult to trace, 2) Special Status
Corporations can set up subsidiaries (kogaish, magogaisha) that show profits even
though the parent corporation may be in debt, 3) the ministries establish Special Status
Corporations as well as their subsidiaries to provide temporary employment for staff
(,shukko) or temporary postretirement positions for retired senior officers before they
migrate to positions in the private sector (amakudari). Currently civil servants are
required by law to wait for two years after retirement before taking positions in the
private sector. However, they are free to take positions in Special Status Corporations,
receiving a salary while receiving postretirement benefits from their former agencies, 4)
Special Status Corporations spend funds to do work that is in the best interest of
corporations (e.g. ministries).
The Nikkei article carried a graph that shows that there were seventy-nine Special Status
Corporations in 1997, employing 831 civil servants and 528, 553 staff. The budgets in
1997 for these Special Status Corporations were also subsidized by the National
Treasury to the amount of £16.8 billion and from other public funds £190.4 billion.
Using 1994 statistics, the graph showed that there were 332 public corporations. (koeki
hojin), that received £1.39 billion in subsidies from the National Treasury and 658
corporations that received £80 million from trusts. These public corporations were said
to employ 151,394 civil servants in management and 191, 779 staff. 1,014 of the public
corporations are connected to Special Status Corporations and 240 corporations receive
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funds directly from Special Status Corporations. The lowest section of the graph
indicated that senior officials from the ministries migrated from Special Status
Corporations to positions in the private sector.
There is an interview with Kato Kan, the director of Chiba Commercial College, who
emphasized that the financing of Special Status Corporations through public funds (i.e.
34 billion yen) is the big problem because the ministries have the power to use the funds
at their discretion without entertaining discussion in the Diet and politicians who want to
direct work such as construction to businesses in their districts can ask the Special Status
Corporations for funds (i.e. provide contracts for infrastructure construction and so
forth).
Kato also complained that there is absolutely no disclosure by Special Status
Corporations regarding postretirement positions for civil servants (amakudari) and
accounting. He claimed that the Special Status Corporations subsidiaries (kogaisha and
magogaisha) provide postretirement positions as well, but this information was not
easily available to the public. The accounting system for Special Status Corporations
was difficult to understand because the method of keeping accounts differed from
private corporations. Mr. Kato recommended that Special Status Corporations be
converted to private corporations, (p 28)
Iishi Koki agreed with Kato that Special Status Corporations bred subsidiaries, which he
called "family companies." (2001 p.26). He also pointed to the Special Status
Corporations that local governments establish with local public funding. These
corporations are involved in tourism and leisure, culture, education and agriculture and
can provide postretirement positions (amakudari) for local government officials. Iishi
counted 6, 615 ex-government officials in these organizations. He also pointed to
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temporary posting (shukko) in these corporations for civil servants, counting 33,243
civil servants (p. 94)
Public Disclosure
The discrepancy in numbers as well as information regarding the administration and
administrative costs of Special Status Corporations and other public corporations can be
attributed to the difficulties in accessing data regarding Special Status Corporations9.
First and foremost there is the problem of disclosure, as Mr. Kato pointed out. Until
1999 and the Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administration Organs
(Gyosei Kikan no Hoyu Suru Joho no Kokai ni Kansuru Horitsu) the ministries were not
compelled to make public the budgets or operating expenses of their organizations. For
example, there is no extant list of corporations that MITI has established since the end of
the war. Although Special Status Corporations have websites, which offer information
about the activities engaged in by the organizations, there is little material available on
how they were funded and their annual expenditure. Nevertheless, Article 42
Information Disclosure by Independent Administrative Institutions and Public
Corporations merely states that:
"...in accordance with their character and type of business, the government shall take necessary
measures such as legislative measures relating to the disclosure of information in order to promote
the disclosure and provision of information of information held by independent administrative
institutions and public corporations."10
Indeed, the government is still in the process of analysing how Special Status
Corporations and public corporations will declare information regarding administrative
activities but it claims that:
8 These position can become permanent
9
In October 2001 some of the Special Status Corporations, including JETRO, released their budgets for
2002 and these can be accessed on the Internet. (JETRO.org.jp: "Special"
10
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..."there is an ongoing effort to disclose the operation and accounting contents of public
corporations by establishing an access room for the data on public corporations."11
Secondly, as will be discussed in the third chapter, the Japanese are reticent to share
information outside their specific group (i.e. division or institution). Unless research in
done within the group, it is exceedingly difficult to gather information about activities
the group is engaged in. The phrase, "information sharing" has become popular among
corporate executives who are trying to promote a more transparent environment in their
firms but realistically, the habit of sharing information with the public will take years to
develop. The study below is given to illustrate the difficulty of accessing pertinent
information from a Special Status Corporation.
Study of the Reticence to Share Information
In 1997 JETRO New York received notice that there would be aformat audit of
JETRO books as well as the books ofother Special Status Corporations and ministries
(Japan Highway Corporation, Ministries ofConstruction and Health and Welfare,
etc.) that hadposted representatives in JETRO's office. The announcement was made
ten days prior to the audit. This was thefirst time that JETRO would undergo a
government audit. Following the announcement, the writer observed that there was a
frenzy ofactivity throughout the office that included the shredding and disposal of
many documents. The conjecture can be made that the audit was a mereformality,
executed to satisfy members of the opposition parties. Ironically, although JETRO
may have not been entirelyforthcoming with data, the audit together with the
recession may have resulted in the subsequent closure of representative offices ofsuch
public corporations as the Japan Bicycle Promotion Corporation (MITI). Also,
JETRO's office moved within the next two years to a smaller space in the same




Thirdly, before the 1990s the majority of Japanese grudgingly accepted the fact that
bureaucrats establish public corporations for the benefit of their ministries. The
common view was that the salaries and retirement benefits of civil servants were lower
than for corporate executives and that the prospect of earning a good salary after leaving
the civil service would be an incentive to enter the ministries. The voices of opposition
to the system went unheeded while Japan's economy was on the fast track
Proposed Reforms for Special Status Corporations
The October 10, 2001 edition of Nikkei Shimbun, ran a front page article on Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro's intentions to reform special status corporations by cutting
government funds to special status corporations by one-third and closely scrutinizing
loans made to special status corporations. The proposed reforms coincide with other
proposed reforms such as the loosening of regulations and tackling the problem of non-
performing loans in order to restore Japan's ailing economy.
According to Julie Norwell in her December 2001 article for the Oriental Economist, in
June 2001 Koizumi targeted 163 "special" public corporations for eventual review. The
government now grants ¥5 trillion ($42 billion) annually to 163 "special" public
corporations.12 The reform starts with the elimination or consolidation of seven debt-
ridden Special Status Corporations.
At Koizumi's request, the ministries reviewed how the largest Special Status
Corporations were spending funds in an effort to cut wasteful spending. Ota Seiich,
former director of general affairs for the Coordination and Planning Agency and
currently director of the LDP office for the promotion of reforms contended that one-
• • 1T
third of the funds government gives to Special Status Corporations is wasted. So far,
the ministries have agreed to eliminate or consolidate seven. Among them are Housing
Loan Corporation, the Urban Development Corporation and the Japan National Oil
12 Norwell J. (December 20011 The Oriental Economist p 7 The writer does not specify which
corporations are Special Status Corporations
13 Nikkei Shimbun October 10, 2001
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Corporation (JNOC) and the Japan Highway Corporation (JH) Three debt-ridden
highway-construction corporations, the Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp.,
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp., and the Shikoku-Honshu Bridge Authority,
which manages the Kurushima Bridge (discussed in chapter 6 in Study of Ehime
Prefecture), are to consolidate operations with the JH. However, Koizumi faces stiff
opposition. His state minister, Ishihara Nobutaru recommended reforms for only one-
third of the public corporations, which forces Koizumi to throw-out his original plan of
cutting in half ¥5 trillion in government subsidies and lowering his targeted amount to
¥1 trillion. Even this reduced amount is too high for ministries to stomach. So far
recommended cuts stand at ¥580 billion.
i 141. The Japan Highway Corporation
The Construction Ministry established the Japan Highway Corporation in 1956 to
manage the construction of major highways and toll roads throughout Japan. It is a huge
kodan that contracts firms to do the construction. The JH as well as the other
corporations slated for consolidation finances projects with government funds and loans
from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP, Zaisei Toyoshi) and repays the
debt with revenue from highway tolls (November 21, 2001 Bloomberg Professional)
Prime Minister Koizumi wants to privatise the Postal Savings Agency because of the
ways funds have been dispersed to both FILP and to Special Status Corporations.
However, reform of Postal Savings will affect funding to FILP and in 2000 FILP loaned
the JH ¥2.1 trillion and the Housing Loan Corporation ¥10.4 trillion. Tax revenue
cannot refinance these loans. Before the Postal Account Agency can be reformed an
alternative way to finance these enormous loans must be found.
Ryuichiro Hosokawa, former managing editor of the Mainichi Shimbun contended that
the reason the JH should be dissolved is:
14 www.Jhnet.go.jp
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"...because its highest posts—including president, vice president and directors—are held by former
Construction Ministry bureaucrats. As most of them lack management skill, it's no surprise that
the corporation continues to lose money. The argument that a public corporation can be allowed to
operate at a deficit does not hold water. The highway corporation's top executives should resign
and refrain from accepting their retirement allowances. The same can be said of other public
corporations."15
Koizumi wants the debts incurred in highway construction paid within thirty years
instead of fifty years but he may soften his stance and accept repayment in fifty years.
2. The Japan National Oil Corporation'6
MITI established the Japan National Oil Corporation in 1967 to secure oil and natural
gas supplies. The JNOC also receives funds from FILP. The corporation states: "JNOC
has actively assisted Japanese oil companies through the following functions:
Providing up to 70% of the risk capital through equity share investment and low-interest loans to
Japanese oil companies for overseas and offshore oil Japan oil and gas exploration.
Granting loan guarantees of up to 60% of development capital financed by banks to Japanese oil
companies.
Conducting geological and geophysical surveys.
Gathering information concerning oil and gas activities. 17
The reason for the dissolution is that the corporate debt from oil exploration was
substantial (£7.8 billion in outstanding loans) but these losses were not disclosed until
the JNOC was revised in 1998. (Kuji T.,1998 p.104) In addition, there are complaints
about MITI retirees migrating to the JNOC for two years and then moving on to oil





The June 11, 1998 edition of Sankei Shimbun reported on the jostling among MITI elite
officials for the position of president after president Komatsu Kunio retired. Komatsu,
who handed in his resignation after almost six years as president because of the
outstanding debts, had been Director General of the MITI Assembly but had no
experience in energy administration. The Minister of Commerce and Industry stated that
if the next president was not an economist with experience in energy administration the
corporation could not be restructured.
The position of president of the JNOC was traditionally a postretirement post for either
former MITI Administrative Vice-ministers or MITI Vice Ministers of International
Affairs (shingikan). At the time that Komatsu was moving towards taking a second
three-year term, there was talk that former Administrative vice-minister Tanabashi Yuji,
also a former director of MITI's Deliberative Council (currently chairman of the
Association ofNew Energy) was to succeed him but Komatsu continued to serve. The
talk in the ministry was that Tanabashi had enough influence to gain the position. The
names of former directors of MITI's Deliberative Council, Hatayama Noboru (currently
president of the Japan External Trade Organization) and the Director General of the Oil
Bureau in the Agency for Natural Resources as well as Sakamoto Kichihiro, once the
head of MITI's Deliberative Council (currently an advisor at Mitsubishi Bank) were
raised also. Since there was criticism of amakudari, the reshuffling and Komatsu's
resignation, a person from the private sector also was in the field for appointment but
tradition prevailed and MITI officials continued to serve as president. The current
president is Kamata Yoshiro, a former MITI official.
The reform of the JNOC seems little more than the elimination of the name. Operations
will be continued by another METI public corporation, the Metal Mining Agency.
The government has divided the largest Special Status Corporations into ten categories:
There are twelve public corporations (kodan and shadari) with the JH and JNOC among
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them, sixteen public enterprises (jigyudan), among them is the Enterprise for
International Economic Cooperation. There are nine finance corporations (koko). In
this category is the Japan Finance Corporation for Small Businesses. There are two
state-run financial institutions (kikin) comprising the Development Bank of Japan and
the Export Import Bank of Japan (EXIM). The largest category is "others" (sono hoka).
The Japan External Trade Organization is included in this category, managed by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
MITI'S Special Status Corporations
The government claims that the number of Special Status Corporations total 163 but
Kuji Tsutomu totals the number of public corporations, foundations and associations
(those receiving public funding) throughout at 26,000 organizations. He claims that the
Ministry of Finance manages 900 of them. He contends that all of the organizations
offer positions for elite bureaucrats and that the results of a survey released to the public
by the Office of the Prime Minister shows that in of December 1997, 7,080 ex-
bureaucrats had migrated to 2,6089 public corporations. (Kuji T., 1998, p. 118)
Tsutsumi Kazuma, who is the director of the Council of Labour Unions for the Liaison
With Special Status Corporations, claims that the number of corporations, associations
and agencies established by MITI is eight hundred and ninety four, slightly less than as
was reported in the Asahi Shimbun. The discrepancy may be due to the ambiguity in the
definition of Special Status Corporations and public corporations and the laws under
which they have been established. Tsutsumi regards all of these organizations as
potential landing spots for ex-bureaucrats. He lists each division and the number of
organizations under its management. (2000, pp. 140-141)
1. Cabinet Director-General: 9
2. International Trade Policy Bureau (related to): 35
3. Trade Policy Bureau: 26
4. Industrial Policy Bureau: 93
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5. Environmental Protection and Industrial Location Bureau: 30
6. Basic Industries Bureau: 55
7. Machinery and Information Industries Bureau: 203
8. Consumer Goods Industries Bureau: 204
9. Agency ofNatural Resources and Energy: 82
10. Patent Office: 7
11. Small and Medium Enterprise Agency: 27
12. Agency of Industrial and Science Technology: 37
13. Trade, Commerce and Industry Bureau 85
Taking the Basic Industries Bureau as an example, among the Special Status
Corporations, institutes and associations under its management are the Development
Bank of Japan, Economics Institute of Japan, Institute for International Business
Communication, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the
Distribution Systems Research Institute and the Japan Department Stores Association.
The top seventy-seven Special Status Corporations are managed by seven ministries and
the Cabinet. They have websites that display some facts and figures regarding partial
expenditures for 2000 and 2001, number of employees, organization and the names of
management. MITI is said to manage twelve. The Japan National Oil Corporations, the
Shoko Chukin Bank, and the Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC).18 are
FILP agencies and there are proposals that they and the other FILP agencies be
privatised. Other MITI Special Status Corporations are the Japan Finance Corporation
for Small Business19 and the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation
(JAMEC).20 These agencies also receive funds from FILP. There is the Japan








(JETRO), the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
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(NEDO) and the Japan Regional Development Corporation, Japan Overseas
Development Corporation, the Japan Corporation for the Research and Development of
Nuclear Power, and the Corporation for Metal Mining. Shima Nobuhiko adds one more
with the Japan Promotion of Small Automobiles {e.g. racing cars) (p 195)
The Japan Finance Corporation for Small Businesses
The Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business founded in 1953 and has ¥410.9
billion in capital resources, is a primary lender to small businesses, giving long-term,
low-interest loans. Its budget comes from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program
(FILP). As of March 31, 2001 there were 1,751 employees and sixty offices throughout
9T
Japan, one in New York and one in Kuala Lumpur.
The Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Agency
The Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Agency was a consolidation in 1999 of the
Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation and the Japan Small Business Corporation
and the transfer of the Textile Industry Restructuring Agency.24 The capital is 3.5
trillion yen and there are 948 employees. There are nineteen domestic offices, one at
JETRO New York, one at JETRO Bankok and one at JETRO Shanghai. The objective
of JAMEC is to help small business upgrade structure by providing loans, jointly
operating businesses and "collective establishment of factories and stores, etc." There
are programs to help the textile industry to restructure and to support the
internationalisation of small businesses. There is the Mutual Relief System for Small
Scale enterprises with 2 million subscribers (funds total ¥7.4 trillion) and the Mutual
Relief System for the Prevention of Bankruptcies in SMEs (410 thousand subscribers
with loans totalling ¥343 billion. Businesses request loans from the JAMEC through





24 The textile industry, a declining industry, is heavily subsidized by government
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local government authorities who, in turn, request the loans from the JAMEC. The local
authorities receive the loans from the JAMEC and pass the funds onto the businesses.
As an example of Special Status Corporation subsidiary organizations, the Electric
Power Development Co. Ltd. has ten (see appendix) The EPDC has a Holding
Company, and Industrial Company, EPDC Environmental Engineering Service Co.,
Ltd., EPDC Coal Tech and Marine Co. Ltd., Kaihatsukoji Co., Kaihatsu Computing
Services, Co., Kaihatsudenki Co., KEC Corporation, KDC Engineering Co., and EPDC
Overseas Coal Co. The Japan External Trade Organization has "family corporations,"
among them research institutes and foundations (such as the Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF) and the Asia Research Institute (mentioned above).
Conclusion: Demands For Reform
In 1994 when Prime Minister Maruyama was attempting to reform Special Status
Corporations, the Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey of 1,780 employees in seven
Special Status Corporations that had been established by the Ministry of Construction.
They were asked questions regarding the amakudari of ex-civil servants who comprised
80% of the staff. 38% felt that amakudari was a very bad influence and should be
stopped. 29% felt that it could not be helped because of the current state of affairs. 7%
felt that the system was necessary. 33% of the employees answered that the ex-
bureaucrats did not serve any purpose as opposed to 7%, who answered that ex-
bureaucrats did serve a purpose. 50% of the employees felt that ex-bureaucrats were
slightly helpful. (.Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1994, p. 183)
In 1995 the now defunct Sakigake Party proposed a number of reforms for Special
Status Corporations as well as smaller public corporations that Koizumi is now
proposing but the Sakigake's proposals went a step further with the suggestion that the
Japan External Trade Organization merge with the Asia Research Institute, a "family
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corporation." Koizumi's proposed reforms for Special Status Corporations have
succeeded in weakening the stance of the opposition parties, who approved Koizumi's
"blueprint to privatise seven major government-backed corporations"
The opposition parties have been calling for the reform of amakudari and Special Status
Corporations. On April 16, 1998 Yamashita Yoshiki, a member of the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) and former member of the Lower House in the National Diet
wrote in his monthly column that elite ministry officials should not be allowed to stay
over a certain period of time in Special Status Corporations where they receive high
salaries along with their retirement benefits. To illustrate amakudari in Special Status
Corporations he gave the example of MITI's Japan External Trade Organization where
six out of the nine top officials had come from MITI via amakudari. He stated that his
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party wanted a law that would prohibit amakudari.
The JCP announced in the March 15, 2001 edition of "Red Flag" that since 1996 the
party has demanded that amakudari in both private and public corporations be abolished.
It claims that there are no regulations in effect that limit the intimate relationship
between retired civil servants and civil servants in the ministries. The JCP wants a law
that requires civil servants to wait at least five years before taking positions in both
private and public corporations. The JCP calls for the termination of benefits they
receive from their corporations when they migrate to other corporations. The party
wants the institution of a more democratic structure and the establishment of a watchdog
28committee to oversee the amakudari system.
In October 2001 the most influential opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan,
together with the Socialist Party and the Free Party called for a number of reforms that
echoed the demands of the JCP. The parties called for not only sweeping reforms of
25
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amakudari in both private and public corporations but also restrictions on retired civil
servants taking positions on advisory boards of corporations.29
Koizumi's efforts to reform Special Status Corporations may be more lip service rather
than the implementation of substantial structural change. The former Secretary General
of the Liberal Democratic Party, Nonaka Hiromu, claimed on October 3, 2001 doubted
that Koizumi's proposed reforms were little more than indicating that particular
organizations must change but that there has been little discussion. Nonaka wondered
how the problems of amakudari would be addressed since the Chief Cabinet Secretaries
of the ministries choose the officers who will work in Special Status Corporations and
public corporations. He claimed that the civil service system must be changed first
before the problems of amakudari could be resolved. (October 4, Mainichi Shimbun
Mainichi Interactive) Indeed, Shima Nobuhiko, an economist and former reporter for
the Mainichi Shimbun, claims that senior officers in the ministries continue to make new
public corporations and then "dig up" posts in those corporations for fellow officers.
(Shima N„ 2000, p 193)
On March 28, 2002 the Asahi Shimbun reported that as of 1999 there were 12,872 public
corporations (koeki hojin) and 13,482 foundations, far more than was revealed in the
Nikkei article. According to a government report issued in 2000, there were 6,112 elite
bureaucrats ("OB") working in 2,428 corporations. However, the Asahi claims that
official reports do not reveal the real picture and that official accounts may only divulge
as little as 5% of elite bureaucrats who take postretirement positions. The report states
that as of 1999 among the twelve ministries, the Ministry of Education took first place,
managing 1,821 koeki hojin, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry came in




The following chapter examines the amakudari system as well as ministerial use of
Special Status Corporations for amakudari
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CHAPTER 6
AMAKUDARI, Yokosuberi, SHUKKO, and KONE: The Ties That Bind "the
Ruling Triad" and Serve to Rigidity the Political Economic System
Introduction
The chapter is designed to show how elements explicit to Japan's political economy will
perpetuate an organic dependency between the Japanese and their governing system.
There is discussion of the amakudari system in the private sector, yokosuberi or
"sideslip" to Special Status Corporations and public corporations, the temporary transfer
of ministry personnel to local government and branch offices of public corporations in
the provinces (shukko), and the informal and formal personal connections (kone) in
business and government.
The National Public Service Law stipulates that retiring bureaucrats must wait two years
before they are eligible to take positions in private industry, which is commonly known
as amakudari. However, bureaucrats can take postretirement positions in Special Status
Corporations, public corporations and other associations that have been set up by the
ministries immediately upon retirement. This function is known as yokosuberi or
"sideslipping." Also, they can work in these organizations for one or two years while
they are still engaged by their ministries and then migrate to the private sector after the
formal two-year waiting period has ended. Another option at bureaucrats' disposal is
that they can remain in these organizations while holding positions in private industry.
One of the main objections to Special Status Corporations and public corporations is that
they facilitate the smooth migration of bureaucrats into the private sector.
There are examples ofyokosuberi to Special Status Corporations that facilitate the
migration of bureaucrats into private business and amakkudari by ex-bureaucrats into
national and local political office, educational institutions and ministerial research
institutes.
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In order to illustrate the importance of having the right connections in Japan a case study
is provided about how the president of a medium-size chemical company effectively
uses his connections with government to procure funding for research and development.
A second case study illustrates how a former governor used his connections with
bureaucrats in the ministries to procure subsidies for public works. A third case study
illustrates how MITI officers gain postings at JETRO's largest overseas office through
their connections in MITI.
Definition
The literal translation of the term amakudari is "descent from heaven" referring to the
practice of ex-bureaucrats taking postretirement positions in private corporations,
Special Status and public corporations and political office. Along with their pensions,
ex-bureaucrats receive full salaries from their new organizations and some ex-
bureaucrats simultaneously serve in two organizations. Amakudari was not a part of the
political economic system until the 1930s.when the government began tightly regulating
the economy for the war effort. Kent E. Calder explains:
"Firms began to need intelligence concerning the plans of bureaucrats and the opportunity to deal
freely with them. Rapid expansion of the number of ex-bureaucrats in the Diet of a heavily
regulated economy and a rapid increase in the demands for government service created a pressing
need for mediators between bureaucrats and the general public..." (989, p 381)
The tradition continued after the war. Through the network of ex-bureaucrats, the
ministries, which are unfettered by legal sanctions, are able to implement policies
without undo restraints. J.A.A. Stockwin states that amakudari is:
"... is an entrenched institution driven by structured bureaucratic interests, and also that it is a
control feature of the way politics and government work in Japan." (1999, p. 108)
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The amakudari system secures the power of the ruling triad but the resulting network
also rigidifies the political economy.
The Japanese call their country, "bureaucrats' heaven" because of the postretirement
positions and additional salaries waiting for elite bureaucrats after their careers in the
ministries. However, it is important to distinguish between the rank-and-file civil
servants, who work diligently without reward and the elite, who receive special
compensation. During the 1990s as the recession deepened the Japanese began
objecting to amakudari, claiming it frustrates reform and promotes corruption since it
serves to extend ministerial controls over territory through a network of elite civil
servants and ex-civil servants, who support the policies of their former ministries.
Johnson contends:
there can be no doubt that the need for post-retirement amakudari has weakened the overall
independence of the Japanese civil service. There can also be no doubt that, over time, the
continued practice of amakudari contributed to serious corruption as was revealed in 1993, in the
bribery and bid-rigging scandals throughout the construction industry." (1994, pp 142-156)
According to a public survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun in 1994 when
Japanese were particularly disenchanted with bureaucrats 60% favoured the
discontinuation of the amakudari system.
Amakudari is considered a catalyst for the policy instrument "administrative guidance."
In the 1950s when new energy-intensive industries developed, MITI staff found that
amakudari was inclusive to the method of administration. Kazuma Tsutsumi claims: "...
it was at this time that a system was established by which administration was done through OBs
who had descended from the upper echelons of MITI." (1994, p. 128)
The policy instrument is still in use and amakudari helps in its implementation.
Stockwin agrees:
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"...there is no doubt that amakudari together with other bureaucratic practices such as gyouseishido
(administrative guidance) have led to the emergence of an economy which is unusually highly
regulated by government. This remains the case, despite a considerable degree of deregulation in
certain areas of the economy that has taken place in recent years." (1999 p. 108)
Even without the formal use of administrative guidance, the elaborate web itself of
bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats can be a mechanism, which automatically induces
consent to guidance.
Amakudari: Rules and Regulations
The National Personnel Agency places retiring bureaucrats into private and public
corporations. The ministries also place staff in corporations under their jurisdiction.
Edward Lincoln claims that this compromises bureaucrats when planning policy:
"The very act of ministries negotiating with the private sector over placement of officials introduces
an additional element of favour swapping; firms may agree to take (possibly unwanted) officials in
exchange for other favours (such as protecting domestic market share against foreign competition)."
(1999, p 192)
However, the National Public Service Law states that retiring civil servants cannot take
a position in a corporation they used to regulate for two years. Therefore, retiring
bureaucrats will first migrate to Special Status Corporations before moving on to the
private sector. This process is known as yokosuberi or "sideslip." (Shaede, 1995, p.297)
Lincoln claims that these organizations serve as: "...a place to park these officials until they
can legally move to industry." (1999 p. 192)
Although not considered to be literal amakudari, the transferring of civil servants for up
to four years in Special Status Corporations and various public corporations (shukko) is
yet another means by which the central ministries control Japan's political economy.
Johnson contends:
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"Another cause of concern is the tendency for public corporations to pre-empt the functions of local
government in many areas. More and more of daily life have been drawn back under control of the
central government..." (1995, P 134)
The network of rank-and-file bureaucrats on loan to branch offices of public
corporations helps the ministries to monitor local government policies and to ensure that
regional policies that have been planned by the central ministries are implemented. In
addition, some of the Special Status Corporations are related to infrastructure
construction (Ministry of Construction's Japan Highway Corporation) and regional
development (MITI's Corporation for Promotion of Regional Development) through
which regional businesses can access contracts and subsidies. The temporary posting of
civil servants ranked above the kacho class in prefectural governments ( haku-tsuke)
also serves to control the implementation of central ministerial policy at the local level.
Amakudari to the Private Sector
One of the incentives that draw Japanese to careers in the civil service is the opportunity
to take postretirement positions in private and public corporations that bring an
additional salary with ministry pensions. The postretirement positions offered to ex-
bureaucrats from the two economic ministries, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MITI
are in banks (Tokyo-Mitsubishi both national and regional, securities firms (Nomura,
Nikko, and Sanwa) and insurance companies (Dai-ichi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and
Chiyoda). For example, Tsustumi Tomio, a former MITI administrative vice-minister is
on the board of directors at Sanwa Bank. Officials from MOF tend to focus more on the
finance-related industries. Securities firms are primary employers.
For MITI elite officials, upper management positions during the period of rapid growth
were mainly in the industries that they were protecting from foreign competition as well
as the industries that were exporting. These industries included textiles, steel, retail,
automobiles, metals, petrochemical, chemical, and electronics. The tradition continued
177
after the rapid growth period. Lincoln, who wrote about the affects of amakudari on
Japanese trading practices contends that even in the 1990s:
"The amakudari system provides substantial reason to be sceptical of the extent of deregulation and
the unilateral market opening in Japan because of the manner in which this practice establishes a
broad web of personal ties between government and Japanese firms." (1999, p. 129)
Examples of ex-MITI staff, who have parachuted to positions in the private sector are
given below in the section, "Amakudari in Special Status Corporations."
MITI's intervention in the petroleum industry and amakudari in petroleum companies is
prolific (Ooyama K., 1996, p. 199). Kazuma records amakudari in such firms as Cosmo,
Abudabi and Indonesia.(see below) Calder records that the Japanese subsidiaries and
affiliates of multinational oil companies such as Mobile and Shell have hired ex-MITI
officials as advisors. (July 1989, p.389) The electronics, retail, and automobile (Mazda,
Toyota, Nissan and Honda among them) industries provide postretirement positions for
MITI officers.
MITI still manages the public utility sector and positions have always been available in
the electric, gas, and nuclear power industries. The positions in corporations range from
chairman of the board, vice-president, advisory board member, etc. For example,
Yamamoto Teiichi retired from MITI in 1989 and migrated to Osaka Gas as an advisor
and then serving as a director. Nagata Hideki retired in 1993, migrating to Kansai
Electric Company in 1994 as an advisor. (Tsutsumi K., 2000, Kyodai Shocho pp. 148-
149)
Postretirement positions in the affiliates of multinationals have been forth coming since
the 1980s as more firms tried to break into Japanese markets. Foreign corporations like
IBM Japan began hiring MITI officials to gain leverage with the Japanese government.
According to Calder, IBM Japan hired Nebashi Masato, former senior managing director
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of both MITI's industrial policy research institute and very large scale integration
(VLSI) electronic circuitry research association and Ozu Shuji, former director-general
of MITI's Tokyo regional bureau. Both men joined IBM in the late 1980s when IBM
was eager to enter the Japanese market but faced stiff competition from Fujitsu:
"IBM was beginning to diversify into information service business requiring special regulatory
authorization and MITI's protege Fujitsu had just passed IBM during 1979 to become the largest
producer in Japan. Counting its three senior ex-MITI officials, IBM Japan's personnel roster
throughout the early and mid-80s included more retired bureaucrats than any domestic Japanese
computer firm." (1989, p 389)
Calder claims that small and medium sized enterprises hire ex-bureaucrats as well.
Small businesses account for 99% of all business activity in Japan and are identified as
having fewer than 100 employees and capital of 30 million yen. Calder states:
"For the Japanese private organization, as for their counterparts elsewhere, the consequences of
interdependence with government has been a perceived need to influence government and thus
reduce risk to the firm created by the unpredictability of state regulatory policy. In the case of
Japanese firms, this desire has intensified since the 1950s by two special circumstances: highly
leveraged corporate strategies made riskier by high fixed price labour and capital costs and the
increasing importance to Japanese firms of unpredictable events overseas." (1989, pp. 379-380)
However, Calder does not give statistics that give an estimate of the number of ex-
bureaucrats in small business.
Calder contends that the closer a small business is to Kasumigaseki the easier it is for
businesses to establish firmer relationships with ministry officials and be able to
influence decisions regarding regulations as well as to access subsidies The owners of
small enterprises who are outside the radius of the Capital have more difficulty in
maintaining relationships with bureaucrats, therefore, it is beneficial for businesses
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located far from the seat of power to hire ex-bureaucrats "...to manipulate and induce
predictability in their political environment." (1989, p 381)
Small businesses are wise to hire ex-bureaucrats whose prior work involved such areas
as licensing, patent applications, permits for joint ventures with foreign firms, loans and
subsidies. Gaining patents can be particularly troublesome for small businesses because
of competition from larger firms who use various tactics to frustrate patent applications.
(Ibata-Arena K., 2000, p. 230)
Amakudari to Special Status Corporations
Calder wrote in 1989:
"Postretirement movement of bureaucrats in the kodan [Special Status Corporations] supplies the
overwhelming majority (76.5%) of the management level officials of government corporations; such
as relatively low status groups and broadening access to the political process for groups without
significant connection to it." (p 390)
Although the government has not categorized all associations and corporations that
receive public funding as Special Status Corporations or public corporations, the
network of these organizations that are used for yokosuberi and amakudari is immense,
as stated in chapter 5. According to Murakawa, in 1994, 817 elite ex- civil servants were
employed in Special Status Corporations and 214 were employed in foundations (zaidan
and shadan) and other public corporations. (koekidan) (1994 p. 77) However, these
numbers do not take into account the industrial associations where ex-MITI staff migrate
as well.
In 1989 Okimoto described MITI's organizations as:
"...intermediate organizations, which extend the tentacles of state throughout the private sector."
(p. 41)
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He defines them: "Informal intermediate organizations -those not requiring special legal
dispensation—include industrial associations, business federations, MITI advisory councils, Diet
member caucuses, and countless study groups, linking MITI officials with leaders from industry,
banking, the legislative branch, the mass media, labour, and academics—the core centre of power in
Japan." (p. 42)
He claimed that the organizations create a positive environment for the implementation
of industrial policy. In the case of MITI, the numbers of ex-bureaucrats who find
positions in MITI-run organizations are said to be large, although there are no statistics
available that reveal the actual number (Ooyama K.,1996, p.38). It is interesting to note
that the Ministry of Finance increases the budgets of ministries that open their public
corporations to MOF retirees. (Johnson C.,1982, p. 68) It is not uncommon to find MOF
officials serving in MITI organizations such as the Japan External Organization
(JETRO) and the Japan Finance Corporation. On the other hand, MOF does not
ordinarily open the doors of its organizations to the other ministries.
It is important to note that, although the law regarding postretirement positions in the
private sector stipulates that bureaucrats must wait two years before taking a position in
a private corporation, bureaucrats can migrate first to Special Status Corporations or
public corporations while still officially employed by their ministries. In other words,
since they no longer have a formal position in their ministries and are physically
separated from Kasumigaseki, they appear to have "retired." Also, ex-bureaucrats can
take positions in Special Status Corporations while simultaneously serving in
management positions in private corporations.1
The banks that MITI established to support industrial growth such as the Development
Bank of Japan, the Long-term Bank of Japan and the Japan Import Export Bank (EXIM)
were used for yokosuberi and amakudari. The following examples point to the use of
1 See section on JNOC in this chapter for the reference to Komatsu Kunio
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Special Status Corporations by MITI for the purpose ofyokosuberi as recorded by
Tsutsumi Kazuma in 2000. ( pp. 146-175)
1) Toyoshima Toru became a director of the Japan Import Export Bank in 1982. He
retired from MITI in 1984, assuming the position of vice-president at Cosmo Oil,
continuing on as the president of Abudabi Oil and then as the chairman of JETRO. He is
currently serving as the Chairman of the Japan Economic Foundation (FEF), a
corporation linked to JETRO.
2) Shibata Masao became the vice-president of JETRO in 1984. After retiring from
MITI in 1985 he became managing director of Kansai Electric2 and then vice president.
3) Sato Mitsuaki served as president of JETRO New York before retiring from MITI in
1986. He became a director at Hecksto Japan, a private firm.
3) Yoshida Fumitake retired in 1988 to become an advisor at the Patent Agency and the
Japan Import Export Bank. He then became an advisor at Tokyo Gas, rising to the
position of a director.
4) Kawasaki Hiroshi was the director of research at the Economic Planning Agency in
1988. After retirement in 1988 he first migrated to director of the Import Export Bank
of Japan. He later went to a position of an advisor at Tokyo Electric4 where he rose to
the position of vice-president.
4) Kitagawa Yukimasa served as president of JETRO New York in 1988. After
"officially" retiring from MITI he served as the director of the Research Institute for
2






Global Industrial Culture, the Chairman of JETRO, then onto a directorship at IBM
Japan and the chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Industry.5
7) Takase Kazuo was the president of JETRO Paris before retiring from MITI he
migrated to Taisei Kensetsu, a construction company, as an advisor.
8) Kubogawa Isao served as the president of JETRO Bankok in 1990. After retirement
from MITI he assumed the position of managing director of Tobu Department Stores.6
9) Takashima Nobutake served as president of JETRO Paris before his retirement in
1990. He entered politics and won a seat in the Upper House of the Aichi Prefecture
Diet as a member of the LDP.
10) Yamamoto Teiichi was the director of the Development Bank of Japan in 1990.
After retiring in 1991 he migrated to Kawasaki Steel, a private corporation, where he
served as managing director.
11) Minamigaku Masaaki assumed the position of advisor at the Japan Import Export
Bank in 1992. After retiring in 1993 he became an advisor for the Mitsubishi Electric, a
private corporation.
12) Nakao Shunichi served as president of JETRO London before he retired in 1992. He
migrated to the Association for the Promotion ofNew Offices, serving as director and
then to Nichimen Corporation where he served as counsellor.
13) Kuroda Naoki assumed an advisory position at the Bank of Tokyo in 1992. After
retiring in 1993 he became an advisor at Sumitomo Trading Company and then
managing director.
5 This is a case of amakudari into a private company (IBM) and a MITI industrial association.
6 MITI manages the retail sector.
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14) Okamatsu Sozaburo assumed the position of advisor at the Long-term Bank of Japan
in 1993. After retiring in 1994 he took a teaching position in the University of San Diego
Graduate School and then a position of advisor at the Long-term Bank of Japan, a MITI
Special Status Corporation.
15) Kawada Yoki became the president of the Development Bank of Japan in 1994. He
retired from MITI in 1995 (current position not recorded).
16) Nakata Tetsuo assumed the position of the Director the Japan Import Export Bank in
1994 and retired from MITI in 1995 (current position not recorded)
17) Aogawa Yuji served as director of the Organization for Overseas Economic
Cooperation in 1995. He retired from MITI in 1996 (current position not recorded).
18) Takashima Me retired in 1994, migrating first to the Foundation for the Promotion
of Machinery as an advisor and then onto Sumitomo Marine Insurance, a private
corporation.
19) Fujiwara Munehirata served as Japan's Ambassador to Bulgaria in 1995. After
retiring he became the managing director of Sharp, a private corporations. He also
served as director of the division for overseas planning, (p. 169)
20) Maeda Masahiko migrated to the Bank of Japan where he served as a member of the
committee for strategic planning. He retired in 1995, moving on to an advisory position
at the Association of Japanese Mutual Insurance Companies, advisor at Tokyo
Mitsubishi Bank and as the director of the Shoko Chukin Bank.7
7 This is a case ofyokosuberi first in a state bank and then amakudari into both a private financial
institution and a MITI Special Status Corporation.
184
21} Kobayashi Atsushi was the director general of the Economic Planning Agency
before he retired in 1996. He migrated to the Association for the Development of
Machinery, a MITI industrial association.
22) Wakamatsu Shigezo served as the director of the alcohol bureau and general affairs
in a MITI Special Status Corporation, New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development Organization (NEDO) before he retired in 1996. He migrated to managing
director of the Association of Engineering for the Management of Information Systems,
a MITI industrial association.
Study of Yokosuberi and Amakudari: The JNOC and the Petroleum
Industry
The petroleum industry involvesfour specific activities; the exploration and
production ofcrude oil, the exportation and importation ofoil, the refining of
petroleum products such as kerosene and gasoline and the sale ofcrude oil and
petroleum products. Domesticfirms engage in exploration, production and refining
ofcrude oil as well as exporting and importing ofoil in cooperation with foreign
firms. Theforeignfirms hold the largest percentage of the investment. Foreign
companies such a Shell and Arabian also sell petroleum products in Japan. (Ooyama
K., 1997p 199)
MITI oversees the energy-producing industries, among them oil. It controls the
import and refining ofcrude oil through federations ofoil producers such as the
Kagoshima Federationfor Oil Exploration, the Federation ofOil Producers, Japan
Petrochemicals, the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) and soforth. These
organizations connect MITI to the oil refiners who distribute to retailers and to
consumers. The Japanese petroleum companiesform groups to execute most of the
activities listed above but they have difficulty selling the petroleum products they
manufacture because ofcompetition fromforeign manufacturers, (p 201)
Government regularly intervenes in order to support price stability
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In thefirst chapter it was explained that the JNOC8, established in 1967for the
development ofoil exploration, is one of the Special Status Corporations that the
Koizumi administration has slatedfor elimination. MITI and MOF have used the
corporation regularlyfor amakudarL When the JNOC revealed that it had 7.8 billion
pounds sterling in outstanding loans in 1998, Komatsu Kunio resigned. However, the
vice-president, the director, and the director offinance, all of who had been ex-MOF
officials, continued in theirpositions. (KujiT. 1998, p.104) Before he resignedfrom
the JNOC, Mr. Komatsu, who retiredfrom MITI in 1986, was an advisorfor the
Long-term Bank ofJapan. He then served as a member of the board ofdirectors at
Nissho Iwai, later rising to vice-president and then to vice-chairman. Mr. Atara, who
retiredfrom MITI in 1995, assumed the post ofmanaging director ofthe JNOC in
1996, continuing the MITI line.
MITI and MOF ex-bureaucrats also use the JNOCforyokosuberi to private oil
companies. For example, Katsutani Tamotsu served as the president of the JNOC in
1981 before moving on to the position ofadvisor at Indonesian Oil, rising to the
position ofvice president and, then, finally, to the chairman ofthe board.
Simultaneously he served as the president ofthe Oil Mining Federation and the
chairman ofNorthern Oik Matsuo Yuhiko served as the President ofthe JNOC in
1989 before migrating to Indonesia Oil, serving as an advisor and then as president.
Matsumoto Koji9 was appointed director-general ofthe JNOC in 1990. He then went
on to Saitama University to teach Policy Science. In 1991 Fukuzawa Koji became the
director-general of the JNOC and then moved on to the Japan Steel Pipe Co., serving
as a director. (Tsutsumi K., 2000, pp. 147-148)
As was stated above, postretirement positions for ex-MOF staff are commonly found in
organizations operated by the other ministries. MITI's organizations such as Japan
8 See chapter 5 for study of JNOC
9 See chapter 4, pg. 110 for review of Matsumoto's book
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Finance Corporation for Small Businesses, Japan National Oil Corporation and JETRO
provide postretirement positions for MOF officials. (Kuji T.,1998, p 94)
Amakudari To Research Institutes
According to the Mainichi Shimbun, ex-MOF administrative vice-ministers migrate to
research institutions that have been established by their ministry. The institutes are
established for the promotion of understanding and research. The companies that use
these institutes are counted at 82 banks, securities firms, and trading companies (1994,
p.202) The ex-bureaucrats receive salaries.
This is also the case for MITI officers. There is yokosuberi and amakudari into research
institutes that are funded by Special Status Corporations. For example, when Tanabashi
Yuji10 retired in 1991 he entered the Industrial Research Institute, using the office and
secretarial staff for private business. Funding came from two of MITI's Special Status
Corporations, the Japan Corporation for the Promotion of Bicycles and the Japan
Corporation for the Promotion of Small-sized Automobiles (racing). The director of
human resources contended that Tanabashi's work at the institute was related to
research, (p.203) The following are examples ofyokosuberi and amakudari by MITI
officials in MITI-connected research institutions as given by Kazuma:
1. Kodama Koji retired in 1989, migrating first to the Institute for Industrial Research as
an advisor before going to Sumitomo Metals where he served on the board of directors
and then vice-president.
2. Tanabashi Yuji, administrative vice-minister, retired in 1991. In 1993 he became an
advisor for the Industrial Research Institute.
3. Kumano Hideaki, administrative vice-minister, retired in 1994 and migrated to the
Industrial Research Institute.
10 See Chapter 2 p. 73 for further details on Tanabashi
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4. Tajika Yu served as the president of JETRO Paris in 1986. After he retired he
migrated to the International Economic Research Centre, serving as the director (p. 165)
5. Okumura ... retired in 1996, migrating to the NEDO Research Institute for Industrial
Technology. He moved on to Japan Mining as an advisor.
Shukko to Local Government Governments: An Extension of Ministerial
Control
Ministries send staff on temporary assignment {shukko) to the prefectural governments.
The ministries contend that officers learn about the region where they are posted during
their tenure and serve as a pipeline to central government. However, in reality, they can
act as watchdogs for their ministries (haku-tsuke) and, consequently, become tools for
controlling policies at the local level. Also, their positions can develop into permanent
positions. (Mainichi Shimbun, 1994, p 268) Furendera Jains writes:
"Japanese scholars argue that this system of transferring central officials to prefectures is most
certainly a product of national distrust of local administration. These officials serve as an
important channel of communication between ministries and prefectures. (1987, p. 16)
Since the prefectures generate on the average one-third of their budgets, local
governments are beholden to central government for loans and subsidies for health and
welfare, education, and public works. This is commonly known as "30% autonomy."
The director of the Kyoto Prefectural Government Representative Office at JETRO New
York from 1995-1998 felt that the central ministries regarded prefectures as "beggars."
Jains contends that the Japanese have been educated to believe that local governments
are dependent on central government authority:
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"Most of the textbooks prescribed for high school students and university undergraduates in Japan
emphasize the dependence of local government and depict local bodies more as administrative units
(gyosei kikan) than as independent, autonomous policy making organs. Thus the conventional
wisdom or the textbook approach relies heavily on the dominant theme of dependence and
centralization." (1987 p. 14)11
The Council on Local Authorities for International Affairs (CLAIR) releases the annual
publication "Local Government In Japan" that explains the structure of local government
and its relationship to central government. Section 8, page 7 of the first chapter of the
1999 edition suggests that Jains' contentions are correct.
"The philosophy underlying the Local Autonomy Law is that the interference by central
government should be kept at minimum and should consist of advice, recommendation and
technical support. In reality, the central government's involvement in local government affairs is
extensive. However, the process is not wholly one-way. Just as local authorities seek approval and
subsidies from various government agencies, those same ministries and agencies need information
from local authority."
The Negative and Positive Aspects of Shukko to the Prefectures
Officials from the central ministries are posted in the capitals of prefectures in local
government offices as well as in government offices throughout each prefecture. In
1993 the Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey of local government officers for their
views regarding having officers from the central ministries in their midst. According to
the survey, as of December 1, 1993 there were 770 officials ranked above the kacho
level posted in prefectural governments, (p. 268) Some prefectures such as Ishikawa
(known as the Kamsumigaseki of the North) had as many as twenty officials from
central government posted within its borders.
11 The Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs and Posts and Telecommunications manage the
Council on Local Authorities for International Affairs (CLAIR) that represents prefectural governments
overseas. There are offices in London and in New York City. Local governments post staff in these
offices to promote business from their areas while elite officials from the ministry manage the offices.
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Mainichi Shimbun interviewed local government civil servants from Iwate Prefecture
(17 staff from central ministries) regarding the merit of the temporary posting of staff
from the central ministries in their offices. They answered that ministry officers have
"know how and information" and that as part of the "clan" (jinpa) from central
government they have easy access to information from Tokyo. Also, they provide
additional staff where there is not enough local staff. When asked about the negative
aspects, they answered that the ministries mistakenly assume that their officers are
posted to direct policy. Also, shukko by too many staff from the ministries stultifies
their organization, (pp 273-274)
When officers in middle management (kacho class) in Yamanashi Prefecture
Government were interviewed, they stated that some of the officers sent by the central
ministries were very fine but there were also officers who did not make the grade. They
also felt that it would be for the best if the number of staff were reduced because now
there were exceptional officers in local government who were being developed.
Mainichi Shimbun illustrated the intimate connection between central and local
government through shukko by pointing to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, which
has thirty-six officers from the central ministries on temporary duty. Among them
twenty-six officers were not involved in any of the work being done by Tokyo
Metropolitan government officers. In an interview to Mainichi Shimbun, Narita Koku, a
kacho in Human Resources, explained that the posting of central ministry officials was
really like borrowing a sun visor (hisashi kashi). In other words, local government must
request favours (e.g. protection) from central government and, therefore, should
cooperate with central government (p 274)
At the end of 1993 Mainichi Shimbun sent another questionnaire regarding shukko in the
prefectures to one hundred officers above the kacho class in sixteen central ministries
and politicians serving in the upper and lower houses of the Diet. 41% members of the
Upper House answered that shukko was necessary because it provided a pipeline to
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central government. 33% were opposed to the system. Interestingly, only 5% felt that
officers from the central ministries were skilful at administration.
Naturally, members of conservative political parties besides the Liberal Democratic
Party such as Komeito, Shin Nihon and Sakigake were in favour of shukko because it tied
central government closer to local authorities. Conversely, all members of the
Communist Party were opposed and 57% of members of the Socialist Party were
opposed, (p 276) Views on shukko by the opposition parties included: 1) The numbers
of officers sent to the prefectures should be regulated by law 2) Local government
should try to think in terms of self-government 3) Elite civil servants should be
cultivated by local government. Kawamura Ichiro agrees with Mainichi Shimbun that
even though politicians in the National Diet talk about devolution in the prefectures, this
will not occur because of the transfer (shukko) of elite civil servants to prefectural
governments, (p. 78)
Mainichi also conducted a national public survey regarding shukko to local governments
in 1993. 41% of people surveyed were opposed to shukko while 40% were in favour
when it was necessary. Other answers given as well as those completely permissive of
the system totalled only 3%.
Shukko by bureaucrats into Special Status Corporations with branches in the prefectures
also serve as control mechanisms over local politics. Many of the top Special Status
Corporations have extensive networks throughout the country, among them the Japan
Highway Corporation, the Japan Finance Corporation for Small Businesses, JETRO, and
the Corporation for the Promotion of Regional Development. Bureaucrats from the
ministries serve as directors in these branches (haku-tsuke) and can monitor as well as
influence local government policy.
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Shukko to Other Government Agencies Can Also Serve as Yokosuberi
Older officers from the elite ranks can be sent to other agencies ostensibly for temporary
duty but these positions can lead to positions\ in the private sector. For example, the ties
between the Defence Agency and MITI's wartime predecessor, the Ministry of
Munitions, have been beneficial to MITI officials. Tsutsumi Kazuma gives an example
of Eguchi Hiromichi, who in 1977 was sent to the Defence Agency to serve as director
of the Equipment Division and then moved on to The Japan National Oil Corporation
(see below) before entering Arabian Oil as the president and then as Chairman. He
became a consultant for the oil company when he took the position of managing director
of the Japan Association of Defence Industries. Eguchi's predecessor as director of the
equipment division in the Defence Agency in 1978 was Mabuchi Naozo, who after
retirement migrated to Sony Corporations as an executive director. In 1982 while Wata
Yutaka was serving as director of the Equipment Division he also served as the
managing director of the Foundation of Overseas Economic Cooperation from where he
migrated to Chairman of Sharp Corporation. In ' 1990 Seki Osamu simultaneously
served as director of the Equipment Division and Director-General of MITI's Small
Business Agency. He migrated to Tokyo Marine Insurance Company and Nihon Soken,
serving as an advisor and then he took the position of Executive Director of Sumitomo
Electric. The companies that employ MITI officials who have served in the Defence
Agency consequently develop an intimate relationship with the Defence Agency.
(Tsutsumi K. 2000, p. 138)
Shukko and Amakudari to Public Universities
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology manage Japan's
national, prefectural and city universities. The majority of the professors are regarded as
government employees (komuin) and they are guided by strict regulations. For example,
professors are not allowed to own businesses. If they want to take a sabbatical or
conduct research abroad, the ministry provides the funding. At times an official will
accompany professors when they lecture overseas as was the case when professors from
Kyoto University gave a seminar at the University of Edinburgh on November 30, 2001.
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Shukko serves to remind professors that that their benefactor is present. Both public and
private universities depend on government subsidies for support and, therefore, "invite"
bureaucrats to teach classes. Some ministries post staff at universities for three years.
An example of shukko is Mr. Maegawa Torn, a MITI officer, who is an electronic
engineer and who was posted at JETRO New York from 1993-1996 as the director of
Industrial Electronics. He is presently serving as a lecturer for three years in Waseda
University's Global Information Telecommunications Institute (GITI). He teaches about
the Internet and e-commerce. Waseda's graduates include three former Prime Ministers,
the most recent of whom was Mori. An example of amakudari in a university is former
president of the JNOC Matsumoto Koji who retired from MITI in 1991. He migrated to
Saitama University, a state-run university, to teach policy science
Amakudari to Political Office
A major reason why MITI and MOF have been able to implement policy with relative
ease during Japan's post-war economic growth is the continuous support from the
National Diet that has been dominated by a single party, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) since 1955. Although there have been exceptions, such as Kyoto Prefecture
which had a communist administration for thirty years, the LDP has also dominated
prefectural politics. Okimoto contends that one reason for this phenomenon is that ex-
bureaucrats run on the LDP ticket and win seats in the national and prefectural Diets.
"Of all the LDP representatives elected to the lower house from 1955 to 1984, 21 percent hailed
from bureaucratic backgrounds, an astonishing proportion given the limited number of officials
leaving the higher civil service each year. The LDP has enjoyed a monopoly over the recruitment of
ex-bureaucrats." (1988, p.316)
An example of this type of amakudari is the case of Takashima Nobutake, who retired
from MITI in 1989 after serving as executive director of JETRO Paris. He then won a
seat in the Upper House of the Aichi Prefecture Diet. (Tsutsumi K., 2000, p 164)
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Big business and business federations make large contributions to the LDP campaign
coffers. The LDP gets votes from traditional support groups such as small local
businesses, and from interest groups involved in construction, transportation and
telecommunications in exchange for funds lined up for public works projects,
procurement and subsidies. Evidence of this kind of "pork barrel patronage," as
Okimoto calls it, is in the expenditure of the stimulus packages released by government
since 1991 to ignite Japan's stagnant economic growth. Some Japanese were unhappy
with how the funds were appropriated as Gillian Tett reported in the January 25, 2000
issue of the Financial Times:
"...elite Japanese in Tokyo, for example, complain that spending has been too heavily biased in
rural areas on "pork-barrel" projects and some local citizen groups argue it is imposed by central
planners without consultation. But the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has refused to stop
spending, fearing it would cost rural votes."
As has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, the small business sector accounts for
about 99% of all companies and 78% of all employees.12 MITI manages the small and
medium-sized business sector. The owners support LDP candidates with large
contributions. In return the businesses can benefit through subsidies from state-run
financial institutions like the Japan Finance Corporation.
In July 1994 there were twenty-six ex-bureaucrats who were serving as governors, all
members of the LDP. Seventeen of them migrated from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
(Mainichi Shimbun p. 262) Officials in top management serve not only as governors but
also as the vice-governors of the larger prefectures. Officers of the kacho class, who
have some influence, will serve as vice-governors in the medium-size prefectures. Even
though they may not have influence, officers of kacho ranking may also serve as vice-
12
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governors in the medium-size prefectures. They also will serve as the directors of
general affairs in governors' offices. (Kawamura I.,1994, p.79)
KONE
Although Kone ("connections") is not directly related to either amakudari or shukko,
personal connections or veins of personal ties (jinmyaku) play an important role in
Japanese daily life and is a key ingredient in the glue, which binds the ruling triad
together. Even getting an appointment with a good doctor requires an introduction. This
is also true for gaining employment in a good company. Without a personal
recommendation, it is very difficult to gain entry. Japanese, who do not have the
appropriate connections to big business may opt to enter a central ministry (1994
Interview Director EID/MITI JETRO New York)
Karel van Wolferen emphasizes that success depends on who one knows. He writes:
"In upper levels of society, the kone multiply to form whole networks of special relationships. These
may derive from one-time favours, school ties or shared experiences, or may involve intricate
mutual back-scratching deals." (1990, p.l 10)
Van Wolferen points to professional marriage brokers who arrange marriages between
the daughters of wealthy industrialists and budding bureaucrats that perpetuate special
cliques (keibatsu). Politicians will marry the daughters of older politicians to strengthen
their position within the LDP and young bureaucrats marry the daughters of high-
ranking bureaucrats to secure better positions within their ministries. He states:
"Without informal contacts the top administrators cannot fulfil what they are expected to
accomplish. The actual power of a highly placed Japanese depends on his jinmyaku...A minister
without an elaborate jinmyaku is worthless to his ministry and his clique within the LDP." (p 110)
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Japanese, who are lower in the social hierarchy, must strive harder to cultivate
connections and spend a great deal of time and energy in accommodating those people
who are ranked higher than themselves in the effort to enter their group.
Wolveren looks at the marriages between daughters of prime ministers and sons of the
presidents of large construction companies to illustrate the tight ties between the
construction industry and the LDP. For example, former Prime Minister Nakasone's
daughter married the son of the president of Kajima. Former Prime Minister Takeshita's
relationship with the construction industry is illustrated by the marriage of his daughter
to the son of the president of Kanemaru. His half-brother, who served as his secretary,
married the daughter of the owner of a medium-sized construction company. Wolveren
claims:
"Shortly after he became prime minister, Takeshita's own prefecture, Shimane, were included in
the first draft of the 1988 budget."
Wolveren also points to Ehime Prefecture as the beneficiary of Takeshita's
administration: "The local government of Ehime prefecture, which elected to the Diet the
construction minister in Takeshita's first cabinet, was similarly happy to discover that its proposals
for public works projects had been accepted in the first budget draft." (1989, p 119)
The case study on Ehime Prefecture at the end of this chapter shows how Ehime's
governor used his connections in central government during Takeshita's administration
and during the 1990s to aid in the procurement of subsidies for public works.
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Close-ups of Amakudari, Shukko and Kone: Business and Government
The following three studies are given to illustrate the significant role that amakudari,
shukko, and kone plays in the lives of business owners and bureaucrats. The studies are
the result of empirical research executed by the writer from 1993-2001.
The research for the first study was conducted in 1999, 2000 and 2001. In 1998 the
writer went to Japan to interview the owners of small and medium-sized businesses in
the high-tech industries about how they were coping with the recessions. Officers of the
• IT •••
Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business arranged the tour. After the initial
meeting in 1998, the writer continued to communicate with some of the businesses,
including the chemical company below. She returned to the chemical company in 2000
and 2001 to interview the president and CEO as well as some of his staff. After
extensive observation, the writer understood that the right connections with government
and big businesses are vital to the well being of smaller businesses.
Study of the Use ofAmakudari and Kone By A Medium-Size Chemical
Business14
Although solid management, a consistent corporate strategy, product diversification
and expansion into overseas markets have been importantfactorsfor this chemical
company's survival during Japan's prolonged recession, thefounder and the current
CEO also needed direct connections with central government and big business in
order that their company sustains long-term growth.
Corporate Profile
The Tokyo-based company was established in 1941 as a manufacturer ofspecialty
chemicals, producedfor the military effort. The Ministry ofCommerce and Industry
administrated the chemical industry during the war and since the company produced
for the war effort it remained in good standing with MITI after the war. This
13
WWW.jfs.gO.jp
14 Interviews conducted in April 1998, December 200 and May 2001.
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relationship helped to pave the wayfor accessing loansfor R&Dfrom MITI. The
company received a number ofsubsidiesfrom MITIfor R&D between 1952-1977.
The company currently ranks 37th in earnings among 537 chemical producers in
Japan and 17th among chemical producers in Tokyo. It is an unlisted company. There
are 700 employees, 170 staff is in Japan. Production facilities are located in Portugal
and China. Sales offices are located in India, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, South
Korea, Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Research and development are
done in Japan.
Thefounder ofthe company, who was the current CEO'sfather-in-law, did not think
it wise to compete with larger chemical manufacturers. His strategy was three-
pronged; to open a niche in the Japanese marketplace by bringing in new
technologiesfrom overseas, to manufacture new chemicalproducts that could be sold
domestically and, eventually, in overseas markets and to expand operations overseas.
For many years the companyfocused on the production offlorescent paint, growing
to a 60% share ofthe world market (presently 5% ofcorporate profits).
His son-in-law has continued this strategy. Twelve years ago, confident that his
company had achieved a strong position in the domestic market, he began to take
measures to internationalise the distribution ofproducts and to diversify into other
areas such as electronic components, pharmaceuticals andproducts connected to
biotechnology. The company has two research facilities near Tokyo.
The company invests approximately 5% ofannual profits in R&D. However, expenses
for research are costly and additionalfunds, namely bank loans and subsidiesfrom
MITI (as stated above) orfrom MITI- run organizations that accommodate small and
medium enterprises are necessary. The applicationsfor such subsidies entail the
submission of reports regarding the research and after due consideration, funds are
released. Detailed accounts on the progress ofthe research are also required and the
results ofthe research are MITI's domain. Although MITI contributedfunds
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amounting to 5% ofperspective sales, the sums were insufficient and other loans were
sought afterfrom banks and MITI-run agencies such as the Japan Finance
Corporation for Small Businesses.
In order to facilitate distribution in Europe and the United States, the company has
engaged in a joint venture with Nissho Iwai, the giant trading company that has solid
distribution channels in those areas. According to the president and CEO, the venture
is beneficial to both firms because Nissho Iwai does not manufacturefiorescent paint.
Nissho Iwai provides investment and distribution while the company provides the
technological information and the production know-how. Hefeels that the best
ventures occur between companies that rely the other's products or services.
Corporate policyforjoint ventures is that the company owns 50% or more ofthe stock
to maintain control. The company also has joint ventures with Takeda
Pharmaceuticals and Seiko in Japan and with Osan in Hong Kong.
The Use of Amakudari and Kone to Ensure Corporate Growth
1. Amakudari
The company received loans from the Japan Finance Corporationfor Small
Businesses over a number ofyears. Undoubtedly, having a former employeefrom one
ofMITI's Special Status Corporations on board to serve as the company's Senior
Managing Director and General Manager ofExecutive Affairs gave the company a
direct pipeline to the Japan Finance Corporation and to MITIfor subsidies, licenses,
permits and patens. The CEO advises that the company's legalfeesfor patent
applications are substantial.
2. Kone
The CEO uses substantial time and energy cultivating the right mix ofconnections in
both business and government. A graduate of Waseda University, he is a friend of
former Prime Minister Mori, who is also a graduate of Waseda. The CEO is the
president ofhis district's Chamber ofCommerce and Industry (managed by MITI's
199
Industrial Policy Bureau) and is also the vice-representative of the Japan Finance
Corporation for Small Business's Client's Association.
When his company tied up with Nissho Iwai, he hired one of its employees who had
been posted in Portugalfor many years and who knew the protocolfor doing business
in Europe. The hook-up is another direct link to MITI because Nissho Iwai, as a
tradingfirm, is in MITl's jurisdiction and MITI officials take postretirementpositions
in the company. For example, Komatsu Kunio retiredfrom MITI in 1984. As stated
above in he took the position ofadvisorfor Nissho Iwai after servingfor two years as
advisorfor the Long-term Bank ofJapan. He climbed to the position of vice-president
at Nissho Iwai and then to vice-chairman. He also served simultaneously as the
president ofthe Japan National Oil Corporation.
The CEO does not take his network for granted and works diligently to maintain and
extend his connections. He knows thatfar-sighted corporate strategy and intelligent
corporate management by no means guarantee success in Japan. He knows that the
right connections is crucial to the survival ofany business and he has wisely used the
amakudari system and his connections to gain a firm position in not only the domestic
market and but in overseas markets as well.
In any country having close connections with central government officials can lead to
more business for local firms. However, it has become evident from government debt
that funds from the fiscal stimulus packages released since 1992 served no more than to
keep unemployment low and to build infrastructure that is not being used effectively.15
The writer focused on Ehime Prefecture because of the former governor's close
relationship with officials in the ministries as Karel van Wolferen described above. The
writer went to Ehime in 1998 and 2000 to conduct research regarding small business
activity and to visit FAZ and the Kurushima Bridge to see how both local and public
15 See footnote 21
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funds were being used. Ehime Prefectural government officers accompanied the writer
on both visits.
Study of Ehime Prefecture Illustrating the Relationship Between Central
and Local Government and Pork Barrel Patronage16
Iga Sadayuki, theformer governor ofEhime, was a staunch LiberaI Democrat and an
officer in the prefectural government before he ran for governor. He was governor
for twelve years until he lost the election in April 1999. He actively sought close
relationships with the ministries, tapping into subsidies that afforded his prefecture a
convention centre, an international airport, highways and the Kurushima Bridge that
links Ehime with Hiroshima on the main island ofHonshu.
Ehime is the largest offour prefectures on the island ofShikoku, the smallest of the four
major islands ofJapan. Located on the northwestern side ofShikoku, the smallest of the
four major islands in the Japan Archipelago. Ehime is approximately 5,677 square
kilometres and has 162.5 kilometres ofcoastline, the fifth longest in Japan. The
population is a little over 1,500,000. The capital, Matsuyama, has a population of
450,000. (1999 Ehime Prefecture Government statistics)
Ehime's primary industries are agriculture, forestry and marine products. The
prefecture has the highest production ofmandarin oranges and the largest harvest of
culturedpearls andfish. Ehime is a major producer ofextrudedfish products
Ehime's secondary industries are mining, construction and manufacturing ofpaper pulp
and paper, textiles, marine equipment, industrial machinery, electrical equipment and
electrical components. There is also shipbuilding and petroleum refining. Tertiary
industries are the service andfinancial sectors and real estate.
16 Visits to Ehime organized by the Ehime Precture Government in April 1998 and December 2000.
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Ehime 's taxes generates about 36% oflocal taxes, making it reliant on central
government loans and subsidiesfor public works, education, health and welfare and so
17
forth. Ehime does not have enough industry to support the issuance ofbonds.
The Ties That Bind Ehime To MITI
Although a few ofJapan's larger prefectures such as Osaka and Hyogo opened
representative offices overseas in the early 1980s to promote regional businesses, most
prefectural governments did not open offices until the mid to late 1980s when small
businesses, were being encouraged by MITI to seek markets overseas The easy
access to low-interest rate loans and the confidence that their country was overtaking
the United States economically encouraged small and medium-size enterprises to
follow big business abroad. Local tax revenue and contributionsfrom small business
associations that were under MITVs managementfunded the one-man representative
offices in some of the eighty overseas branch offices of the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO). Regrettably, in most cases, the representatives were
unprepared to operate in foreign environments and interact with foreign businessmen.
Unlike their counterparts in the central ministries, they did not have the opportunity to
study and live abroad. The language barriers and insufficient education made them
fairly ineffective as representatives. Nevertheless, prefectures wanted to strivefor the
image ofinternationalisation and spent large sums posting representatives overseas,
using JETRO offices as bases.
Governor Iga wanted overseas representation for his prefecture but Ehime's economy
was not large enough to support an overseas representative office. Nevertheless, the
formerpresident ofJETRO New York (1992-1994) and a closefriend of Iga, created a
position for the governor's son in the Research and Planning Division. The son, a
civil officer of the Ehime Prefectural government, entertained his constituents when
17
In 1998 there were only sixteen prefectures out of forty-eight that issued local government bonds. Most
of these prefectures either had large cities or enough industry that could guarantee enough tax revenue that
would cover payment when the bonds matured. Central government bonds covered 98% of the public
deficit while local government bonds, including municipal bonds, covered 8% of the public deficit.
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they visited New York, but in reality he was considered a JETRO staffand not a
representativefrom his prefecture. His duties were minimal. After spending one year
at JETRO, he returned home to be assigned the directorship of the newly established
Foreign Access Zone (FAZ). Another officerfrom Ehime Prefectural government
succeeded him when he returned to Japan. Subsequently, there werefive other
officersfrom Ehime, who were posted annually at JETRO New York. The seat was
closed in 1999 and an Ehime representative is now posted in JETRO's Hong Kong
office since Ehime has closer trading ties with China than with the United States.
The MITI officer who was the Executive Director ofJETRO New York (1992-1995)
managed to cultivate a connection (kone) with Iga's son, a relationship that continued
after he returned to MITI because he became the director ofthe Export Division in
the International Trade Administration Bureau, which manages Foreign Access
Zones (FAZ).18 MITI initiated FAZ in 1993 to answer the United States' demands
that Japan open its markets to more imports. MITI wrote the Law on Extraordinary
Measuresfor the Promotion ofImports and the Facilitation ofForeign Direct
Investment in Japan and created thefirst FAZ in the port ofMatsuyama, the capital
ofEhime Prefecture.
The FAZ installation at Matsuyama'9 was designed to serve manyfunctions,
including a distribution centrefor the handling of imported goods, an exhibition halt,
International Trade and Exhibition Messe (I.T.E.M. EHIME) and an imported goods
centre. According to the I.T.E.M. brochure, thefacility was built: "To promote local
industries that serve Japan's increasingly international society." The exhibition area
alone is 7,300 square meters.
In April 1993 a company was established to manage thefacilities. The Ehime Foreign
Access Zone Co., Ltd. is comprised ofgovernment organizations and private
18 www.jetro.org.jp/ov/e/faz/whats.htmI
19 See appendix 5 for Matsuyama Faz
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corporations. The company constructed three exhibition halls (I. T.E.M. EHIME),
one of which is the largest exhibition hall in the Shikoku-chugoku region. It has
4,5000 square meters offloor space and a 12-16foot ceiling (October 2000 Foreign
Access Zone Co. Ltd. pp 4). The hall is equipped to meet the needs ofany event.
There are conference rooms and projectorfacilities and simultaneous translation
facilities. There is an Ehime Products and Tourism Centre that is divided into three
zones exhibiting products from local industries. There is I. T.E.M. World Mart where
imported goods are displayed. A JETRO Support Centre (e.g. JETRO branch office)
is located on the samefloor.
There is a second FAZ installation under construction. It intends: " ...to gather trade-
related firms in the "Ehime International Zone" established on the sea front of the Matsuyama port
area. It also involves building of a new port and roads connecting the facilities to the expressway
system. The result will be a comprehensive upgrading of industrial infrastructure."
Pork-Barrel Patronage: Value for the Money or "empty boxes"?
Although Ehime was thefirst recipient ofa FAZ, thefacilities have not been used as
much as had been anticipated. The Japanese refer to the exhibition halls and other
facilities that have been built through publicfunding (both from central and local
governments) during the past ten years but have not been utilized efficiently as "empty
boxes."
Since 1997 there have been a total ofeleven international tradefairs, however, the
facility (I. T.E.M.Ehime) lies vacant most ofthe time. When there are no exhibitions,
there are no visitors to the otherfacilities located in the hall. The display in the World
Mart has changed little over the past three years. The types ofproducts displayed are
mainly processedfoodstuffs, wines and spirits, toys, sporting equipment, clothing and
sundry items. There arefew industrial goods.
The JETRO office, located in the same building often goes unattended.
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A museum ofmodern art was built during Iga's administration and it is a beautiful
structure, complete with mahogany bathrooms. However, there is not enough art to
fill the rooms.
The Kurushima Bridge was opened to the public in May 1999 and is managed by
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority, which is deeply in debt.20 Commuters still prefer
to ride theferry between Hiroshima on the main island ofHonshu and Matsuyama
because the Kurushima Bridge toll is too expensive In his plansfor reform ofSpecial
Status Corporations, Koizumi wants to merge the Japan Highway Corporation with
two other highway-related construction public corporations before privatisation. He
also would like to merge the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority with these three
entities. However, there is heavy opposition to this plan by LDP Diet members, who
have vested interests in highway construction. They do not want the corporations,
responsiblefor building roads in their constituencies, burdened with the debts of the
Authority, which could effectively haltfuture plansfor highway construction in their
regions. (Bloomberg Professional Nov. 21, 2001)
Although Governor Iga was expected to maintain control over Ehime politicsfor
many years, the continuing recessions encouraged voters to replace him in April 1999
with Kato Moriyuki, a native ofEhime, a Liberal Democrat and an ex-bureaucrat
from the Ministry ofEducation Reaction from local businesses was positive because
Kato would give them a direct pipeline to central government (e.g. subsidies and
contracts forpublic works). Nevertheless, Ehime like other prefectures is burdened
with heavy debt and given thefact that national debt is also out ofcontrol, Kato may
21
not be able to use his ties to central government effectively.
20 See Chapter 5 for explanation about Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority.
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By 1999 many prefectures were experiencing the affects of the prolonged recession because of the
sharp decline in corporate tax revenue. Gillian Tett and Nakamura Michiyo reported in the October 1,
1999 edition of the Financial Times that the Tokyo Metropolitan government, Kanagawa and Osaka
prefectures announced that they were on the verge of bankruptcy: "Such comments have fueled
j^ncerns that local governments may cut spending—and thus undermine central government
^tempts to boost growth through a stimulus package." In 1999, the residents of Tokushima
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The Japan External Trade Organization, a MITI Special Status Corporation, has eighty
overseas branch offices that serve as places for amakudari, yokosuberi and shukko. The
writer conducted research on JETRO while working at JETRO New York from 1992-
1998. During that period, the elite MITI officers who were posted in the office were
generally excellent calibre but they had to have had the right connections to be sent to an
office that was highly regarded for overseas duty.
Study ofAmakudari, Shukko, and Kone at JETRO New York
It is said that when MITIpersonnel bureau announce to an officer that he will be
posted as president ofa JETRO overseas office, the officer understands that he is
approaching the end ofhis career in his ministry. The post is viewed as afarewell gift
from the ministry. The officers can either return to their ministries afterfinishing
their tenure at JETRO or they may go to another Special Status Corporation or on to
a position in the private sector. The MITI officer who was president at JETRO New
York from June 1992-June 1994 had served as the director ofthe Policy Planning
Office in the Minister's Secretariat. When he returned to MITI in 1994 he became
the Deputy-Director-Generalfor Global Environmental Affairs and a director of the
Research Institute ofInternationa! Trade and Industry. After retirement he took the
position ofpresident of the Electronic Industries Association ofJapan, an industrial
association under MITI management.
Prefecture, adjacent to Ehime, protested the construction of a dam, illustrating the growing opposition to
the spending of stimulus packager funds on unnecessary construction. The Ministry of Construction was
determined to go through with the project, financing it primarily with funds from FILP. The governor, a
member of the LDP, fully supported the project. Nakano Naoko reported in the March 17, 2000 edition of
the Financial Times that Tokushima residents were worried that the prefecture, already 60bn yen in the
red, would become inundated in debt: "The prefecture will have to pay for only 20 percent of the
dam's construction costs, but critics warn that few public works projects have managed to stay
within budget, often ballooning to double initial estimates." The residents took their protest to the
polls and over 90% percent of voters voted against the dam. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Construction
announced that it had not given up the fight to build the dam.
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His successor at JETRO New York in 1994 had a long-term relationship with JETRO,
having been transferred (shukko) from MITI to JETRO headquarters to serve as the
director of the Planning Division from 1986-1989. He returned to MITIfor the next
two years to serve as the director ofthe Industrial Standards Policy Division in the
Agency ofIndustrial Science and Technology. In 1991 he became the president of
JETRO San Francisco. It is unusualfor an officer to servefor two consecutive terms
as president ofa JETRO overseas office but the officer had managed to procure a
Green Card and he was sent on to New York. He retired after hisfouryears as
president of two JETRO overseas offices and migrated to IBM Japan as an advisor.
With the exception of the president, all officers who are posted by Japanese
organizations at JETRO overseas offices are on temporary assignment (shukko). The
position ofExecutive Director at JETRO New York is held by an elite, who is younger
than the president and who is climbing up the ministry ladder. For example, the
officer who served as Executive Directorfrom 1979-1982 climbed to the top position
of Vice-Minister ofInternational Affairs in 1997. After leaving the ministry he
became an advisor to the Japan Industrial Policy Research Institute and taught
Japanese economics at Stanford University (Daniel Okimoto's section)for three
months. He also became a Special Advisor to the Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance
Co. In 2001 he took a position as the managing director of Toyota.
Kone
Both MITI and JETRO officers look at JETRO overseas offices are much sought
afterfor assignment, especially the offices in Paris, London and New York. They call
JETRO New York "the golden apple" because New York City is a popular tourist
attraction among Japanese Some officers are chosen for duty on merit but many
have connections in the ministry or they may have connections through marriage or
relations. For example, a non-career officer in the Research and Planning Division
at JETRO New Yorkfrom 1992-1995 was connected through hisfather who was also
an officer in the ministry. A young career officer (31), who was married to the
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daughter ofan elite MITI official, was sent as a director in Industrial Research from
1994-1997, even though he knew nothing about thefield he was to research
(Washington, D.C. and national politics). Another career officer, whosefather had
been an elite officer in the Ministry ofForeign Affairs was posted in Research and
Planningfor three years to investigate patents in Washington, D.C. It is highly likely
that he had been transferred because he had made an auspicious marriage to the
niece of the president ofMarubeni America, a giant trading company.
Having political connections with the LDP is also beneficial. The director of
Research and Planning (1991-1995), a JETRO staff is the son ofa former member in
the Upper House of the National Diet. The director had been posted in the 1980s at
JETRO New Yorkforfour years.
An interesting example ofkone is seen in the case ofa JETRO officer whosefather
was the president ofan oil company. After graduatingfrom Keio University he
entered JETRO and was sentfor two years to study computer science at the University
ofPittsburgh where he received his Masters degree. He returned to JETRO
headquarters in Tokyo and was later posted to JETRO New Yorkforfouryears (1992-
1996). He returned to JETRO headquarters in June 1996 but in 1997 he elected to
leave JETRO and go with his wife and two children (born in New York during his
tenure at JETRO New York) to the United States and study at the University of
Georgia.
All of the above studies illustrate that connections are crucial to business people,
politicians and bureaucrats for survival in the Japanese political economy.
Conclusion: Round and round and round it goes. Where it stops nobody
knows
Amakudari, yokosuberi and kone act to establish a network of ex-bureaucrats in private
and public enterprises and politics thus creating an organic interdependence between the
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ministries, businesses and national and local political organizations. This
interdependence is indicative of the Japanese system, a system that can be viewed as
rigid and as defying reform because it is self-perpetuating.
Although amakudari is most often pointed to as the tie that binds the bureaucracy to
business and politics, yokosuberi and shukko are the catalysts that put civil servants into
positions in Special Status Corporations and public corporations. These positions can
lead to permanent postretirement positions in these organizations and, also, to
postretirement positions in the private sector as well (i.e.amakudari). Since Special
Status Corporations and public corporations serve ministries specifically as the places
for yokosuberi it is logical to conclude that ministries will establish corporations for
yokosuberi.
The term shukko means "temporary transfer" and can appear to be a vehicle through
which ministries send officers for periods of one to three years for duty in local
governments or for duty in branches of their Special Status Corporations and public
corporations located in the prefectures. However, in reality, these "temporary" posts can
become permanent positions. In this way, the ministries can monitor local government
activities and influence policies. The primary reason for Prime Minister Koizumi's
reform of Special Status Corporations is the drain on government funds. However, a
significant reason to push for reform is that the privatisation or dissolution of Special
Status Corporations and public corporations will help to loosen the ties that bind the
national government ministries to local government. As long as the ministries can use
their organizations for yokosuberi the issue of amakudari cannot be effectively
addressed.
Although the majority of Japanese are in favour of the discontinuation of amakudari, the
ministries need the system as a means to administrate policy and for postretirement
positions. Unless the civil service system itself is restructured the amakudari system will
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continue. Since the ministries are in charge of administering reforms, Special Status
Corporations continue to flourish.
The March 28, 2002 edition ofAsahi Shimbun carried a commentaiy on amakudari and
the problems of reforming the civil service. It contended that no reform ofelite
bureaucrats would occur and that indeed amakudari was on the increase especially
among the kacho class of bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER 7
THE JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (JETRO): A SPECIAL
STATUS CORPORATION
Introduction
The Japan External Trade Organization is one of MITI's primary Special Status
Corporations. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part I discusses JETRO's formal
role as an organization that promotes exports and international economic cooperation
through various programmes. Part II examines MITI's objectives for maintaining
JETRO through the positioning of its activities despite public criticism that the
organization is no longer needed.
Part I: History and Functions
History
The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) is a government-supported
organization and classified by government at a Special Status Corporation. The JETRO
website gives a chronology of JETRO, stating that in 1951 the Japan Export Trade
Research Organization was established. In 1954 it was reorganized as the Japan
External Trade Recovery Organization. In his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle
Chalmers Johnson credits Akuma Bunzo, the mayor of Osaka and a former member of
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MITI's former name) together with Sugi
Michisuke, the chairman of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, for JETRO's inception in
1951. Their objective was to help revive the Japan's postwar economy by encouraging
small businesses to export goods and to survey foreign markets. The organization
offered services such as export promotion and information on foreign markets such as
the United States and the U.K. MITI accepted the organization, posting personnel in
management positions. In 1956 MITI took over the management of the organization and
chartered it as a public corporation in the current name the Japan External Trade
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Organization or JETRO. It is an operating arm of MITI. MITI opened JETRO's first
overseas offices in the late 1950s. Chalmers Johnson states:
"However, its post-war 1958 legal status as a public corporation rather than as an agency of
government has sometimes gotten it into trouble in the United States. During the late 1950's
JETRO set up in Washington an organization, wholly_staffed by Americans called the United
States—Japan Trade Council but failed to register it under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938. As a result of this oversight, in 1976 the U.S. Department of Justice sued the Trade Council
for civil fraud, charging that 90 percent of its funds actually came from MITI via the New York
office of JETRO. It also agreed to file as a foreign agent and to identify its publications as coming
from Japanese government sources." (1982, pp. 231 -232)
By 1958 JETRO established the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs. Two years later
the institute was established as a public corporations and renamed Institute of
Developing Economies (IDE). In 1971 yet another organization was established, the
International Economic and Trade Information Center.
In 1975 JETRO operated twenty-four trade centers and fifty-four offices in fifty-five
countries, testimony to the fact that Japan had become a major entity in world markets.
MITI also used the offices as listening posts keeping track of foreign regulation on
commerce and industrial standards, patent applications in anticipation that any new
patents could be applicable to Japanese industries, and impending laws that might affect
Japanese trade.
The JETRO website states:
"In the first half of the 1980s, however, as Japan's trade surplus continued to grow and
international trade friction intensified, JETRO made a 180-degree reversal and began promoting
imports entering Japan, a primary mission that continues to this day."6
212
By 1980 Japan was showing a marked trade surplus with its leading trading partner the
United States. There was significant pressure from the United States to deregulate
domestic markets and raise import quotas for such goods as electronics, agriculture and
automobiles. Realistically, JETRO's role as a promoter of Japanese exports no longer
could be considered as relevant to Japanese businesses as in the 1960s and 70s. Also, as
an agency that collected data on foreign economies and markets JETRO was in
competition with large Japanese multinationals and research institutes that conducted
independent surveys.
MITI began to re-orchestrate JETRO functions so that the organization would come to
serve primarily as a promoter of imports and internal investment. In 1983 JETRO
organized a task force to look at promoting imports. In 1984 a second task force for the
promotion of international economic cooperation between industries was formed. In
1984 activities such as trade fairs was initiated with imports fairs in Nagoya, Yokohama
and Kitakyushu. Thus the corporation continued to operate and branch offices continued
to proliferate. In 1989 JETRO established a "sister organization" the Institute for
International Trade and Investment.
Currently there are eighty overseas offices in fifty-eight countries and thirty-five




JETRO claims that its activities focus on supporting imports and investment to Japan:
"The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) offers a wide-ranging support for importing
into Japan, thereby helping to strengthen harmonious economic relationships between Japan and
other nations."8.
During the past ten years JETRO has revised old services and added others, designed to
promote investment in Japan. Also, services that were only accessable through JETRO
offices a few years ago now can be accessed through the Internet. The services are
directed to small to medium-size businesses that would like to export goods and services
to Japan but do not know the regulations for entering Japan nor are they familiar with
the consumer culture.
1. Publications
JETRO supplies to the general public a range of marketing surveys, magazines that
show consumer preferences, books on how-to-do-business in Japan, import procedures
and economic data. For example, JETRO publishes the "JETRO White Paper on
Foreign Direct Investment" and "JETRO white Paper on International Trade." JETRO
promises that it:
"...fully mobilizes its information and know-how to respond to trade and investment inquiries at
offices around the world."9
JETRO's information can be obtained at a JETRO office library or on databases that are
accessible on the web. The market surveys include many products ranging from
processed foodstuffs to apparel to sporting equipment. Source materials on the Japanese





JETRO launched a fifteen-minute television program in June 2001 that can be viewed in
Canada and the United States either by cable or on Internet TV. The program's title,
"Inside/ Outside Japan" is named after the JETRO New York newsletter. Topics for the
inaugural program were "Looking at Free Trade Agreements" (NAFTA) and "The
Future of Regional Economic Integration in Asia."
3. Import Promotion
JETRO has among its import promotion services trade fairs, "senior trade advisors" who
are posted at overseas offices, the Trade Tie-up Program (TIPP), the Tiger Gate Project,
the Japan Corporation for Foreign Direct Investment (FAZ), FAZ Support Centers in ten
of Japan's Foreign Access Zones, and the Business Support Centers in major Japanese
cities.
Trade Fairs
JETRO participates in trade fairs that are industry specific where businesses can display
goods and meet prospective buyers. For example, there are trade fairs for construction
and housing, automobiles and parts, computer industries, electric, electronic and
communication equipment, food and beverages, health care products, furniture, sporting
equipment and so forth.
Senior Trade Advisers
JETRO inaugurated the senior trade adviser program in 1990 in the United States. In an
address to the Japan Society in New York City in 1993, Toyoshima Torn,10 the
Chairman of JETRO, explained that this program was an extension of the "import
products specialist" program, which sends staff overseas for two months to hunt for
products that have potential markets in Japan:
10 See chapter 6, p. 178 for information on Toyoshima
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"A senior trade advisor is stationed here for two or more years, usually working with the commerce
department or economic agency of a given state. The advisor's job is to visit small businesses,
identify products and actively promote them for export to Japan." {Inside/OutsideJapan,
November 1993).
By 1994 there were twenty-one trade advisers stationed throughout the United States.
There are currently twenty-seven, providing, MITI with an extensive network in state
governments. Some of them have been employees of Japanese multinational trading
firms or manufacturers and others are JETRO senior staff. Mr. Toyoshima gave an
example of the success of the program.
"A medium-sized manufacturer in Clearwater, Florida, developed an electronic anti-rust system,
which one of our senior trade advisors decided would have great potential in Japan. The adviser
was right. In two years of 1991 and 1992 the manufacturer sold a total of 80 thousand units.
Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank of Japan extended a loan of 1.5 million to the company to be
used for capital investment. As some of you may know, in April 1990 the Exim Bank of Japan
introduced a program designed to increase imports into Japan and provides financing to American
companies with products that are likely to sell well in Japan. The Florida company was the first to
have such financing."
JETRO FAZ Support Centers
JETRO claims:
"JETRO invites business people to Japan to the Export to Japan Study Program, which offers
seminars for furthering their understanding of the Japanese market and the chance to meet face-to-
face with potential Japanese partners. In addition, JETRO welcomes foreign missions that visit to
develop business."11 The foreign missions visit Foreign Access Zones (discussed in
chapter 6)12 to show how JETRO promotes exports.
Trade Tie-up Program (TIPP)




"Internet-based business solution system that mediates between Japanese and overseas corporations
to find suitable business partners."
TIPP is another extension of past programs for the promotion ofjoint ventures between
foreign and Japanese businesses. There are also databases listing potential Japanese
importers and exporters:
Tiger Gate Project 2001
"The Tiger Gate Project 2001 is a JETRO initiative to offer various forms of support to venture
companies actively working or planning to work in high-tech fields such as IT. This year, JETRO is
launching "Venture Incubation in the USA," and "International Techno Business Forum" as the
major project of the Tiger Gate Project." 13
This program focuses on tiny venture businesses that seek capital to develop and market
inventions. Some of these begin in university incubators where entrepreneurs, who may
be professors teaching at the university, can develop inventions along with students.
Such incubators exist at New York State University (Farmingdale and Stonybrook).
Japanese companies may inject capital into these ventures if the technology is applicable
to the companies' needs. The Tiger Gate Project encourages this kind of tie-up and the
program has commenced in California.
JETRO through Tiger Gate conducts many forums and seminars to encourage
networking among American and Japanese businesses engaged in telecommunications.
JETRO calls the International Techno Forums "Achievements in 2001." The forums
were held in several major metropolitan areas in both Japan and in the United States.
Foreign Investment in Japan Corporation (FIND)




"...foreign companies and foreign affiliates assess and fully develop their potential in Japan.
Established on the basis of the Japanese government policy of supporting foreign companies entry
into Japan and facilitating their smooth operations here."14
FIND is a private corporation that was established in 1993. Its activities closely
resemble the ones that JETRO offers to help foreign companies to do business in Japan
except that it also claims to help businesses already established in Japan to expand
operations. Find states:
"500 million yen of capital was provided by the Japanese government (Industrial Structure Fund)
and a further 445 million yen was invested by powerful businesses in the private sector and industry
associations. Find is able to provide a range of supportive services through their team of in-house
specialist staff, coupled with the cooperation and collaboration of institutions from the public and
private sectors. "1S
FIND claims that it has helped two hundred foreign companies gain access to the
Japanese market and success stories can be accessed on the web. The company admits
that it has connections with MITI, JETRO, the Industrial Structure Improvement Fund,
the Development Bank of Japan and other public corporations.
Among the thirty-one stockholders are MITI industrial associations such as the
Electronics Industries of Japan (EIAJ), the Japan Electrical Manufacturers Association
and the Japan Electronic Industry Development Association. A MITI subsidiary, the
Industrial Structure Improvement Fund is also a stockholder. Among the private
stockholders are Toyota Motors Corp., Mitsubishi Chemical Corp., Nissho Iwai Corp,.
Sumitomo, Corp, IBM Japan, Ltd., Kobe steel, Ltd. Tokyo Electric Power CO. Japan,
Sanwa Bank, Ltd. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. Nissan Motors Corp., Marubeni, Corp.






"To help newcomers to Japan, JETRO operates Business Supports (BSCs) in major cities such as
Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe and Fukuoka to provide free and temporary basis, office
space and other support, including consultants to advise on how to enter the Japanese market." 16
In his speech, Mr. Toyoshima expressed the hope that the Business Sport Centers would
act as "base camps" for entering the Japanese market. Opened in 1993 the BSCs offer to
foreign business people promoting their wares to Japanese businesses:
"...free office space with consulting services and more! The centers are staffed with advisers who
provide complimentary consulting services on exporting to Japan and doing business there"17
There is also exhibition space provided in each BSC where exporters can display goods
to the public.
4. Promotion of International Economic Cooperation
MITI has come to use JETRO to promote "international awareness" of the Japanese
economy, market and business practices. There are JETRO-sponsored Japanese
language programs at universities. JETRO also encourages Japanese businesses and
local governments to offer internships to students.
The Japan Economic Foundation
The Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) was founded by MITI in 1981 "...to enhance
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mutual understanding between Japan and other countries." It is an example of foundations
that are spawned by Special Status Corporations. The foundation publishes the
bimonthly magazine Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry, which provides





is sent to organizations and individuals whose interests center on Japan. Other activities
include the Japan Study Program for International Executives (JASPIE). "Prominent
people in the economic arena" are invited to Japan to visit companies and meet leaders
in government and industry. The UK-Japan High Technology Forum is an annual event
that is supported by the British Department of Trade and Industry and MITI. Toyoshima
Toru, the chairman of JETRO in 1993 is now the chairman of JEF. Former
Administrative Vice-Minister Tsutomi Tomio, who was referred to in chapter 5, serves
as a Special Advisor.
5. Promotion of Government Economic Policy
During the past ten years JETRO representatives (e.g. MITI officials) have assured
audiences that Japan's economy was recovering and touting the release of stimulus
packages as cures for the ailing economy. In his address to the Carnegie Council of
Ethics in March 1993, JETRO New York President Tsukamoto Hiroshi assured the
audience that Japan's economy was on track:
"I am aware that Americans think that Japan's economy is in the doldrums. Yet, Japan continues
to grow, its unemployment remains below 2.5% and its budget deficit as a share of the GDP is 1.5%
in cpontrast with the 4.9% of the United States. And the $86 billion stimulus package that went into
effect earlier this year is showing results." (April 1993)
All of the stimulus packages released since 1993 were heavily invested in infrastructure
projects such as bridges, dams and highways. The FAZ projects also benefit from funds
from stimulus packages. JETRO itself has benefited from revenue from the stimulus
packages. In his speech titled "Change and JETRO's Role" he gave at the New York
Japan Society in October 1993 JETRO Chairman Toyoshima Toru stated that the third
stimulus package of $58 billion dollars "...included budget increases for JETRO's new
projects."
Six years later, as the recession continued, JETRO New York Executive Director
Nishiyama Hidehiko in his speech titled "The Current Economic Situation and Business
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Opportunities in Japan" given at a JETRO seminar in New York City ( March 16, 1999)
stated that:
"in addition to earlier stimulation measures worth $133 billion and a previously planned $58 billion
tax cut, last November the government announced a third supplemental budget package of more
than $167 billion Overall, the program will help Japan raise demand by 2-3%, so as to achieve a
positive growth rate in FY 1999 and engineer a recovery by FY 2000. By FY 2001m we expect to see
demand to shift from public to private sector-led growth.," 19
Until the late 1990s MITI officials in top management positions at JETRO kept a
relatively low profile, preferring to meet privately with government officials, leading
academics and business leaders. As Japan's recession continued, however, the officers
became more active in explaining and defending government economic policies to a
wider audience. Nowadays when they visit JETRO overseas offices MITI officials
address various influential groups. There is usually an assessment of the current state of
the Japanese economy and then a promotion of JETRO's activities in the promotion of
trade. Hatakeyama Noboru, the present Chairman and CEO of JETRO, addressed the
Center of Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. on April 26,
2001.20 "A Reassessment of Japan's Economy, Trade Policies and Economic Interaction
with the US" gave a relatively positive picture of Japan's economic conditions. As a
representative of the Japanese government Mr. Hatakeyama stated:
"In my personal view, Japan's economy as of now is not and will not be as bad as is thought to be.
What matters will be the Japan economy for the second half of this year and thereafter."21
Some of the reasons that Mr. Hatakeyama gave for his positive outlook were that
government spending on public works was changing to private fixed investment, which,
according to Mr. Hatakeyama, was 7.6% higher in the fourth quarter of 2000 than the
same time in 1999. He said that orders for machinery were still going up and that:
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"Even in private consumption, the demand for home electricity was 5.6% higher in Jan.-Feb. than a
year earlier, although this might have been unusually high because of our cold winter this year."22 .
Mr. Hatakeyama endorsed the government's continued policy to release fiscal stimulus
packages to induce consumer spending, even though stimulus packages released during
the previous ten years had accomplished little more than accumulate debt both at the
national and local levels: "A stimulus package totaling about $200 billion is the centerpiece of its
economic recovery effort." The chairman enumerated the various components of the
package such as reductions in personal and corporate taxes. He also stated: "Public
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investment in infrastructure, another major component, has already begun to kick in."
To show that foreign businesses have opportunities in the Japanese marketplace, Mr.
Hatakeyama said that:
"...many sectors of the Japanese market are growing rapidly right now and offer especially
attractive opportunities to U.S. providers of products and service. The list of "hot areas today
includes environmental, healthcare, particularly for the elderly, and Internet and e-business
related."
At the end of his speech Mr. Hatakeyama promoted of JETRO's services by reminding
the audience that:
"JETRO is probably the best source of information in what's happening in Japan and where the
best opportunities are for foreign businesses. Above all, keep in mind that our Senior Trade
Adviser, stationed in Raleigh, Mr. Shibata, is highly qualified and eager to assist you."
22 Increase in machinery orders could be attributed not to expectations in increased demands but to the fact
that during the recession, to conserve cash, companies delayed the purchasing of new equipment.
18. www.jetro.org/newyork
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Despite Mr. Hatakeyama's positive predictions regarding Japan's economic recovery,
the Bank of Japan recognized publicly in October 2001 that the Japanese economy had
entered its third recession.
To engage foreign approval of economic policy, JETRO has joined forces with
prominent universities to put on seminars such as the Joint Conference on Regional
Trade Agreements December 2001 at the John Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). JETRO New York president Urata
Masutaru gave the opening remarks along with SAIS Dean Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. The
panel discussed the "multinational trade regime embodied in the WTO" and the future of
U.S.-Japan trade relationship. 4
Another example of JETRO promotion of government economic policy is JETRO's
contributed to the support of a symposium at the University of Edinburgh held on
November 30, 2001. "The Kyoto University Symposium on the Changes in the
Japanese Economy Facing the New Century." Although these contributions aid foreign
universities to conduct symposiums they also serve to cultivate a positive image among
foreigners of JETRO, which helps MITI to keep its Special Status Corporation alive.
Part II: JETRO and MITI's OBJECTIVES
The Bureaucracy's Resistance to the Reform of Special Status
Corporations
The Opinion Page of News Asahi on January 9, 1995 ran a story about the difficulties
that Prime Minister Murayama Tomichi's Administration was having in convincing the
ministries to consolidate some of the smaller Special Status Corporations. It points to
the proposal of the now defunct Sakigake Party for the dissolution of both the Price
Stabilization of Silk Yarn and Sugar Corporation and the Promotion of Animal
Husbandry Corporation, Special Status Corporations that are under the management of
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The ministry objected to dissolution, claiming
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that these corporations would act to continue to protect consumers by providing strategy
that would maintain stable prices. However, the ministry did contemplate consolidating
the two corporations.
The article also points to the reticence of other ministries to restructure their Special
Status Corporations. It contends that at the very outset of the hearings MITI voiced
disapproval, wanting to know if the restructuring was related to the total number of
Special Status Corporations or if it was related to the ways they were being financed. In
1993 MITI had rejected the third hearing about administrative reforms and Hashimoto
Ryuutaru, the Minister of Commerce and Industry supported the ministry's stance at that
time and continues to do so.
Asahi notes that the ministries were changing the objectives of their Special Status
Corporations, adding new roles. Asahi called this behaviour "the skill at disguising"
(henshin no gijutsu). It holds JETRO up as an example, an organization that had been
established fifty-eight years before for the purpose of promoting Japanese exports. "Now
when you phone, the receptionist answers, 'JETRO, the promoter of imports."
Since the 1980s, MITI has indeed revised JETRO's duties and expanded operations so
that it can continue using the organization. As was reported in the prior chapter that
MITI uses JETRO for amakudari, yokosuberi and shukko. MITI uses JETRO for other
purposes as well. Ezra Vogel writes:
"To represent their interests within congressional and administration circles in Washington.
Japanese hire former American government officials of both parties as lawyers, consultants and
public relations specialists. They send and receive goodwill missions. Prime ministers make
speeches urging Japanese to buy foreign goods, which frank Japanese acknowledge may be aimed
more at foreign audiences. Japanese bureaucrats in JETRO (the Japan External Trade
Organization) help arrange 'import fairs' of boutique goods, food products and other goods that
have at best minor significance in the trade balance." (1986, pp. 761-762).
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MITI officials at JETRO overseas offices act as representatives of the Japanese
government, espousing government economic and social policy. MITI officers use
JETRO overseas branch offices to monitor and report on economic and political policies
that will influence Japanese trade. (Johnson C.,1995, p.23) Foreign agents based at their
countries' embassies and consulates ordinarily do this type of work. Since MITI officers
are posted at the Japanese embassies, consulates as well as at the Japan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, which, like JETRO, maintains offices around the world, in
essence they can perform the same duties as the officers are doing at JETRO. .
The Asahi article states that MITI changed JETRO from an export promoter into an
import promoter. The JETRO's makeover into an import promotion organization in the
early 1980s gave it a new lease on life. However, the effectiveness of JETRO's
programmes have been questioned by dissatisfied users particularly, the viability of the
data bank that lists hundreds of potential importers of a wide range of products, which
was recently discontinued for reasons unrelated to complaints and which will be
disclosed later in this chapter. It is an illuminating exercise to take a second look at
some of JETRO's publications as well as the JETRO programmes that were described in
Part I of this chapter.
Much of the literature has been discontinued because JETRO is again undergoing
another makeover (discussed later in this chapter) but they are a good illustration of how
JETRO has been dealing with foreign business people who want to enter the Japanese
market. The literature is detailed but simultaneously ambiguous, leading readers to
believe that access to the Japanese market is a simple procedure.
25 The most common complaint from business owners who had tried to contact the potential importers
listed in the data bank was that their inquiries were never answered even after numerous attempts to reach
them, (observed by writer and fellow staff who worked in JETRO's New York's Trade Inquiry Section
where business owners used data banks.
225
JETRO's Approach to Potential Importers: Does JETRO Promise More
Than It Can Deliver?
Publications: Detailed But Ambiguous
When Karel van Wolveren wrote "The Japan Problem" in 1986, analysing how Japan
was dealing with America's demands to reduce its surplus by opening up markets to
American goods he claimed:
"In Japan quite often—and always more frequently than in the West—what is true on paper is not
true in practice. Japanese spokesmen widely advertise the fact that a number of foreign firms that
have tried hard enough have been successful in this market. These firms are well-known because
they belong to a small sample always mentioned in this context. A select few foreign firms receive
assistance to serve as fresh examples of Japanese openness." (1986/1987 p. 293)
1. A Survey on Successful Cases ofForeign-Affiliated Companies in Japan (1989)
The thirteen manufacturers were asked questions about how they prepared for entering
Japan and about operating in Japan. Although the companies surveyed were very
positive about being in Japan, readers would not be able to contact any of them to
confirm the authenticity of the information or to find out more about doing business in
Japan because none were identified by name but merely by main industry product,
location of the headquarters, location in Japan and capital investment.
2. The Challenge of the Japanese Market 1990
The book is a colourful layout of companies that have succeeded in Japan. However, the
companies reviewed already had brand recognition among Japanese before they entered
Japan because Japanese tourists had purchased the products on trips overseas. Imported
luxury goods have traditionally found a lucrative market in Japan because consumers
connote expensive brand-name imports with quality and elegance. Purchases of
expensive imports also have a certain snob appeal as well. The companies reviewed
produced luxury goods, including Baccarat Pacific, Bausch & Lomb Japan, Bussan
Lladro, Cartier Japan, Jaeger, Cycles Peugeot Sales Japan, Rolex Japan, Reebok Japan,
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Rolex Japan, Mont Blanc, Dunhill, and so forth. The majority of the companies entered
the marketplace through partnering with large Japanese trading companies (a common
route for foreign companies) who distributed the products through finely tuned
distribution channels. Trading companies such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and
Marubeni pursue foreign manufacturers if they are certain that there is a ready market
for their products. Even now, in Japan's recessive economy, the Japanese continue to
purchase these luxury goods. Some of the companies such as Cartier, Dunhill, and Van
Cleef & Arpels have been able to break away from Japanese control and operate 100%
independently.
Small business owners who were new to the Japanese market may have imagined after
reading the publication that since Japanese consumers enjoyed expensive goods foreign
goods their products that the same type of goods, but less expensive, would find a
lucrative market also. This is a logical assumption but not applicable to the Japanese
market where brand recognition plays a significant role in assisting businesses to
penetrate the Japanese market
3. Lists ofJapanese Enterprises Promoting Imports 1991
JETRO literature that states that many Japanese companies want to procure foreign-
made goods can be construed as ambiguous. An example of this is seen in the
publications that JETRO's Import Promotion Department issued. The first two chapters
are devoted to the promotion of JETRO's export promotion services and to Japanese
business practices and procurement procedures. The third section of the second chapter
"Requests of Suppliers made by Japanese Enterprises" lists three unidentified companies
as willing procurers. "Company A' is an automobile manufacturer, who claims an "open
door' policy, stating:
26
JapanConsumming April 2002 p. 1
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"Parts, material, and equipment are quite varied and we procure them from all over the world. It
goes without saying that we will make impartial evaluations from the overall view of quality, price,
delivery, technological capacity, management policy, etc. " (p. 14)
The management of "Company B," an electric utility company, stresses the importance
of fairness in selection of supplies and is searching for: "capacity with existing facilities,
technological capacity, and management." (pi 5)
"Company C," an electric appliance manufacturer, hopes to make a "contribution to
society," and cooperate with suppliers, intending to "set goals without compromises." (p 16)
The three companies hope for "mutual trust" and pledge "equal opportunities" for potential
suppliers.
The third chapter, "Guide to the List of Japanese Enterprises and Prospective Products"
includes "315 prospective products that 86 enterprises may wish to import." The majority of
the companies listed are large multinationals and affiliates of large firms, all in the
industrial sectors that MITI oversees. Nisshin Steel Co., Ltd. claims that it procures iron
ore and coking coal and that: "Active companywide effort is underway." (p 134)
Although no volume is stipulated, Mitsubishi Motors claims that it is actively promoting
the procurement of auto parts and accessories, (p. 108)
Mitsubishi Kasei Corporation, a producer of petrochemicals states that it will: import
when an opportunity arise." (p. 106)
Kawasaki Heavy Industries as well as the majority of the companies listed did not have
procurement guides in English at the time of publication, making it extremely difficult
for foreign firms to communicate with the prospective procurers.
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The forward in the 1992 edition of List of Japanese Enterprises claims:
"...through these efforts and other efforts, JETRO is effectively helping to increase the flow of
goods being imported into Japan. At the same time, JETRO provides strategic support to
influential people in foreign countries, including business people and officials, who seek to increase
exports to Japan. JETRO also supports global trade and economic exchange."
In this volume the phrases "when the opportunity arises" and "active countrywide effort
underway" are extensively used by potential importers.
4. Success is Yours (1996)
JETRO reassures novice importers to Japan that entry into Japan is not difficult if certain
processes were followed. The confectionery company and producer of the popular Jelly
Belly, Herman Goelitz, Inc. was used as an example of how a foreign processed food
producer successfully entered the Japanese market. However, small or medium sized
businesses that do not have the same high visibility and brand recognition as Goelitz
before they attempt entry are at a distinct disadvantage. Goelitz was way ahead of the
game before entering Japan because the Jelly Belly was already popular among Japanese
who purchased the confection while visiting the United States. The report revealed that
Sony Plaza was the distributor. Any association with Sony Corporation would ensure
success however Sony Corporation would be adverse to risk a tie-up with manufacturers
that did not have a solid track record. JETRO did not participate in facilitating
Goelitz's entrance into Japan. Nonetheless, since JETRO did not state otherwise,
readers may have assumed that JETRO had been involved.
5. Focus (January-February 2002)
Focus is JETRO's bimonthly magazine. It is distributed in all of the countries where
there are JETRO offices. The contents vary from issue to issue but generally there are
sections devoted to Japanese market trends, culture, reports on Japan's industry and
trade and so forth. The January-February 2002 issue can be seen as illustrative of the
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positive picture JETRO draws of Japan in terms of importing and investment
opportunities.
The cover story, "Reform drive brings new business opportunities" states that major
structural reform is under way:
"Seven concrete reform programs ...including privatisation and deregulation, support for
"challengers (shift to a social system that emphasises individual ability), and strengthening o the
insurance system...In addition budget drafting by various national government ministries and
agencies is to be overhauled. Long-term plans for public works are to be reviewed, as is the
earmarking of revenues for particular types of public works spending, and revenue sources are to
be shifted from the national government to the regions" (p 3)
The story states that the principle behind the reform is that the private sector, local
authorities will be obliged to carry more of the burden that has previously been handled
by the public sector, (p 3)
Focus gives no further details about the reforms. There are specifics given regarding the
reform of the Postal Accounts Agency or Special Status Corporations and public
corporations, two of Koizumi's pet reform projects. Under the heading "Timetable sets
the reform order and pace" is the statement:
"...the administration on September 26 announced a tentative Advanced Reform Program and
Reform Schedule, which is a timetable indicating the order and pace of the specific reform
measures." (pp. 3-4) There is no mention of when reforms will actually be initiated and
there is no information given that shows readers where they can access the timetable.
By quoting Yamaguchi Nobuo, the chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry Focus assures readers that Japan is a good place for doing business and for
investment:
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"The schedule for implementing the Koizumi reforms has been shown concretely to a certain
degree; 1 expect this to have a favourable effect on the market as well." (p.4)
Yamaguchi, as the spokesman for an organization that is under MITI management,
promoted two of MITI's Special Status Corporations; the Japan Finance Corporation for
Small Businesses and the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation,. He warned
that private financial institutions are not able to refinance loans of small and medium-
sized businesses.
"I hope that the full forces of the government-affiliated financial institution will be marshalled to
provide a firm safety net keeping sound small and medium-sized firms from being pulled under
through chain-reaction bankruptcies." (p. 4)
This statement could be regarded as pointing to continued control by MITI over the
small and medium-sized manufacturing sector.
Under the heading "Reform makes Japan more attractive" the articles promises the
possibility of deregulation.
"The portion of structural reform in which business executives actually have the greatest hopes is
deregulation...This is because there is a very strong possibility that the removal of regulatory
restraints will allow new businesses to be born and provide direct stimulus for demand." (p. 5)
Focus does not give any time frame for deregulation nor what kinds of deregulation may
be implemented but it does admit that the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan has
been after Japan to: "to reduce the level of its regulations." (p. 6) The European Business
Community as well has echoed these demands. Focus suggests that deregulation may
happen because of meetings last October between high-ranking officials from Japan and
the EU. At the meeting the EU representatives demanded that Japan develop a "greater
transparency" for investment in Japan and that METI (i.e. MITI) can be asked in
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advanced by businesses wanting to enter Japan: "...whether their planned business activities
would be considered in violation of Japanese law." (p. 6)
Despite the uncertainty regarding the time table of future reform and deregulation the
article under the heading "Benefits from the entry of foreign firms" claims: "if
deregulation progresses, all sorts of ideas for new businesses should become possible." One of the
possibilities given is the operation of medical institutions and farms by joint-stock
companies. Coincidently, these two sectors are not in MITI's jurisdiction. Any
deregulation in the agriculture or health services industries would effectively erode the
territory of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forest, and Fisheries and the Ministry of Flealth,
Labour, and Welfare respectively.
Focus claims that the majority of Japanese are supporting Prime Minister's Koizumi's
platform for reform (70% as of January) and that businessmen approve as well. Focus
predicts that by 2004 Japan's GDP should be 1.5% "in real terms" and 2.5% "in nominal
terms." (p.4) The article admits that Koizumi is facing growing resistance to his plans,
his opponents emphasising that he must deal immediately with Japan's deepening
recession such as tackling the problem of non-performing loans. The article omits telling
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readers that the ministries are responsible for the administration of the reforms.
JETRO has a web site "Invest Japan" that it promotes with a small package, which
includes a CD-Rom for visiting the web site. The advertisement on the package claims:
"Now's the time! The Japanese government has been actively promoting foreign investment in its
marketplace and the investment environment has changed dramatically in recent years. The
Japanese government pursues positive deregulations of its economy...The Japanese government is
currently undergoing structural reform of an unprecedented scale."
27
Koizumi's popularity rating have dropped significantly since January to below 50% and he is now
being seen as being ineffective in implanting his reforms.
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The advertisement claims the success of foreign companies that have entered risky areas
such as finance and insurance but the names of companies are not listed.
6. Japan Trade Directory 2002-2003 (with CD-Rom)
The directory has been published annually since 1990. The current edition lists 2,000
businesses that JETRO claims are: "...looking for export/import services trade and other
international business opportunities."28 A common complaint among American business
people who want to export their goods and services is that many of the companies do not
9Q
reply when contacted.
7. Directory for Setting Up Enterprises in Japan (July 2000)
Published annually, the book lists companies by region (12) and business (16) describing
each business and including point of contact. Again, Japanese companies fail to
communicate when contacted by prospective importers.
Trade Promotion Programs: More Image Than Substance?
1. The Business Support Centers (BSC)
The BSC were created by Hirai Sumihito, a JETRO officer who was the director of
Public Relations at JETRO New York (1991-1995). To promote the BSC JETRO New
York teamed up with the New York State Department of Economic Development
(NYSDED) and organized a market tour of Japan for small business owners who were
members of the National Minority Business Council (NMBC). Recipients ofNew York
States Global Market Service grants (GEMS), the businessmen and women were given
the opportunity to display their goods (fashions, accessories and ceramics) at a BSC in
Tokyo to potential buyers. A boutique owner from Harajuku, a trendy fashion area in
Tokyo, was escorted by JETRO to the BSC and he placed a small order for some of the
products.
28
29 Personal observation while working for three years in "Trade Inquiry JETRO New York
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A press conference was staged on January 26, 1994 to announce the success of the trip.
The owner of the Harajuku boutique was flown to New York to participate. All of the
owners, who were of African descent, displayed the goods that they had displayed in
Tokyo. There was: "...millinery from Xenobia and Natisha&Armour Hat Co., women's fashions
and accessories from W.W. Chey New York Co., Fussin Inc..." (Inside/Ouside Japan. April
1994, p 6) Statuesque African American women decked out in African headdress and
heavy African jewellery modelled the fashions. With the exception of a ceramics
collection, the products were inappropriate for Japanese market because petite Japanese
women prefer conservative French and English fashion.
Noel Copeland, the Jamaican ceramicist whose products did fit into the Japanese market,
was the only member of the delegation to return to Japan. Invited to exhibit his dishes
and furniture at a Kobe gallery the following October, he sold everything he exhibited.
Upon his return to New York he gave his evaluation of the BSC at a private interview.
"The Business Support Center is a good idea but it needs some PR work. The location isn't ideal.
It's in a big office building and there is not a lot of traffic outside of the building. The whole third
and fourth floors have different boutiques. I was there around lunchtime and only two or three
people were walking through. The exporters who were exhibiting their work were just standing
around. I spoke to two of them and they were losing money because there wasn't enough traffic. I
think that one was from Morocco and one was from America. I think that JETRO either has to
publicize the place or find a different location in order for businesses to succeed. I spoke to the
people and they were frustrated," 30
2. The Foreign Investment in Japan Corporation (FIND)-.
In his book Troubled Times Edward Lincoln writes that it had been anticipated that
FIND would concretely assist in foreign investment but the organization received
criticism because:
TO
Noel Copeland, 1995, interview JETRO New York
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"...its advice is limited to recommending tie-ups with its member firms (for which Find receives
referral fees). Furthermore, as a government organization it was not really an independent voice for
merger and acquisition advice. Foreign firms were less in need of advice or introduction to
potential business partners than in a dismantling of the real obstacles to acquisitions." (p. 192)
As seen in the description of FIND in Part I the members on FIND's board of directors
represent major companies within MITI's jurisdiction and MITI- related organizations.
3. Trade Tie-up Program (TIPP) and the Tiger Gate Project 2001:
These programs are recent additions to the JETRO export promotion programs and it is
still too early to evaluate their effectiveness but it is worth noting that the Tiger Gate
Project hooks up American high tech small businesses that are being nurtured in
university incubators with Japanese firms in search of new technologies,
What JETRO Does Not Tell Prospective Importers
As a government supported organization that promotes government policy it is
appropriate that JETRO approaches potential importers with a positive scenario of
Japan's markets, implying that they can successfully penetrate the Japanese market if
they are willing to adapt their products to fit Japanese consumer preferences and to tie-
up with a Japanese distributor for easier access to the market. JETRO urges companies
to find Japanese partners to facilitate marketing and distribution since most foreign firms
are unfamiliar with the system. On the other hand, mention is never made of potential
problems that an importer may face if he hooks up with a distributor who happens to
produce the same item. A California wine producer found that entrusting distribution to
a Japanese wine producer was unwise because the Japanese wine producer became his
competitor.
Surprise, Surprise
In the late 1980s Mercian, Inc., a major Japanese winemaker was jostlingfor number
one position in the domestic market with its leading competitor Suntory. Suntory,
235
anticipating a burgeoning wine market, had begun buying wineries in famous wine
producing regions In 1986 the company purchased a winery in Sonoma, California.
Mercian followed by purchasing Markham Vineyards in the nearby Napa Valley.
Mercian had been importing and distributing Louis Martini wine, a premier Napa
Valley winefar superior in quality to Markham. Markham Vineyards is located on
the same road as Martini. Mercian replanted the vineyards and completely renovated
the plant and buildings. The kacho, who was in charge of the Louis Martini account
was also in charge ofMarkham and travelled often to California to oversee
operations. It was evident that he wanted to be givenfull responsibilityfor Markham.
When Louis Martini visited Japan in 1988for a ten-day promotional tour, the kacho
refused to attend him and the writer, who had entered Mercian a few months earlier
as a member ofthe wine division, was assigned to act as market guide and interpreter.
During the tour, Martini discussed with her marketing tacticsfor his wine in Japan
and ways ofapproaching Mercian management because salesfor his wine had not
been remarkable. He also knew that Mercian had bought Markam Vineyards and
worried about competition, although, the quality of the wine at the time was inferior to
Martini31
The writer, who felt that Mercian should continue distributing Martini wines until
Markam wines had improved, suggested to Martini that he publish a small cookbook
designed to showcase his wine with easy-to-prepare dishes. Martini liked the idea and
when Mr. Martini met with the director of the wine division to discussfuture strategy,
he requested the promotional cookbook with the hope that sales would improve. The
director ofthe wine division appeared to be enthusiastic about the project, agreeing to
split the costs ofpublication fifty-fifty. The writer was put in charge ofcookbook.
Martini was satisfied that Mercian wouldpush sales ofhis wine and returned to
California thefollowing day.
31 Markham has won international awards for excellent in recent years
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The writer had accompanied Martini to various retailers to show him where Mercian
was selling his wines. When he visited the shops, Martini saw an array ofhis wines
on the shelves. After he left Japan, the write revisited the shops to survey the pricing
ofother wines. To her surprise, Louis Martini wines had been replaced with Mercian
domestic wines, obviously an early indication that Mercian would replace Martini
wine with its own Markham. Nevertheless, she proceeded with the cookbook as
planned.
At the outset there were several obstacles. First, the smallpublic relations company
that was assigned to assist in the project knew nothing about California and wine.
Second, the other staff in the wine division did not participate. In fact, they
complained that the cookbook should showcase Mercian domestic wines, despite the
fact that the wines consistently received low-ratingsfrom Japanese. 10,000 copies
were printed and delivered to the wine division. The books were put away and there
was no effort to distribute them. At the writer's prompting they were distributed to
Mercian sales offices throughout Japan but no strategy had been devisedfor their use.
As the promotional activitiesfor Markham increased, the promotion for Louis Martini
decreased. Ironically, the American consultant, who Martini had hired to engage in
contract negotiations and who shared an interest in a California winery, also
approached Mercian to distribute his wine. Not only was Martini in competition with
his Japanese distributor but with his American consultant as well. Mercian no longer
distributes Martini wines.
The Power of Persuasion: MITI Promotes Government Economic and
Industrial Policies
Van Wolveren writes:
" When 'beliefs are dependent on socio-political circumstances, and 'reality' is something that can
be manipulated, it is fairly easy to maintain Actions... The dire need for better 'mutual
understanding' is frequently and enthusiastically endorsed. But wakatte kudusai means 'please
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understand' in the sense of'please accept my explanation, regardless of whether it has some basis in
fact. It connotes acceptance and tolerance." (1989 p. 10)
The speeches that have been given about fiscal stimulus packages as a means to trigger
Japan's flagging economy are examples of this type of promotion.
One MITI officer, who served as president of JETRO New York from 1992-1994, was
particularly innovative in his approach to promoting government policy. Tsukamoto
Hiroshi was an active president who succeeded in creating a positive image of MITI and
JETRO using a method that differed from past presidents, who primarily relied on
networking personally with national and state government officials, businessmen and
academics. Tsukamoto preferred to supplement his networking activities with a
newsletter, Inside/Outside Japan.
Tsukamoto initiated the publication of the monthly newsletter that was sent unsolicited
to American opinion leaders in government, business and academia. The concept for
Inside/Outside Japan32 must be attributed to the Executive Director of Research and
Planning but Tsukamoto took the idea and used the newsletter for disseminating
information of Japanese business and promotion of government policy. The paper did
not focus fully on promotion of government policy. Rather, it was an effort in
promoting the image that JETRO (e.g. MITI) was a sophisticated and well-versed
organization whose officers understood Americans and their political economy.
Simultaneously, the paper's tone promoted to readers the importance of "mutual
understanding" and acceptance of the Japanese way of governing and doing business.
More importantly, the paper was, in effect, an attempt to revise JETRO's image (henshin
gijutsu). Whether intended or not, it also succeeded in making the recipients more
aware that MITI and JETRO were synonymous.
32 For on-line issues:
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One year after the first issue was released, Tsukamoto enclosed a letter in the July 1993
issue. It read in part:
"JETRO New York began producing this publication back in July 1992 with the goal of bringing
attention to American opinion leaders aspects of Japan that tend to be overlooked in the United
States. Japan is a complex nation undergoing many changes in its social relations and its mobility
and diversity—at an intense pace. Seldom has Japan been static in its long history, and again it is
grappling with momentous decisions; international responsibility versus participation and domestic
versus individual happiness, to name only a few."
"Inside/Outside Japan" was sent to such scholars as Hugh Patrick and Gerald Curtis
(Columbia University), Chalmers Johnson (University of California, San Diego), Ezra F.
Vogel (Harvard), Kent E. Calder (Princeton), Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford) Joseph Nye
(Harvard), Nathaniel Thayer (SAIS, John Hopkins), Ronald Dore (Imperial College),
Leonard Shoppa (University of Virginia), and Gary Saxonhouse (University of
Michigan). It also was sent to congressmen and senators and to journalists at leading
newspapers and magazines.
In the majority of issues, the other articles pertained to Japanese society and culture.
There were highly positive pieces on Japanese marketing techniques and industrial
leaders thus giving Tsukamoto a comfortable setting for expressing himself in a literate
and persuasive manner on the Japanese economic environment. It is an interesting
exercise to analyse a few of these articles to illustrate Tsukamoto's adeptness at
promoting the value of fiscal stimulus packages.
In the very first issue (July 1992) he promised that Japan's economy would recover and
promoted the release of the first stimulus package:
"Real estate prices continue to drop, vacancy rates of new office buildings remain high, banks are
competing among themselves trying to dispose of bad loans, manufactures are struggling to reduce
excess capacity and personnel...
This is not a description of the United States a few years ago, but Japan today.
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Seven-Five-Three is a traditional Japanese festival for congratulating children on turning seven,
five, or three years of age. But the term is now used to forecast Japan's economic recovery: real
estate will take seven years, banks five, the securities market three before regaining their footholds.
The bursting of the economic 'bubble' seriously injured the United States; now it is injuring Japan
no less." Tsukamoto humbly admitted that the Japanese government was too optimistic
in its original forecast of economic recovery and was now going to release a recovery
package to ignite the economy.
"The recovery plan, announced on August 28, provides for $86 billion to achieve four main goals:
(1) expand spending on public housing; (2) increase loans to small businesses (3) promote
investment in plant and equipment (4) to give financial institutions incentives for depreciating Bad
debts. The package includes $250 million earmarked for promoting imports."
To the naive reader, the release of a stimulus package would seem to be an effective
means to the revitalize the economy but to readers who knew how funds were
distributed visions of pork-barrel politics and the waste of public funds would have
come to mind.
Tsukamoto ended with a bit of American-style philosophy;
"How can we get out of this adversity? Benjamin Franklin said: 'So what signifies wishing and
hoping for better Times? We may make these Times better if we bestir ourselves. Industry need not
wish, as Poor Richard says, and He that lives upon Hope will diefasting. There are no Gains, without
Pains.' "
Ten years have passed since Tsukamoto wrote his piece. Although the Japanese, as
individuals, have yet to feel the full effects of the recession, Koizumi has warned the
Japanese that economic reforms will demand sacrifices and commitment. However,
Matsuba describes Japan as:
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"...an affluent and conservative society in terms of both income and assets, where wealthy people
form a majority and, of course, it is most unlikely that they hope for, or will accept a radical social
change." (2001, p.208)
Lincoln warns that the failure to reform will lead to a "cyclic recession." And the
individual households will suffer. (October 2001, p.5)
In the December 1992 issue Tsukamoto took advantage of the image that many
Americans had at the time, including Johnson, that Japan's economic strength was due
to its industrial policy:
"As the new Administration [Clinton] contemplates ways of strengthening U.S. competitiveness,
'industrial policy' seems to be on the lips of many policy makers. In devising and pursuing
industrial policy, however, it is important to recognize that a government's role in fostering
industrial competitiveness is limited."
In a single sentence Tsukamoto dismissed any questions that MITI was able to force its
policy on Japanese industry because ofbuilt-in control mechanisms such as amakudari
and MITI's industrial associations that are never revealed by government officials.
However, he did admit that there was a:
"...joint effort between government and industry to find what may lie in the future and respond to
it appropriately.'
Inside/Outside Japan began to bring a new image to JETRO New York and put MITI
more into the public eye. However, this was not necessarily a positive thing because it
also brought JETRO into the limelight via Sankei Shimbun (discussed below) exactly a
year after Tsukamoto returned to Japan. Subsequently, the paper gradually shied away
from any subject that might be considered controversial, focusing more and more on
cultural issues.
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Promotion of Industrial Policy With a Scottish Twist
Tsukamoto's talents as a spokesman for MITI were showcased in a speech he gave on
March 10, 1993 to the members of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs. Although Tsukamoto did not announce his government's intention to release
another fiscal stimulus package two weeks later, it was auspiciously timed. The speech
was included as a Special Supplement in the May issue of "Inside/Outside Japan" in
which the announcement for the stimulus package was made.
In his address "MITI and Human Values" Tsukamoto managed to connect MITI's
Vision for the 1990s, ("Creating Human Values in the Global Age"), the release of
another fiscal stimulus package with Andrew Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth"33 while
simultaneously presenting his ministry as a compassionate and caring organization bent
on helping the Japanese to realize a better quality of life.
Although it would take some stretch of the imagination, comparisons can be made
between MITI, a Japanese bureaucracy, and Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish immigrant
from Dumfermline who became the father of the American steel industry. He founded
Carnegie Steel, the forerunner of US Steel in 1869, a year after the beginning of the
Meiji Restoration. He also made his fortune in iron, coke and chemicals. MITI's
ancestor, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, began nurturing Japan's steel
industry in the late 19th century.34
3j
Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth" was used at the suggestion of the writer
34
Harold C. Livesay writes in his biography of Andrew Carnegie that he: "publicly advocated and often
practiced the doctrine of free enterprise in business, but supported tariffs, sometimes joined pools,
and finally sold out to a combine expressly formed to eliminate competition in the steel industry. "
(1975 Andrew Carnegie and the Rise of Big Business Little, Brown and Company pp 5)
Also, Carnegie, along with other American industrialists like John D. Rockefeller and John Clay Frick, his
business partner, did not object to certain types of government protection such as stiff patent laws. (Joseph
Frazier Hall Andrew Carnegie New York Oxford University Press pp. 642)
15. Japanese taxpayers may view some of JETRO's administrative costs for 2000-2001 on the web. As
stated in the first chapter, the budget for Special Status Corporations are funded by investments from the
Postal Savings Agency and, therefore, Special Status Corporations do not have to disclose their budgets.
Additional funds are available as well from tax revenue. The Ministry of Finance assigns an annual
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However, here any similarity between Carnegie and MITI ends and the dissimilarities
begin because Carnegie's wealth came out of his own pocket. The parks, libraries,
schools, hospitals, meeting halls, universities and concert halls were personally financed.
Japanese government fiscal stimulus packages are publicly funded.
Tsukamoto introduced himself to his audience by mentioning his recent visits to the
Carnegie-Mellon Institute in Pittsburgh and Carnegie Hall in New York, both highly
visible examples of Andrew Carnegie's philanthropy. Then he got down to the subject
of his speech, "creating human values as a form of industrial policy." Introducing his
ministry as a firm but gentle guide of Japan's industry, he said that MITI was sometimes
called "notorious" but that he was uncertain of the term's origins:
"Perhaps it has to do with the way Japan's economy developed rapidly in the past five decades and
MITI's supposed role in that development, which is often expressed by the very term 'industrial
policy.35
Tsukamoto spoke of Japan's competitive spirit as the driving force behind Japan's
industrialization after the Meiji Restoration, quoting the first sentence of the first essay
in Carnegie's "Gospel"
"The problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth." He reflected: "Though Mr.
Carnegie was a great philanthropist, in his gospel he did not preach a 'kinder, gentler,' attitude. He
budget for each ministry. However, it is generally known that the ministries increase their budgets by
pressuring their support groups both in industry and in politics to contribute more funds. MITI's
supporters include ex-MITI bureaucrats, who as members of the LDP serve in the national and prefeQtural
Diets, the small and medium-sized business sector, which MITI regulates, and from industry, both rejgil
and manufacturing. These extra funds are not divulged to the public and the ministries can use them at
their discretion such as expanding operations of Special Status Corporations. For example, although ML
Noguchi stated that 75% of JETRO's budget came from public funds, he did not reveal how the remaining
25% was generated.
35' Officers from other ministries use the term 'notorious MITI' to point to MITI's propensity to go after
other ministry's territory in order to expand jurisdiction.
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was hard-nose arguing, at one point that 'no substitutes [for the law of competition] have been
found: and while the law may sometimes be hard for the individual it is best for the race because it
insures the survival of the fittest."
Tsukamoto's reference to Carnegie's generous but "hard-nosed" character was savvy
because it linked MITI's use of administrative guidance.
He insisted that post-war industrial policy included cooperation but there was a catch:
"Competition is important, but a body of people—be it family, a company, or a society—cannot
hope to function and grow without cooperation among its members."
Tsukamoto was inferring that companies cooperated with MITI's guidance to form
cartels or to fix prices in order to ward off competition from foreign firms.
Carnegie's tract on the distribution of wealth had a Socialistic tone to it:
"...under its sway we shall have an ideal State, in which the surplus wealth of the few will become,
in the best sense, the property of many, because administered for the common good, and this wealth,
passing through the hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the elevation of
our race than if distributed in small sums to the people themselves." (Hall 1975 p.807)
Likewise, MITI's Vision and MITI's role can be characterized as Socialist. Tsukamoto
told his audience that post-war industrial policy had focused on catching-up with the
western powers and on increasing
"... Japan's competitiveness in the global marketplace. Each of these Visions, in that sense, was a
'how-to' guide on a grand scale."
In his speech Tsukamoto assured the audience that "creating human values" was very
much a part of industrial policy:
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"after all, industrial policy—at least practiced by MITT—is aimed to increase prosperity or a sense
of well-being in the nation."
He claimed that MITI was aware that the Japanese were not enjoying the fruits of their
labour and that the Vision for the 1990a was to:
"...shift the focus from 'how-to' to 'what-for.' " He listed some of the objectives of the
Vision:
"...greater consumer-orientation and protection, further promotion of recycling, creating greater
employment opportunities and increasing security for the elderly, and pushing for advancement of
women's social and professional status. The vision also calls for vast improvement of 'social
infrastructure,' including housing (no more 'rabbit hutches,' please), and a massive attempt to
reduce excessive concentration in Tokyo and encourage regional development...the vision sets forth
goals that must be achieved to secure long-term economic development that is essential to the
enhancement of human values."
Tsukamoto, as a government spokesman, stated a recurring theme: Although Japan's
economy might be regarded as being stagnant Japan was still experiencing some growth
(1.5% GDP) and that the first fiscal stimulus package of $87 billion was proving an
effective measure to spur on the economy.
MITI's Progeny: JETRO
During the last decade there have been claims in both the Japanese and American press
that JETRO as an organization set up to promote imports does not fulfil the function
effectively and that in reality MITI is manipulating JETRO for its own purposes.
Interestingly, a front-page story by Washington, D.C. correspondent Komori Yoshihisa
in the June 13, 1995 issue of Sankei Shimbun, a major daily, triggered a series of articles
questioning JETRO America's activities.
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In his article "Is JETRO Running Wild?" (Jetero boso? ") Komori criticized the
president of JETRO New York, Nogughi Nobuya, for his editorial in the April 1995
issue of Inside/Outside Japan, a JETRO New York monthly publication. The newsletter
was sent unsolicited to influential people in business, academia and government.
According to Komori himself a recipient of the newsletter, William C. Triplet II, aid to
Republican Senator Robert Bennet (member of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations) who also received the newsletter, objected to Noguchi's analysis of former
Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara's book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons
of Vietnam, in which McNamara re-evaluated America's policies during the Vietnam
War.
In his editorial, Noguchi wrote:
"Finally, on this 20th anniversary of the end of the war, he has made public his close examination of
how he and other policy makers were gradually pulled into a dubious war. It is in this process that
he repeatedly admits his mistakes. This is a courageous act. I cannot recall a single instance from
among Japanese policy makers who, following Japan's defeat, did anything remotely similar."
Komori claimed that Triplet was enraged with Mr. Noguchi's reference to the Vietnam
War as a "dubious war," stating that it was inappropriate for the representative of a
foreign trade organization to criticize American policies. Komori maintained that
Noguchi, the president of an organization established to promote foreign trade and
economic cooperation, was trying to change JETRO's image by assuming the role of
political analyst. Komori contended that there was opposition in the Diet to the
continuation of JETRO because it no longer served a purpose, was a waste of tax
revenue, and had become, in essence, a second Ministry of Foreign Affairs (daini
gaimusho)36
36 The article sent shock waves throughout JETRO New York. Noguchi was obviously shaken because of
what he felt was a personal attack by Komori. The following day at 6: PM after most of the officers had
left the office Komori visited the office where he had a meeting with Noguchi to "apologize."
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The monthly magazine Sentaku followed suit in its July edition, carrying a photograph
of the April issue of Inside/Outside Japan and an article (authored anonymously)
claiming that the reasons for Triplet's criticism was due to U.S. irritation with JETRO's
activities in the United States. Sentaku contended that the CIA and FBI were always
keeping an eye on JETRO New York's elite directors in Industrial Research (sangyo
chosain) for activities at JETRO branches scattered throughout the United States. The
two agencies perceived the directors as CIA-type agents from Japan and that their status
was ambiguous because they were neither foreign diplomats nor employees of private
corporations. The article stated that there was suspicion among members in the
Congress that the directors of Industrial Research engaged in industrial espionage.
Sentaku pointed to Naito Masahisa as the first MITI official to be a director of Industrial
Research at JETRO New York. (p. 86) In February 1994 Sentaku had covered the
scandal surrounding the dismissal ofNaito from MITI. (The incident and the reasons for
his dismissal are discussed in chapter 2)
The October 10, 1995 edition of Nikkei carried an article by Steven L. Harman who
wrote that The New York Times had reported that the CIA and the National Security
Agency had tapped the conversations of Japanese trade representatives and automobile
manufacturers during the 1995 trade talks in Geneva proving that Japan was engaged in
industrial espionage in the United States. Harman discovered that the FBI was focusing
its investigation at JETRO Los Angeles and JETRO San Francisco, questioning former
local staff about their bosses' activities:
'This is a routine part of the jobs of such Japanese posted in the United States' says an American
woman, who worked for one of the Japanese agencies in California and who as questioned by the
FBI about the suspicious activities of her boss."
According to Harman, Okamoto Yukio, who held the number two position in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' North American section, stated: "this kind of eavesdropping
is quite natural."
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Perhaps to give balance to the October 21,1995 issue of Sankei Shimbun to the Nikkei
report announced that the CIA also identified Australia, Canada, Germany, France,
Great Britain, Italy, and Spain as countries that also conducted industrial espionage in
the United States. France was pointed as being the most active. The article added that
the CIA contended that JETRO appeared to be a substantial information organization.
The December 20, 1995 issue of the magazine Sapio also_published an article about
JETRO New York, questioning whether or not MITI officers engaged in industrial
espionage, (pp 88-90)
What's It All About, JETRO?
The February 16, 1997 issue of U.S. News and World Report, a major weekly, continued
to probe JETRO's authenticity as a promoter of imports with an article by William J.
Holstein who sharply questioned JETRO U.S.A's true function. In "With Friends Like
These" Holstein described JETRO as:
"...a uniquely flexible organization that defies American definition. Representatives of MITI, the
key agency guiding Japan's international economic push, can float in and out, as can
representatives of major Japanese companies." (p. 47)
Mr. Holstein claimed that JETRO U.S.A. did not function as a promoter of American
exports to Japan but that it was a sophisticated commercial intelligence-gathering
agency. He suggested that the promotional materials and activities served to disguise
the true reasons for JETRO's presence. He charged that the organization:
"...is playing a far more complex and sometimes deceptive game, a growing body of critics alleges.
They say that JETRO's U.S.A. operations—with an annual budget of at least $30 million and 160
employees—are the linchpins of a pervasive information gathering effort, aimed at tapping into
American technological treasure chest and learning how U.S. innovation works. 'At best, the
Japanese are being disingenuous when they say that JETRO's primary job is promoting American
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exports' says Edward Lincoln, former advisor to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale."
(p.46)
Holstein wrote that although JETRO denied claims made by the FBI that JETRO
operates as an intelligence agency in the United States he maintained:
"Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been watching JETRO for years. The bureau
declines to comment but sources say that the feds regard JETRO as the most sophisticated
commercial intelligence-gathering body operated by a foreign government on the U.S. soil." (p.46)
Holstein contended that there was a danger that products invented by American small
businesses were being appropriated by the companies with whom they had teamed up.
He held as an example the Clearwater, Florida entrepreneur, Donald Lewis and his
electronic devise that JETRO claims to have successfully marketed in Japan in its
publication, Success in the Making. Toyoshima Toru had told audiences at the New
York Japan Society in 1993 about the support Mr. Lewis received, including funding of
$250,000 for expansion from the Japan Import Export Bank (related in Part I of this
chapter). However, Mr. Holstein painted a different picture. According to Holstein,
Toyota had agreed to use Lewis's device but a few days after the company had started
using the product, Lewis received word from the Japanese distributor that he should sell
his stake to Toyota. Lewis felt pressured to sell out because Toyota was a huge and
influential company (pp. 47-48)
MITI officials continue to insist that JETRO is an import promotion organization. When
Holstein interviewed Iizuka Kazunori, the president of JETRO New York, Iizuka stated
emphatically: " We are promoting U.S. exports to Japan to reduce the trade gap between us." (p.
46). However, Edward Lincoln told Holstein:
"Their [JETRO| core mission hasn't really changed much...Helping Japanese companies with their
investments, working on the acquisition of American technology, and gathering political intelligence
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on Washington—these are really the reasons that justify their existence. They just prefer it if we
didn't view them that way." (p.48)
Sankei Shimbun article addressed two issues regarding JETRO's current operations.
First, JETRO was no longer serving as a trade promotion organization and MITI was
changing JETRO's duties so that it could move into other areas (henshinjutsu). Second,
MITI was manipulating JETRO into a secondary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, implying
that MITI was using JETRO to wrest away territory from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The articles in the three other publications cited above all point to alleged
industrial espionage activities,
JETRO's New Role in the 21st Century: Again, MITI's "skill at disguising"
The devaluation of the yen and the declining trade deficit with Japan's trading partners
may alleviate some of the burden on MITI to continue JETRO's image as a promoter of
imports. Indeed, MITI is phasing out much of the import promotion literature and the
T7
potential importer data bank. JETRO will once again take on the more comfortable
• • "Jfi
image of promoter of Japanese small to medium-sized business exports again.
However, this time around it is irrational because Japanese multinationals can market
and distribute exports. Also, since small businesses are ailing, MITI will have to offer
substantial assistance to potential exporters.
JETRO: Expansion of Territory
Masahisa Naito was the first MITI officer to be posted as the director of Industrial
Research at JETRO New York. He negotiated with the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) in Washington, D. C. for the Japanese semiconductor industry in
the 1980s with his colleague former Administrative Vice Minister Tanabashi Yuji. He
as well as his successors commuted regularly to the Watergate office of the
37 Information out of JETRO London (April 2002)
38 JETRO's main program for import promotion will be the Trade Tie-up Program (TTP)
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Manufactured Imports Promotion Organization (MIPRO), a MITI organization39.
During his time in Washington, D.C. Naito cultivated ajinmyaku (human network) of
American political, academic and business leaders.
After he was fired from MITI in April 1994 Naito took the position as the Marks &
Murase Professor, participating in the Asia Law and Policy Studies (ALPS) program at
Georgetown University. In an article announcing the appointment, the 1994 Fall issue
of the Georgetown Law did not mention Naito's dismissal but stated instead:
"Masahisa Naito, who recently retired from the number two career post in Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, was in residence at Georgetown during the spring semester as
theMarks& Murase Professor." (p 7) 40
On April 7, 1994 Naito addressed an audience at the Law Center. He described the
relationship between the bureaucracy and the Japanese and reminisced about the
attitudes of staff working in MITI during Japan's rapid economic growth period and the
change of attitudes of bureaucrats in the execution of their duties and the motivations
regarding the formulation of policies, protecting territory for personal benefit and not for
the good of the State:
"Evidence of the role of the bureaucracy is in the implementation of laws—eleven thousand laws
and regulations. For over a hundred years, the Japanese have relied upon a higher power (okami).
Since there was no true individualism in place, the people demanded that government take the
responsibility for their social and economic problems. The result was that the ministries were
granted new administrative power. Businesses feared retribution through the implementation of
these laws. Even though the laws were not directly enforced, there was continuous contact with
bureaucrats thus giving the ministries additional power. The work encompassed more than merely
39 In the MITI 1994 Handbook, the profile of MIPRO reads: "MIPRO was formed in February 1978 for
the purpose of supporting advanced countries expand their exports of manufactured goods to
Japan, thereby, contributing to the promotion of international trade and industry." (pp. 25)
40
It is interesting to note that the law firm of Marks&Murase has provided legal services to JETRO. Carl
J. Green, the director of the ALPS was appointed as Senior Representative of Hitachi Corporation in
Washington, D.C. on February 3, 1997, a position he still holds.
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management. It was deeply involved with the destiny of the People. Consequently, the work
facilitating this kind of administration beckoned the best and the brightest youth. Even though the
situation has deteriorated, men of high calibre are entering the ministry. Along with the changes in
the institutional curriculum, 'excellence' is now being defined in terms of submissiveness to the
system rather than for the good of the People. The Japanese bureaucratic system worked well while
it served clearly for the purposes of'overtaking the American economy.' However, as Japan has
become prosperous and individual needs are put before state values, the system has lost its
effectiveness. Now each agency aspires to its own purpose and 'turf consciousness' has become
strong. This behaviour increases the obstacles to a free market economy."
Naito was implying that the Japanese did not want to take the initiative and bear
responsibility for their own destinies thus passing the burden to bureaucrats. However,
the fear of retribution (fear of a higher power) was inherent in the social system and was
not linked to the apprehension by businesses that they would suffer the consequences if
they did not cooperate with MITI's guidance. His reference to "turf consciousness" no
doubt applied to confrontations between Japanese ministries for control over territory as
seen in the jurisdictional disputes between MITI and the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT) in which he participated. Johnson relates:
"But MITI has a serious problem. It is losing jurisdiction. Unfortunately for MITI,
telecommunications circuits are clearly within MPT's jurisdiction." (1987 p. 186)
However, Naito's "turf' also means postretirement positions and ministerial power.
Scot Callon describes the ministries' tussles over jurisdiction:
"Japanese government agencies tend to be jealously territorial, and when jurisdiction overlaps, the
most common result is a bare-knuckle brawl for control.
The more territory within a ministry's jurisdiction (e.g. manufacturing sectors, health,
education, construction, etc) the more prospects for amakudari and yokosuberi.
Johnson agrees:
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"A bureaucrat's security and livelihood became dependent on maintaining or expanding his
ministry's jurisdiction. Shrinking jurisdiction threaten not only the bureaucrat's active-duty
positions but also their amakudari prospects, since a ministry needs clients and captive
organizations to hire those of its circumstances thus produce and intensify 'territorial
consciousness' (rtawari ishiki) punctuated—in Sakahibara's words—by 'gangster-like struggles over
jurisdiction (yakuza no nawari arasoi) throughout the state bureaucracy." (1982, p. 74)
According to Naoko Nakamura in an article for the March 31, 2000 edition of the
Financial Times the number of postretirement positions in private enterprises had
decreased:
"The traditional Japanese practice called 'descent from heaven' or amakudari, in which bureaucrats
go to work for private companies they previously supervised hit a record low last year, according to
the latest data from the National Personnel Authority."
However, Stockwin states that the statistics released by the National Personnel
Authority: "...conspicuously leave out account of those re-employed in state-run corporations and
other public entities." (1999, p. 107) JETRO has increased in value to MITI not only as a
source for amakudari but for yokosuberi as well since yokosuberi positions can either
become permanent positions or lead to other positions in JETRO-related institutions
A major reason that MITI has been able to continue JETRO is that the organization is
used for the promotion of government economic policy, policy that has been planned by
MITI and MOF and supported by the LDP. MITI actively uses JETRO's overseas
branches as vehicles to promote Japanese government's economic policies by sending
elite officials to JETRO offices located in countries where there are large markets for
Japanese goods and where Japanese economic and trade policies are susceptible to
criticism. For example, throughout the United States, Japan's largest trading partner,
JETRO operates eight offices. The spokesmen are usually the presidents of the offices
(shocho) because they deal primarily with the public.
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JETRO: Value For Money?
According to JETRO New York President Noguchi Nobuya, seventy-five percent of
JETRO's budget is generated from public funds.41 According to JETRO annual
operating cost for JETRO's eight American branches is $30 million (Holstein 1998 p.
46). The sum covers salaries and benefits for local staff, JETRO and MITI officers, and
daily operations of the offices that include rent, office supplies, legal fees, etc.
However, this sum does not include relocation and housing expenses for all officers.
The officers from other organizations receive salaries and living expenses from their
individual organizations. Their assistants' salaries are also paid by their organizations
through JETRO. The $30 million covers promotional events and seminars but it does
not cover JETRO' import promotion materials, which are published in Tokyo, nor does
the money pay for the research done by the other organizations.
JETRO claims that all of the officers, who are considered to be on sabbitical, conduct
research for their organizations at overseas branches. However, MITI and JETRO
officers do little of their own research but rely heavily on consulting companies and
research institutes. For example, at JETRO New York, such research institutes as
Brookings and the Berkley Round Table on the International Economy (BRIE:
University of California) are on retainers and smaller consulting companies that are
based in Washington, D.C. and New York are also on contract. Law firms that employ
Japanese nationals are used as points of contact with American government and business
leaders.
The offices from other government organizations at JETRO New York rely almost
entirely on outsourcing research projects because they are unfamiliar with the American
political economy, the consumer culture and, also, they do not speak English well
enough to conduct independent research. Local staff, many of them recent college
41 October 1995 "Nobuya Noguchi on How Small U.S. Companies Get Help from JETRO on Cracking the
Japanese Market" Japan Economic Survey
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graduates, do some superficial research. JETRO New York management as well as
management at the other overseas offices do not encourage officers to roam far from
JETRO. On the contrary, MITI does not want them exposed too much to American life
for fear that they will have difficulty readjusting to their society after they return to
Japan42 or they would find life outside Japan more to their liking and decide not to
return. There have been incidences where JETRO officers have chosen to stay in the
United States after obtaining Green Cards. The majority of officers at JETRO overseas
offices are considered "on sabbatical" and they are not expected to engage in
comprehensive research. Their duties related to the promotion of their organization and
receiving delegates from their organizations are also light.
However, some officers look at JETRO New York as a way to further their careers.
Although most representatives are not strictly evaluated on their performances at
JETRO, some directors use their time to network with future employers (amakudari) or
publish books in their fields. The director of Research and Planning from 1992-1996,
who spoke good English, spent most of his time out of the office and on the road
meeting American politicians, academics and economists. He published several books
regarding Japanese-American economic relations.
In order to justify the offices (e.g. maintain territory) MITI tries to fill as many seats as
possible in JETRO overseas offices. The director of EID/MITI at JETRO New York
(1992-1995) admitted:
"There are many people in this office who do not want to return to Japan. Staying at JETRO on
business is a very unique experience, including the nice income. The directors can have a nice
42
The lack of exposure can effect the interpretation of foreign societies. For example, the officer who
represented Kyoto Prefecture government at JETRO New York for three years (1995-1998) culled most of
his information about America from newspapers and television broadcasts. When he helped a group of
producers of traditional foods and crafts in Kyoto exhibit their wares at a large exhibition at the World
Trade Center he gave his views on American consumerism. He warned them that traditional products
from Kyoto would not sell in the American marketplace because most Americans watched TV all day, ate
spaghetti out of cans and drank large quantities of beer.
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lifestyle so that's maybe the reason they do not want to go back to Japan." (Interview January
1994 JETRO New York)
While on duty overseas the officers enjoy the one to three-year respite from their
organization and group pressure and a lifestyle afforded them as officers on overseas
duty Since the officers have little to keep them occupied, they are free to come and go
from the office, unheard of in a regular work environment.
Conclusion: Here a JETRO, There a JETRO, Everywhere a JETRO, JETRO
In 1975 JETRO operated twenty-four trade centres and fifty-four offices in fifty-five
countries. Since the number of offices has grown to eighty overseas offices in fifty-eight
countries the theory can be advanced that as MITI's territory along with the number of
postretirement positions in the private sector slowly decreases, the value of JETRO for
amakudari, yokosuberi and shukko increases.
In addition the manipulation of JETRO's role of a promoter of Japanese exports into a
promoter of foreign imports and foreign investment and now once again into a promoter
of Japanese exports is due, in part, to the ministry's desire to create more territory not
only for amakudari and yokosuberi but to engrave its signature around the world and
wrest power away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. In
his article for Sankei Shimbun Komori voiced the opinion of Diet members that JETRO
had become a second Ministry of Foreign Affairs (dainijimusho). Although Kumano
Hideaki took exception to the Nikkei Shimbun interviewer's question if he did not think
that MITI was taking on responsibilities ordinarily done by MOF and was becoming the
"second Ministry of Finance" 43 MITI's new name the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) suggests otherwise. Even the Senior Trade Advisor programme, which
Toyoshima Torn referred to in his speech to the New York Japan Society, extends
MITI's network across the United States.
43 See Chapter 2 for review ofNikkei book Kanrvo Kishimu Kvodai Kenroku
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Also, as a means to monitor local government authorities, MITI strengthens JETRO by
contriving additional duties for the thirty-six domestic offices. For example, The BSC is
an extension of JETRO, using JETRO staff. JETRO branches support the twenty-two
FAZ installations. Since MITI officers are transferred to JETRO domestic branches
(shukko) they are able to monitor local government activities. MITI's close ties to
Ehime Prefecture's (discussed in chapter 6) is an appropriate example of this type of
control that not only MITI but other ministries are able to exert through their
corporations.
The JETRO web page "Japanese Ministries and Agencies" reveals that METI (e.g.
MITI) has bureaus in eight regions in Japan; METI Hokkaido, METI Tohoku, METI
Kanto, METI Chubu, METI Kansai, METI Chugoku, METI Shikoku, and METI
Kyushu. As was explained in chapter 4 on METI, the ministry is intent on becoming
more involved in regional development and JETRO, as an arm of METI, helps METI
control, directly and indirectly, local government policy regarding industrial and
economic development.
In an effort to reduce the drain on public spending, MITI could easily consolidate
activities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. It is logical
to assume that JETRO's functions that do not relate to the promotion of imports and
exports (e.g. research and surveillance ofpolitical economies and trade policies) could
be executed in cooperation with the Ministry of Ministry of Foreign Affairs since MITI
officers are already posted in the embassies and consulates. JETRO has become a major
supplier to the foreign public of information on Japanese culture. However, Japanese
embassies and consulates also have well-stocked information centres that are open to the
public. Here again, consolidation of this function is appropriate.
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry is under MITI's Industrial Policy
Bureau management with offices worldwide. Duties that are ordinarily consigned to
JETRO could surely be facilitated through these offices so that substantial amounts of
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public funding would be conserved. This is particularly relevant because much of the
research done at JETRO foreign branches is farmed out to consulting companies.
Forecasts for JETRO
JETRO is said to be phasing out much of its import promotion activities and once again
turning to the promotion of small business exports due to the falling yen. This would
seem to be a return to its original functions. However, there are two reasons why this
step is illogical. 1) Small businesses are ailing and cannot afford to adapt products for
global markets. Efforts to export would entail substantial subsidization by public
funding. 2) Small business exports can be marketed and distributed effectively by the
giant trading companies thus alleviating the need for MITI to guide small business
owners
JETRO's future role as a government-supported export promoter will be secondary to
the roles that it presently plays.
1. Through JETRO's overseas offices MITI officials will continue to promote
government economic policy to foreign opinion leaders, a role that is also in the realm of
the Ministry of Finance.
2. MITI officials will continue operate as commercial attaches out of JETRO offices
even though it is usual for foreign embassies and consulates to house commercial
attaches.
3. JETRO overseas offices will continue to disseminate to the general public information
on Japanese culture, markets and economic data despite the fact that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs disseminates similar information through its embassies and consulates.
4. JETRO staff will continue to research foreign political economies with the ongoing
assistance of law and consulting companies even though MITI officers who are posted
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in embassies and consulates can easily execute similar research as well as monitor
foreign legislation related to trade and industrial standards.
6. Despite proposed future cutbacks import promotion activities, the Business Support
Centers and JETRO FAZ Support Centers in Japan will continue to operate because
MITI needs to maintain a presence throughout Japan.
In the final analysis since JETRO's operations can be consolidated with other
organizations this leaves JETRO with little to contribute the economic well being of the
Japanese. JETRO offices are essentially "empty boxes" or "virtual offices." Elowever,
as one of its main signature cards both inside and outside Japan MITI is determined to
continue JETRO regardless of the cost and the Japanese will continue to support the
ministry's use of JETRO.
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CONCLUSION
The Japanese call their governing system a "ruling triad"- the bureaucracy, politicians
and business. The most influential body is the bureaucracy, which was established in
the 1880s and entrusted with substantial powers by government to bring Japan's
feudalistic economy into the twentieth century and into the same league as the
industrialized Western countries. The bureaucracy continued to control Japan's industry
throughout World War Two. After Japan's defeat the Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers (SCAP) gave the bureaucracy extraordinary powers to restore Japan's war-torn
economy, putting into place a conservative government so that the United States would
be assured of an ally in the Pacific where it could position military bases in order to
contain Communist expansion in East Asia. The Liberal Democrats (LDP) dominated
the National Diet from 1955-1993 and then again returned to power inl996. In general
ministerial policies have been continuously supported by the Diet and ministerial
guidance has been generally accepted by business.
This support mechanism is grounded in a network of formal and informal relationships
between bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians, which is secured and, also,
perpetuated by amakudari, a system, which allows civil servants to take postretirement
managerial positions in the private sector and in publicly funded institutions. Amakudari
to the private sector can serve to ensure acceptance of ministerial guidance by private
corporations. Amakudari to public corporations can serve to facilitate the migration of
civil servants to positions in the private sector. Officially civil servants cannot take
positions in the private sector for two years after they have retired from their ministry
but they can take positions in publicly funded institutions known as Special Status
Corporations and public corporations to wait out the two years before entering private
corporation.
The Japanese accepted amakudari as a part of the civil service system before the 1990s
because the economy was doing well but the bursting of the "bubble economy" and the
260
ensuing recession triggered growing opposition to amakudari because the system also
acts to ossify the political economic system and to inhibit the adaptation to the demands
of a constantly changing environment of the global economy.
Public opinion polls conducted in 1994 and 1995 by two major Japanese newspapers
indicated that 60% of the subjects surveyed wanted the system abolished. There is
growing concern that the ministries establish and use their public corporations as means
to assist civil servants to parachute into the private sector and as vehicles that may
control economic and social policy at the local level as well. These corporations, which
Iishi Koki call "the parasite that is consuming Japan," are illustrative of how the
bureaucracy can dominate Japan's political economic environment.
Non-performing Reforms
The forecast for Japan's future as a global economic power is bleak. The annual growth
rate during the 1990s was 1.3% compared to 3.9% during the late 1980s. During the last
decade government released 120 trillion yen of fiscal stimulus packages and the Bank of
Japan lowered its official discount rate from 6.75% to 0%. None of these measures have
alleviated Japan's recessive economy. In 2001 Japan's GDP contracted 0.5%, the first
annual drop in three years. In the last quarter there was a 12% plunge in corporate
capital spending. Manufacturing output plummeted to 15% from its mid-2000 peak, a
thirteen year low. There is $130 trillion in outstanding bad loans and $120 billion in
corporate debt. A pessimistic view is that one-third of all corporations are not viable,
however, if these corporations were to fold there would be huge pressure on the work
force and on production.
There was a 30% drop in the production of IT-related electrical machinery. Reflecting
the global slump in the high tech sector, corporate losses among such high tech
companies as Fujitsu, Hitachi and Toshiba has resulted in announcements of huge cuts
in employment. 400,000 jobs disappeared in September, the largest decrease since
1973, bringing the total of 1.5 million jobs that disappeared in 2001. According to
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government sources about half a million workers will lose their jobs within the next two
to three years as banks try to solve the non-performing loans problem. Cuts in public
works spending will cost 650,000 construction workers their jobs. However, this
estimate may be on the low side because the same source, claims that structural reforms
are progressing.1
The New York Times reported on March 26, 2002 that a Japanese government report
announced that property prices fell 5.9% last year, the fastest decline in nine years. It
was the eleventh consecutive year that real estate prices had dropped. Commercial
property fell by 8.3% and is presently 62% below peak value registered in 1990. The
banks refuse to sell property that was used for collateral because they are waiting for
prices to rise again. Government hopes that deflation, the weakening yen and the fact
that Japan's trade surplus is steadily decreasing will encourage manufacturers to export
more, a strategy that has been fundamental to the planning of economic and industrial
policy during postwar economic growth. However, Yasutaru Yamamoto, an economist
at Sumitomo Life Research Institute warns:
"Relying on external demand to pull the economy forward will only bring about another weak
recovery. These problems are structural, and it's hard to see full-fledged recovery until these are
resolved." 2
The Japanese still believe in their value system and have yet to feel the real sting of the
economic slump. They are purchasing government bonds, believing that their
investment is secure.3 It is improbable that significant change is likely to occur soon.
1
March/April 2002 Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry p.21
2
March 9, 2002 Japan Times Online
3
According to the Ministry of Finance "Planned Bond Issuance for FY 2000" report 23% of bonds
offered are 10-year bonds and 5-year Discount Bonds, Public Offering Bonds (i.e. 30-year, 20-year, 6-
year, 2-year bonds and Treasury Bills) comprised 41% of the bonds offered. These bonds, totaling 65%,
are distributed in the Private Sector. MOF's Trust Fund Bureau comprised 21% of the bonds, Postal
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Prime Minister Koizumi has proposed reforms that encompass three areas: 1) fiscal
reforms 2) state-sector reforms 3) tackling the non-performing loans. In an effort to ease
mounting public debt, which was 130% of GDP for 2001 and is in danger of rising to
140% of this year's GDP, and to ease public spending, Koizumi wants to privatize state-
run banks such as the Postal Savings Agency and downsize drastically the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program, the two bodies that fund public works programs and
public corporations. Koizumi is also intent on eliminating or consolidating Special
Status Corporations as well, proposing a cut of government subsidies of 5 trillion yen.
However, as was noted in the second chapter, Koizumi's proposals are meeting with stiff
resistance from members of his own party and from the ministries as well. So far, only
four Special Status Corporations out of the 163 Special Status Corporations are slated
for consolidation and three for elimination. Four of the highway construction-related-
Special Status Corporations are to merge and the Urban Development Corporation, the
Housing Loan Corporation and the Japan National Oil Corporation will be eliminated.
All of these corporations are heavily in debt.
Koizumi's reforms also include the regulation of amakudari in both private industry,
Special Status Corporations and other public corporations but here too he faces stiff
opposition because of the vested interest of bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen.
Indeed, most reforms have been stymied because, as was pointed out in the February 16
issue of the Economist:
"These groups stand to gain from the fiscal gravy train that has rattled along unhindered
throughout the slump. Just as important, these factions are constantly battling each other, over
which should bear the blame and financial costs of fixing the problem." (p.26)
Savings comprised 6% and Bank of Japan bonds amounted to 9%. These bonds totaling 35% are
distributed by the Public Sector.
Since the lawmakers are among the members of these groups reforms are in a state of
political limbo. Japanese voters, who have allowed the Liberal Democrats to dominate
the Diet for most of Japan's postwar history, feel helpless to deal with these factional
frays. Indeed, they themselves are part of the mechanism that frustrates reforms.
Lincoln claims that the majority of Japanese have vested interests. (October 2001, p. 2)
Small and medium-sized enterprises that employ 78% of the work force and that engage
in 99% of Japan's business activity are staunch supporters of the LDP Manufacturing
businesses both keiretrsu and independent that rely on procurement contracts from
bigger Japanese businesses and, therefore, domestic demand are folding as orders have
dropped dramatically during the last ten years. Larger companies are not only procuring
cheaper parts from Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia but, also, they are pulling
manufacturing operations out of Japan and setting up plants in Asia and in countries
where labor and operational costs are far less than in Japan. The hollowing out of Japan
spells the disintegration of the keiretsu system and painful times for smaller independent
enterprises that have not developed sales and distribution networks abroad as the
medium-sized chemical producer whose case is discussed in the fifth chapter.
The rate of bankruptcy among small businesses has risen dramatically since 1998,
peaking in 2000. METI attributes the bankruptcies directly to the bursting of the asset
inflated bubble and the ways that loans were made to small businesses before the
recession began. In the mid-eighties local, metropolitan and state-run banks pursued
small business owners and entrepreneurs with many types of low-interest, long-term
loans. Now that banks are calling in loans and becoming stricter in assessment of loan
applications, small business owners are naturally anxious about how reforms will affect
them and their families. The reform of the Postal Account Agency and the downsizing
of FILP indicate less accessibility to loans and subsidies through such MITI-run public
corporations as the Japan Finance Corporation for Small Businesses that have doled out
subsidies and long-term loans (up to twenty years) at low-interest rates since the late
1950s.
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Traditionally in Japan small business owners have identified so strongly with their
companies that they would prefer closing than tying up with other small businesses in
order to continue. Even merging with larger business is not a usual solution for avoiding
bankruptcy. Most big business leaders want to support Koizumi's reforms and members
of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) express vocal support.
On the other hand, members of Chamber of Commerce and Industries whose members
are small and medium-sized business owners have an entirely different attitude and
prefer to support the status quo rather than risk their families' immediate futures.
The Japanese Diet must have the political will to make policy that will begin to pull
Japan back from the brink of disaster. However, the social mechanism that can create
this resolve simply does not exist in Japan's political system. It has been pointed out
throughout the thesis that since the Meiji Period, the Japanese political economic system
has been characterized as a web of interconnecting formal and informal personal
relationships between government officials, businessmen and bureaucrats. The organic
interdependence can paralyze decisive policy making during a crisis, nevertheless, these
elements are inherent to Japanese society. Van Wolferen contended twelve years ago
that the Japan's governing system is still rooted in the 1950s with a de facto one-party
system continuing to dominate the electorate:
The problem today is that Japan is dragged too forcefully in one direction, for lack of a mechanism
to set new priorities. The political give-and-take among the System's components interferes with
the nation's need to deal with the rest of the world." (1990 p.48)
The case remains the same today because no mechanism exists in the Japanese socio¬
political system that thwarts this political give-and take. In 1990 Japanese in the
banking industry predicted that within ten years some banks and public universities
would go bankrupt. Their predictions have come true but instead of restructuring,
troubled banks merge thus postponing necessary restructuring.
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Van Wolferen wrote in 1990:
"The American-designed Japanese constitution does not define a political system in which laws
prevail over authorities. Japan is ruled through highly informal structures of government and
bureaucratic authority, which dovetail with so-called jinmyaku (personal network) relations and
transactions unregulated by law, among clusters of elite." (1990, pp. 46-47)
He maintained that Japanese civil society was politically weak and ineffective as a
mechanism for change. He also claimed that like bureaucrats everywhere, Japanese
bureaucrats identify themselves through their efforts to bring power to their ministries:
"Unless changes could conceivably bring further advantage to their own bureaus, bureaucrats will
endeavor to work for the status quo." (1993, p.45). Since Japan's bureaucrats are
administering reforms, the process will go at a snail's pace.
Lincoln also believes that significant reforms would not be forthcoming:
"Unlike the United States or other countries where political dissatisfaction led to electoral outcomes
that brought deregulation and a reduction in the economic role of government, in Japan the
bureaucrats themselves have been granted the mandate for change. " (2001 pp.5)
Lincoln wrote that even though there was a recent major reshuffling of the ministries, it
amounted to: "...moving pieces of various ministries around within the ministerial structure,"
(p.5) Furthermore, there has been no real effort made to address the bigger problem of
government's role in Japan's economy. It can be suggested that sincere promises that
reforms will be initiated can promote the image that reforms will be implemented.
Proposed Reforms of Special Status Corporations and JETRO
The recessions and burgeoning public debt has brought about popular recognition that
the ministries are using their Special Status Corporations for amakudari and as listening
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posts in the prefectures, a mechanism that directly links central government to local
governments, allowing elite bureaucrats to monitor local government policy. Japanese,
who are members of opposition parties and also members of the media began objecting
to the uses of Special Status Corporations for these specific reasons.
The ministries' determination to maintain the status quo and thus protect vested interests
is aptly illustrated in the preservation of Special Status Corporations and other publicly
funded organizations. Whether Koizumi's intended overhaul of Special Status
Corporations will actually be implemented is a question that has yet to be answered. In
1995 when the Murayama Coalition government reviewed Special Status Corporations
for reform MITI was reluctant to cooperate. Indeed, the name of one of the ministry's
corporations slated for dissolution, the Japan National Oil Corporation, will be
eliminated but in name only because its operations will be transferred to another MITI
Special Status Corporation, the Japan Metal Mining Corporation.
The Japanese press claims that in order to maintain their Special Status Corporations the
ministries manipulate the activities, substituting or adding activities. This is called in
Japanese "henshin gijutsu" or the skill at disguising." The Japan External Trade
Organization, established in 1954 and taken over by the MITI in 1958, is a good
example of how a ministry can orchestrate the functions of one of its major Special
Status Corporations in order to ensure its continuation. JETRO's original mission was
to promote Japanese small business exports but by the early 1980s Japan's trade surplus
made the organization no longer practical. Nevertheless, since MITI had come to rely
on JETRO for functions other than export promotion, it transformed JETRO into a
promoter of imports, later into a promoter of direct investment and international
economic cooperation, and this year, again changing JETRO's focus to promoter of
exports in order to continue operations.
Japanese press and journalists maintain that MITI uses JETRO not only for purposes of
amakudari but also for functioning in roles overseas that had been done in the past by
both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Ministry of Finance. In essence MITI
uses JETRO to snatch territory away from other ministries. In the United States where
there are seven JETRO' offices, the CIA and FBI charged that JETRO staff was
involved in industrial espionage activities. More significantly, foreign businesses and
government officials were wary of JETRO's claims that it effectively functioned as an
import promotion agency.
It is popularly believed in Japan that JETRO is an import promotion organization but the
Japanese are surprised when they hear that JETRO has as many as eighty overseas
offices and thirty-six domestic offices. If they were made aware of JETRO's extraneous
uses, the expense incurred for maintaining these offices and for import promotional
activities that are said to be ineffective, the majority would be appalled but they would
not protest. After all, JETRO has existed for almost fifty years and is being managed by
a bureaucracy to which they have deferred power since the Meiji Restoration. Since the
Japanese have a strong institutional memory it is highly probable that JETRO will
remain unscathed by structural reforms when and if they do occur.
In his speech4 at Georgetown University Naito Masahisa defined the reasons why the
majority of Japanese have consistently acquiesced to bureaucratic rule. Naito explained:
"For hundreds of years the Japanese have relied upon a higher power (okami). Because there was
no individualism in place they demanded that government take responsibility for social and
economic problems. The result was that the ministries were given much power. Businesses feared
retribution through the implementation of their laws. Even though laws were not enforced directly,
bureaucrats were in constant touch with businessmen, thus giving more power than was necessary."
The Japanese' reliance for centuries on either an emperor, a military or the bureaucracy
to govern them and the innate fear of retribution if they do not submit to edict or
4
The excerpt from the speech was taken from the original manuscript, which Naiito brought with him to
JETRO New York after he had been dismissed from MITI. The circumstances surrounding his dismissal
are covered in chapter two.
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guidance clearly shows why Japan's present socio-political system defies change.
Elements explicit to this system are:
1) A rigid hierarchical socio-political system with a bureaucracy that was invested with
the powers to plan and implement Japan's economic development without being subject
to legal sanctions.
2) The close cooperation between business, the bureaucracy and the Diet that began
during the Meiji Restoration. The finely tuned relationship continued before and after
World War Two. Known as "the iron triangle," it is one of the dominant features of the
current governing system.
3) A conservative party that has dominated the Diet since 1955 and that has consistently
supported the bureaucracy's policies.
4) The network of ex-bureaucrats throughout business and government that is
perpetuated by the amakudari system, which greatly enhances bureaucratic power to
enforce policy at both the national and local levels as seen in the use of policy
instrument "administrative guidance".
5) The significant social pressures to accept policy and bureaucratic guidance.
Forecast for Japan
Although during the last fifty years the Japanese have achieved remarkable economic
growth, their socio-political system has not developed at the same pace to support the
internal social changes that have come as a result of this rapid growth. The system also
cannot support adaptation to external pressures as well. The Japanese seem to be locked
into a system that still resembles the prewar model yet their circumstances have changed
dramatically. All energy was concentrated on catching up with the United States and
becoming a world economic power but little analysis was given to how economic
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growth was affecting the future Japanese socio-political system. An example that aptly
illustrates this problem is the use of fiscal stimulus packages for public works. Hundreds
of miles of roads and highways and bridges were constructed, providing companies with
lucrative contracts and workers with employment but how these roads would serve the
Japanese, operational costs and maintenance were not considered. In other words,
highways and bridges were built for the sake of being built.
Too Little Too Late
Continued political bickering among vested interest groups is causing political gridlock
and interfering with the implementation of substantial structural reforms. The economy
may seem to revive at times due to external demand but basic structural reforms must be
initiated before there is a solid and pervasive recovery. In the early 1990s during the
Hosokawa and Maruyama administrations voters had great expectation that government
would do something to ease the effects of the bursting of the "bubble" but they were
disappointed to find little change resulted even with electoral reforms and the release of
fiscal stimulus packages. Indeed, they later discovered that government was compelled
to further subsidize public works projects being financed by the stimulus packages
because construction that had been contracted out to construction companies by Special
Status Corporations managed by the Ministry of Construction went over budget.
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Dealing With External Pressures
The government's reactions to external pressures (gaiatsu) that Japan may face vary.
The most significant external factor that would serve to pressure the Japanese to initiate
change is the competition from other economies in world markets. For example now that
the United States has levied a 30% tariff on steel imports, Japanese steel companies,
which experienced big losses last year, will face even stiffer competition from Korean
steel producers in Asian markets. Many government officials regard the rapidly
developing economies in Asia, especially China, as potential threats to Japan's
economy. Some believe that Japan should form a free trade zone with neighboring
countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Another opinion held by conservatives in government is that Japan should insulate itself
from the competition of the rapidly developing Asian economies by strengthening
protectionist policies. They predict that China will be the United States' future
philosophical and economic rival and that there is a real danger of a military conflict
between the two countries and that Japan, as an ally of the U.S., would be dragged into
the fray. However, these worries are far-fetched because China is plagued with
numerous problems such as extreme poverty in the inland provinces and rampant
corruption in both government and business and cannot be conceived as a major threat to
Japan in the foreseeable future
Internal Pressures that Should Spur Change But Probably Will Not
1. Personal Bankruptcy
It would seem that if enough Japanese experienced personal bankruptcy they would be
shaken out of their political malaise. Although on the average Japanese have a high
percentage of personal savings they also have outstanding loans. When household wage
earners are laid-off they will no longer be able to pay off family debts. If they purchased
their homes or apartments during the bubble economy, they would have paid highly
inflated prices, borrowing heavily. If they were to sell property now at currently
deflated prices they would not be able to pay off their loans. Also, they may not have
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the funds to pay inheritance taxes to receive property willed to them by their deceased
relatives.
Nevertheless, failure to meet mortgage payments may not persuade Japanese to pressure
government to hasten structural reform because they are reticent to admit to bankruptcy
because of the social stigma attached to it. They will prefer to live with solvent relatives
or to borrow money from relatives.
2. Failure of the Social Security System
There is the recognition among the younger generation that government will no longer
be able to support the social security system because of the falling population. Parents
who are sixty-five years or older receive full benefits and rely on the consistency and
security that the present system provides but their children no longer trust the system
and try to avoid paying into the system. If the welfare system were to go bankrupt, the
aging population, which comprises one-third of the population might pressure
government to take action.
3. Disintegration of Job Security
Although most small businesses could not afford to guarantee lifetime employment,
until recently the larger corporations guaranteed jobs. However, in order to avoid
expensive employment benefits, companies now are outsourcing work and hiring
workers on contract, which is making the job market more competitive. The young
Japanese executive class with exceptional skills and secondary degrees from foreign
universities no longer feel the pressure to remain loyal to one company and may change
jobs mid-stream but the job crunch makes most workers nervous about secure futures.
4. New Nationalist Movement
Along with continuing corporate bankruptcies and rising unemployment there is a
growing discontent that is serving to drag an already conservative electorate further to
the right. There is some concern among Japanese and foreigners alike that Japan might
resort to a military confrontation with neighboring countries. The New Nationalist
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movement, which is gaining political strength, could use the xenophobic tendencies
inherent to Japanese society to incite civilians to believe that Japan should be strong
both economically and militarily to stave off the threat of aggression from foreign
powers (as was the edict of Emperor Meiji). Although the younger generation would
probably acquiesce to serving compulsory military duty for one or two years, the
majority, who want to continue living a peaceful and comfortable life, would not want to
commit themselves to military action.
It is now apparent to western commentators who originally believed Japanese
government officials who promised reforms that the Japanese political economic system
is so rigid that it cannot deal the economic crisis. The May issue of the "Oriental
Economist" predicts another decade before Japan rights itself.5 A more pragmatic figure
would be twenty years. The National Personnel Agency is now running an appeal on the
Internet to private companies for jobs for retiring bureaucrats. The ad states: "Use the
talents and skills of retiring civil servants!"
In Japan's case "structural reform" points to a major overhaul of the system itself and
this process will take many years. What is fundamental to this process is an intense
participation by voters at the grass roots level but this has yet to occur because there is
no vehicle in the socio-political system to promote this kind of participation. Also,
opposition parties that were at opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum are now
converging as the LDP platform encompasses all of their platforms. The Japanese are in
a political limbo.
Less Isolation From the Political Process
Until recently, the Japanese were fairly isolated from the political process. They
perceived their elite bureaucrats and politicians as existing outside of their world and
unreachable. Some Japanese, who are educated at high-ranking universities like Tokyo
University, voice opinions about policy issues but the majority of voters have not
5 "The Japan that can Recover" (p.3)
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wanted to commit themselves. Voters tended to cast their votes for personalities rather
than for issues. In the early 1990s there were movements by politicians in the National
Diet during the Hosokawa and Murayama administrations toward reforms that could
have stopped the evolutionary process of Japan's economic deterioration but many
Japanese feel that the opportunity was lost when the LDP returned again to dominate the
Diet in 1996.
There are several trends that may point to a growing awareness of the political process
and an active role by the electorate in Japanese politics in the future: 1) Diet sessions are
now being televised daily and voters can watch their politicians in action. 2) Grass roots
movement against central government policies concerning unnecessary infrastructure
work as was pointed out in chapter seven has been occurring but these episodes are still
the exception to the rule. The Japanese lack the confidence and drive that is needed to
inspire major change.
Older Generation v.s. Daydreaming Younger Generation
The generation of Japanese that grew up during the war years or were part of the baby
boomer generation wanted economic recovery and prosperity and willingly allowed
bureaucrats to guide them. They believed that their government could protect them from
economic disaster and they are amazed and shocked by the events of the last ten years.
Nonetheless, they feel that they are survivors, having recovered from the devastation of
a war, two energy crises and a recent earthquake and that they will survive the economic
downturn, leaving government to find a solution. They are very conservative and do not
want change because they fear that they will lose what they have worked so hard to
achieve. They have transmitted this conservatism on to their children but, also, they have
given them the physical comforts that they did not have.
The generation that was born in the 1970s and 1980s did not experience the hardships of
their parents and thus take life in stride. They are not concerned with the end of the
system that guaranteed job security because they simply look for another job. Called
274
"parasite children" they live with their parents, take blue-collar jobs to earn a small
income while they look for their "dream jobs" which they believe will give them
personal satisfaction but which may never materialize given Japan's serious economic
state.
New Blood In the Bureaucracy but...
Kozo Yamamura contends that the power and turf of the ministries is decreasing rapidly
in the 1990s because of the 1995 law that officially prohibits oral transmission of
"administrative guidance" and because of the Public Information Act. He feels that
these laws will fundamentally change bureaucratic behavior. (1997, p. 312) However,
the bureaucracy will not give up territory without a struggle as has been illustrated with
the resistance to the streamlining of Special Status Corporations and public corporation.
The bureaucracy will remain strong, however, some younger elites, who have received
foreign education and MBA degrees, are opting to leave the ministries and go into
business or academia. Their incentive is the concern that in the future such
compensation as amakudari into top Japanese companies may decrease along with
prospects of a lucrative double salary. This exodus may seem to deplete the brain trust in
the bureaucracy but elite hopefuls will fill the empty slots simply because of the
competition in the job market. From a positive standpoint, a more diverse graduate
population from other universities besides Tokyo and Kyoto may actually break the
Todai Clique barrier and revitalize the atmosphere in Kasumigaseki. However,
conservative policies will prevail along with "turf consciousness."
Japan's economic woes were originally attributed to macroeconomic reasons emanating
from inflated real estate and stock prices. The possibility that structural problems and
flaws in the Japanese system itself were contributing factors generally was not
considered until fiscal stimulus packages not only failed to ignite the economy but also
sent government debt skyrocketing. Japan's prolonged economic stagnation has finally
brought into the open the fundamental reasons for the inability of the Japanese to take
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decisive measures to bring about an economic recovery. What economists and political
scientists have come to understand is that in order that substantial reform can be
initiated, Japan's socio-political system will have to change as well.
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Direction of Research
Special Status Corporations and public corporations are illustrative of the basic nature of
Japan's political economy. The subject is relatively new and further investigation
should prove to be an effective method of gauging the progress of structural reform in
regards to the civil service system and ministerial power. The streamlining of these
organizations could indicate that the ministries are growing weaker as elected officials at
both the national and local levels push for an end to public funding because of
government debt. On the other hand, a stable number could indicate that the ministries
are determined to maintain their corporations and, despite a decrease in public funding,
other sources, perhaps from private industry, are being tapped to guarantee continued
operation.
Research of Special Status Corporations and public corporations as vehicles that
promote bureaucratic control of Japan's economy may be a more effective method of
observing the Japanese economy than through quantitative methods since statistics
collected in Japan regarding industrial output have been proven overly optimistic and
thus unreliable. The Financial Times reported on March 13, 2000 that the figures on
Japan's GDP were incorrect because of problems in the way data was being collected.
The main collector of economic statistical data, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA),
had made major revisions in the statistics it released on Japan's GDP and that there was
a discrepancy in the quarterly figures and monthly figures. Also, MITI released figures
that portrayed production had increased in order to show that demand was strong while
the EPA's statistics showed that demand had declined:
"Such discrepancies are not unique in Japan; the IMP says many other countries face 'data issues'.
But they appear to be worse in Japan than in most industrialized countries partly because there is
no single statistical agency with responsibility for the numbers."6
6 Gillian Tett March 13, 2000 "Recession or recovery; the figures don't add up" Financial Times
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A few weeks after the article appeared, the late Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo called for
a total overhaul of statistics collection.
It is hoped that the Public Information Act and media coverage will make accessing
information about Special Status Corporations and public corporations easier and thus
facilitate research. Nevertheless, Japanese academics are still reticent to probe into this
area and researchers may have to rely on Japanese magazines and books rather than on
academic literature for reference material.
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APPENDIX 1





The post-war reconstruction period ... the years of high economic
growth ... the present. The history of METI reflects the history of Japan
itself. From the time when you were born to the future which you will




cookers emerge on the market
Single currency rate of 360
yen/$1 Dr. Hideki Yukawa
awarded the Nobel Prize
Signature of Treaty of Peace
with Japan and the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty
Start of television program
"Sazae-san"
Japan joins United Nations
"End of the post-war period"
becomes a catchphrase
Tokyo Tower completed 10,000
yen bill issued
Marriage of the Crown Prince




Tokyo Olympic Games First
color TVs sold
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
visits U.S. Agreement on the
return of Ogasawara
300 million yen incident Auto
sales pass the 10 million mark
Kasumigaseki Bldg. completed









Revival of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry
Adoption of priority production
system
Establishment of the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry
1956 Japan joins GATT
1958
I 959 Establishment of JETRO
960
963
Plan to liberalize trade and
currency
Establishment of the Basic Law
1964 on Small and Medium
Enterprises
iqc'7 Industrial Structure Council
launched
Formulation of Public Nuisance
Countermeasures Basic Law
! 968 First stage of capital
liberalization (second in
1970s,etc)










Former Prime Minister Sato
awarded Nobel Prize Novel
"Nippon Chinbotsu (The






i 972 Creation of 1970s Vision
Signature of Japan-U.S. Textile
Agreement Establishment of
1 973 Agency of Natural Resources






Measures to combat the oil
crisis and escalating prices
Petroleum Supply and Demand
Optimization Law
Emergency Law for
Stabilization of National Life





Tsukuba '85 (Science Expo)
opens Hanshin Tigers top
baseball rankings for the first
time
Skyrocketing yen; strong yen
recession
National rail company split up
and privatized Satellite
broadcasts begin Space-
shuttle Callenger blows up
Equal Opportunity Promotion
Law launched Stock prices
skyrocket
Tokyo Dome completed Seto-
Ohashi Bridge opened
Collapse of the Berlin Wall
Consumption tax launched
Unification of East and West
Germany
Collapse of the Soviet Union
Gulf War Birth rate falls to 1.57
1979
1980
1 981 Formulation of 1980s Vision
Voluntary regulation of auto983
exports to U.S. begins






creation of an action program
GATT Uruguay Round Japan-
U.S. Semiconductor Agreement
concluded Maekawa Report





taken for domestic expansion
(fiscal measures worth 6 trillion
yen)
Measures taken to address
global environment issues




Creation of 1990s vision
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/data/ahistory.html 01/04/17
Completion of EC market
integration Barcelona Olympics
Collapse of the bubble
1992
Marriage of the Crown Prince 1993






Atlanta Olympics First Asia-
Europe Meeting held
The First Meeting of the WTO
Cabinet Conferences





Law for Promotion of Utilization
of Recyclable Resources
(Recycling Law) formulated
(amended to the Law




related laws such as the Large
Stores Law
Rio Earth Summit Publication of
the Report of the WTO
consistency of Trade Policies




scale of 13.2 trillion yen)
Uruguay Round negotiations
concluded Seventh APEC
Ministerial Meeting held in
Osaka
Formulation of the Law on
Temporary Measures to
Facilitate Business Innovation
and the Temporary Law
Concerning Measures for the
Promotion of the Creative









The Restructuring of METI
for
Logical Consideration, Effective Action and
an Emphasis on Results
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has restructured its organization
in the
following ways, in order to carry out our policies based on our new mission.
Promoting Economic Restructuring with the Aim of Understanding the Total
Economy, both Microeconomic and Macroeconomic:
Promoting Regional Economic Development:
Developing a Structure With Improved External Economic Relations:
Greater Integration of Industrial Policy and Technology Policy and
Coordination with Environmental Policy:
5 Responding to Industrial and Economic Realities from a Broader
Perspective:
6 Enhancing Information Technology and other Economic and Social
Infrastructure and Making the Economy More Responsive to Consumer
Interests:
7 Ensuring a Stable Energy Supply Consistent with Both Environmental
Protection and Efficiency Concerns:
B Enhancing a System of Provisions Fundamental to Technological
Development and the Protection of Intellectual Activity:
3 Enhancing the Economy through the Growth and Development of
Independent Small and Medium Enterprises:
Promoting More Efficient, Better Operation through Devolution:
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ecember 1934 Showa Brewery Co., Ltd., is established in Tokyo
>ril 1935 Production of alcoholic beverages begins
ptember 1937 Production of Sanraku synthetic sake begins
arch 1946 Production of shochu, a distilled spirit, begins
arch 1957 Production of feedstuffs begins
ay 1961 The Company merges with Nisshin Brewery Co., Ltd., and acquires the Mercian label
ly 1962 The Company merges with Ocean Co., Ltd., acquires Ocean brand whisky and changes its name to
Sanraku Ocean Co., Ltd.
luary 1966 Production of the agricultural antibiotic, Kasugamycin, begins
ptember 1969 Production of the medical antibiotic, Josamycin, begins
>vember 1972 Concludes an import and distribution agreement for Tio Pepe brand sherry with Gonzales Byass
S.A. of Spain
iy 1973 Acquires distributorship for Japan of wines produced by Gustav Adolf Schmitt GmbH of Germany
:tober 1973 Acquires distributorship for marketing Tokay brand wines from Hungary
:tober 1977 Concludes an import and distribution agreement with Jim Beam Brands Co, of the U.S. for the
Canadian whisky, Windsor and the bourbon whiskey, Old Crow
cember 1981 Marketing of the anticancer agent, Aclacinomycin, begins
?ruary 1982 Distributorship for Japan of the wines produced by Maison Albert Bichot, S.A. of France is acquired
tuary 1984 Distributorship for Japan of the cognac produced by Remy-Cointreau S.A. of France is acquired
irch 1984 Concludes import and distribution agreement for Rhine wines with Administration Schloss
Reinhartshausen of Germany
ril 1985 Company name is changed to Sanraku Co., Ltd.
tober 1987
iuary 1988
Premium wine producer, Markham Vineyards of Napa, California, U.S.A. is acquired
Forms a sole-agency agreement with William Grant & Sons Ltd., Scotch whisky distiller, to sell
Glenfiddich single-malt whisky and Grant's blended whisky in Japan
le 1988 Sales of the anticancer agent, Pirarubicin, begin
y 1988 Concludes an agreement for the import and distribution of the French champagnes produced by Pommery
)tember 1988 Concludes an import and distribution agreement with Crus & Domaines de France, and purchases
Chateau Reysson, a winery in Bordeaux, France
y 1989 Sales of Original Peachtree Fizz, a low-alcohol beverage, begin
cember 1989 Concludes business relationship with seven Italian wine makers, including Bersano S.p.A., to
increase selection of Italian wines for marketing in Japan
y 1990 Sales of Chinese Shaoxing wine, Gu Yue Long Shan, begin
Establishes a joint-venture company, Shenzhen Main Luck Pharmaceuticals Inc., with a Chinese
itember 1990
pharmaceutical company to produce anticancer drugs for the Chinese market
The Company's name is changed to Mercian Corporation
iruary 1993 Begins import and distribution of wines produced by Vina Concha y Toro S.A. of Chile




Mercian Karuizawa Museum of Art opens
Begins importing and distribution of wines produced by Bodegas Trapiche S.A. of Argentina
:ember 1997
Katsunuma Winery becomes the first in Japan to receive ISO 9002 certification
Receives ISO 9002 certification for Tomakomai Plant, thus completing awards of certification to
tember 1998
ober 1998
all our plants and wineries
Begins import and distribution of wines produced by Robert Mondavi of California, U.S.A.




Begins import and distribution of wines produced by Frescobaldi of Italy






for alcoholic beverages for in-home con¬
sumption. By maximizing our ties with
overseas producers, we continue to expand
our selection of top-quality imported wines
and whiskies.
To enhance our pharmaceuticals opera¬
tions, we have forged ties with several lead¬
ing pharmaceuticals manufacturers abroad,
and currently market a variety of drugs pro¬
duced in cooperation with these companies.
Mercian's international network spans
more than 20 countries and includes seven
production facilities, of which two are
wholly owned, while the remaining are
affiliates in which our equity holding is
up to 50%. We are also closely associated
with more than 50 producers abroad.
Challenging economic conditions in
recent years have increased the popularity
of dining and socializing at home in
Japan. This trend has bolstered demand
The Netherlands
Liqueur























oratoire Roger Bellon S.A.
many
lac Gesellschafifur
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South Korea






Shenzhen Main Luck Pharmaceuticals Inc. (above photo)
Main Life Co., Ltd.
Taiwan




Jim Beam Brands Co.








Tsingtao Brewery Shaoxing Yellow
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1951 Japan Export Trade Research Organization established.
1954 Above organization reorganized as Japan External Trade Recovery
Organization.
1958 Above organization rechartered as Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) and overseas public relations and
advertising programs for Japanese companies inaugurated. Institute
of Asian Economic Affairs established.
1960 Institute of Asian Economic Affairs reorganized as special
nonprofit organization.
1969 Institute of Asian Economic Affairs renamed as Institute of
Developing Economies (IDE).
1971 International Economic and Trade Information Center established.
1974 Focus Japan, JETRO's first periodical for overseas readers,
published.
1980 Provision of information for Standards Code of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) inaugurated.
1982 Cooperation with Office of Trade and Investment Ombudsman to
settle complaints inaugurated.
1983 Task force for import promotion formed.
1984 Task force for promotion of international cooperation between
industries formed.
1985 Made in USA Fair in Nagoya and other large-scale import fairs in
Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kitakyushu organized.
1987 Asia Forum established to promote Asian regional trade.
1989 Institute for International Trade and Investment, a sister
organization, established.
199(1 Upgraded programs for import expansion inaugurated and Local
Internationalization Centers established.
i 991 Programs to promote foreign investment in Japan inaugurated and
Robotics Exhibition in London organized.
1992 Seville Universal Exposition Japan Pavilion managed and
Japanese Trade and Industrial Exhibition in Moscow organized.
1993 First Business Support Center established in Tokyo and first
Foreign Access Zone Support Center established in Kitakyushu.








nousing exhibitions established in major cities ot Japan.
1995 Annual Survey on Actual Conditions Regarding Access to Japan
inaugurated.
1996 Region-to-Region Initiatives for Mutual Industrial Development
and Asian Industrial Network Project inaugurated.
1997 First Conference on ASEAN Auto Supporting Industries and first
JETRO Debate Contest organized, and Japan Pavilion at 12th
Indian Engineering Trade Fair managed.
1998 JETRO-IDE Joint Symposium organized and Japan Pavilion at
Lisbon World Exposition managed. JETRO and IDE merged.
1999 Economic mission dispatched to Nigeria, African Exhibition
oraganized and Technology Tie-up Promotion Program (TTPP)
inaugurated.
CjfAl'K
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Inaotute of Developing Domestic offices Oversea* offices
Economies (IDE) 36
—( Oenerai Affairs Department
—| Planning and Coordination Department
—| Finance and Accounting Department
—I Operations Department
—{ Economic Research and Analysis Department
—[ Overseas Research Department
—| Information Service* Department
—| International Communication Department
—| Import Promotion Department
1 Economic Development Assistance Department
—| Investment Promotion Department
1 industry and Technology Department
1 T r ade Pad Department
' [ Agricuti:ie Department
—[ Research Planning Department
—| Research Administration Department
—[ Area Studies Department 1
—[ Area Studies Department E
—j Development Studies Department
—| Economic Cooperation Studies Department
—| Economic Development Research Department
—| Training Affairs Department
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History
Publishing
JETRO publishes a long list of
periodicals, market reports, fact
books, business guides and
numerous other materials to assist
foreign business people doing
business in and exporting to Japan.
Most publications are produced in
English, and sometimes in other
selected languages, and are made
available through JETRO offices
around the world. JETRO also produces videotapes about doing business
in Japan and other subjects of special interest to foreign business-people
and government officials involved with the Japanese economy.
Search | Database | Publications | Links | FAQ | Terms of Use |
Privacy Policy
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JETRO fully mobilizes its information and know-how to respond to trade
and investment inquiries at offices around the world. Companies
frequently request JETRO's help, for example, when searching for foreign
business connections, selecting candidates for international business tie-
ups and comparing investment climates overseas.
We maintain a system of advisors who can draw on years of experience to
capably answer inquiries about diverse subjects, including Japanese import
procedures, investment incentive programs of foreign governments and
labor conditions.
Our overseas offices provide foreign companies and pubic organizations,
including chambers of commerce and industry, with information about
Japanese companies interested in importing of investment.
JETRO Libraries
JETRO has a wide variety of information in its two libraries. One, located
at JETRO headquarters in Toranomon, Tokyo, offers the latest information
and data on economics, business, trade and investment, as well as
extensive materials such as business directories, tariff schedules,
periodicals and much more.
The library of IDE, located in Makuhari,Chiba, has a wealth of material
issued by overseas research institutes and international organizations for
research on developing countries.The library is one of the nation's largest
repositories ofjournals, newspapers, maps and other printed materials of
developing countries.
Information from both libraries is fully catalogued and much of it is
compiled into electronic databases, which will be intergrated.
http://www.jetro.go.jp/top/e/activities/information.html 01/11/13
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other support, including consultants to advise on how to enter the Japanese
market.
We also certify people with extensive experience in the importing field to
serve as international trade advisors, thereby creating a nationwide
network of reliable consultants for Japanese companies interested in
importing.
Improving the Business Environment
JETRO conducts surveys in order to assess the degree of accessibility of
the Japanese market for foreign companies. In particular, these surveys are
to determine if barriers to foreign goods exist in specific industries. The
surveyed Japanese industries are assessed from an international
perspective by comparing them with counterpart industries in the United
States and Europe. Recommendations are approved by an Advisory
Council of nine professors, mostly economists, from Japan, the U. S., the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with the majority being foreign
professors. Industries surveyed so far include chemical products,
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment, assistive technology
devices, regulations and domestic costs related to the distribution of




JETRO dispatches specialists on
overseas assignments lasting about one
month, during which time they look for
foreign products that have potential for JETR0 impor1ad Automobile showroom
import into Japan. Samples of these (Mita,Tokyo)
products are brought back for promotion
through exhibitions targeted at Japanese buyers.
In cooperation with foreign governmental organizations, JETRO organizes
import fairs in Japan and helps foreign companies, especially those new to
the market, participate in Japanese trade fairs to display their products and
meet potential customers. We also operate permanent exhibition sites,
including the JETRO Imported Automobile Showroom, JETRO Imported
Housing Exhibition Site and JETRO Housing Materials Center.
C/M( A
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The Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO) offers wide-ranging support for
importing in Japan, thereby helping tO Export-to-Japan Study Progrin "s^nnar
strengthen harmonious economic
relationships between Japan and other nations.
(Tokyo)
The list of JETRO's export-to-Japan support activities is extensive. We
post, for example, Japanese market experts (Senior Trade Advisors) on
long-term assignments to developed countries in Europe, North America
and other regions, where they offer advice on doing business with Japan.
They also create export opportunities by providing advice on developing
products for the Japanese market and facilitating direct contact between
foreign and Japanese companies.
JETRO supports export campaigns conducted by developed countries
through organizing trade exhibitions, holding seminars on exporting to
Japan and conducting advertising and promotional activities.
We manage the Trade Tie-up Promotion Program (TTPP) system on the
JETRO homepage (www.jetro.go.jp) to help Japannese and foreign
companies find partners for international business, including export/import
trade, technology tie-ups and other partnerships. Companies register
information about the kind of international business they are interested in
conducting and the system then uses this information to search for
potential partners that match their specific interests. Whenever a match is
made, emails are automatically sent to both companies to inform them
how to establish direct contact
This and other import-promoting services are also available at JETRO
FAZ Support Centers in 10 of Japan's 22 Foreign Access Zones (FAZs).
JETRO invites business people to Japan in the Export to Japan Study
Program, which offers seminars for furthering their understanding of the
Japanese market and the chance to meet face-to-face with potential
Japanese partners. In addition, JETRO welcomes foreign missions that
visit Japan to develop business.
To help newcomers to Japan, JETRO operates Business Support Centers
(BSCs) in major cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe
and Fukuoka to provide, on a free and temporary basis, office space and
http://www.jetro.go.jp/top/e/activities/trade.html 01/11/13
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:he Ehime FAZ Program\to Success
Ehime Foreign Access 7Zone CO.,LTD.
Hand in hand with its FAZ, Ehime is
What is a Foreign Access Zone (FAZ)?
In accordance with the Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Promotion of Imports and the
Facilitation of Foreign Direct Investment in Japan (Import Promotion/Foreign Direct Investment
Law), foreign access zones have been set up in harbors, airports and surrounding areas as
"import promotion areas" to facilitate the importation of foreign products. The third sector is
taking the lead in constructing or otherwise providing the infrastructural facilities for promot¬
ing imports. In the case of the FAZ in Ehime Prefecture, it is the Ehime Foreign Access Zone
Co., Ltd. which has assumed this responsibility. The company is engaged in providing 1 facil¬
ities (storage, cargo-handling and other such facilities) to support the distribution of foreign
products, 2 import support facilities (imported goods exhibition facilities, imported prod¬
uct information center, design-in center, etc.), and 3 import processing and other infra-
structural facilities for promoting imports. Accompanying these projects, the company
provides services to expand and facilitate the importation of goods by, for instance,
offering import-related information, leasing import-related equipment, and managing
imported cargo.
In addition, the company promotes the distribution of imported cargo.
21 areas approved as FAZs under the regional import promotion plan
Niigata Prefecture (Niigata Port Area) -
Ishikawa Prefecture (Komatsu AirPort Area)
Kyoto Prefecture (Maizuru Port Area)
Kobe City (Kobe Port Area)
Tottori Prefecture (Sakai Port Area)
Hiroshima Prefecture (Horoshima AirPort Area)
Yamaguchi Prefecture (Shimonoseki Port Area)
Kitakyushu City (Kitakyushu Port Area)
Nagasaki Prefecture(Nagasaki AirPort Area)
Kumamoto Prefecture (Kumamoto Port Area)
Aomori Prefecture (Hachinohe Port Area)
Miyagi Prefecture (Sendai Port, Sendai AirPort Area)
Kawasaki City (Kawasaki Port Area)
Yokohawa City (Yokohama Port Area)
Shizuoka Prefecture (Shimizu Port Area)
Osaka City (Osaka Port Area)
Osaka Prefecture (Kansai International AirPort Area)
Okayama Prefecture (Okayama AirPort Area)
Kouchi Prefecture (Kouchi Port Area)
Ehime Prefecture (Matsuyama Port Area)
Oita Prefecture (Oita Port Area)
Company Outline
Company Name:
Ehime Foreign Access Zone Co., Ltd.
Directors:










48 organizations and corporations
Business Lines:
Management and operation of infrastructural facilities (warehouses, cargo-handling
equipment, permanent exhibition hall for imported goods, offices) for promoting imports
Renting of loading/unloading equipment, freight-handling machinery and vehicles
Management and operation of international economic exchange facilities (international
trade fairgrounds, parking lot)
Planning and staging of trade fairs, exhibitions and other events
Importation and exportation and sale of agricultural and fishery products, processed
foodstuffs, textiles, industrial goods, forestry, mining products and liquor
Brokerage services for import and export transactions, provision of information, and
representation for filing with the authorities and other business formalities
1 Sale of ship and automobile fuel oils and their parts
■ Publication of printed materials and provision of information geared toward international
economic exchange
• Provision of translation and interpreting services
• Nonlife insurance agency services
• General or specific personnel dispatch services
• All other operations relating and incidental to the above
gearing up o make the world its market.
Basic Policy
Import center for Seto Inland Sea wide-area economic zone and Shikoku
Ehime FAZ is making full use of the geographical characteristics, the wide range of coastal shipping
functions and other features of the city of Matsuyama, which is the import center for the Seto Inland
Sea economic zone and Shikoku, in order to function as a trade center.
Revitalizing of industry by improved logistics efficiency
Processed agricultural and fishery products, fruit juices, processed foodstuffs, textiles and
industrial goods from South Korea, China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia can now be directly
unloaded at the port of Matsuyama. Such goods would otherwise have to have been
conveyed by secondary transportation in trucks, ferries and coastal ships from Kobe,
Osaka, Kitakyushu and other ports. In this way, distribution costs are reduced and
business concerns in the prefecture are revitalized.
Promotion of globalization through international
industrial cooperation
Through its commitment to stage international trade fairs, exhibi¬
tions and other events and integrate information pertaining to
commercial and physical distribution, Ehime FAZ encourages
the introduction of new information industries and physical
distribution-related industries, it opens up new business
opportunities in the Seto Inland Sea wide-area eco¬
nomic zone and Shikoku, and it promotes globaliza¬
tion and the revitalization of business.
low the FAZ program will be
pecifically promoted at Ehime FAZ
nder the Ehime FAZ program, many and varied
anches of overseas and regional data and
formation will be collected through the events and
Tivities held at "ITEM Ehime" and the "l-LOT complex"
hich lie at the heart of the FAZ. Import and export
jsiness activities will be supported by processing and
leasing this data and information.
Waterfront development
Ehime Prefecture Matsuyama port region
revitalization program
Infrastructural facilities for promoting
high-grade physical distribution Permanent exhibition hall
l-LOT: Ehime International Logistics Terminal
Trade fairgrounds
/trade and tourism center




Advice and information will be
offered on laws and systems con¬
cerning investment, trade, per¬
sonal importation, international
dealings, management issues, etc.
Global network
support
Regional information from over¬
seas sources where investment or
trade opportunities are expected
to be forthcoming will be provid¬
ed through networks of tenant
overseas organizations, JETRO,
Ehime International Business
Association, trade concerns, and
so on to provide advice and infor
mation support.
Staging of seminars on
import/export, overseas
investments, etc.
Seminars will be held by individu¬
als with specialized expertise and
entrepreneurial experience to






Information on the functions,
facilities, customs clearance and
import/export situation relating
to Ehime FAZ will be released.
Information will also be released
to a wide area covering Shikoku
and the Seto Inland Sea economic
zone by linking up with the FAZs





Information magazines will be
published, globalization-related
documents, video presentations,




complex with the largest exhibition hall
in Shikoku can accommodate almost
any kind of event.
TEM Ehime is a multi-purpose facility: it can be used to stage everything
fom large-scale international trade fairs to exhibitions, presentations,
eceptions, workshops, large-scale seminars and conferences. From this
ocation, information from all various parts of the world and from all over
:hime prefecture is relayed. The ITEM World Mart provides opportunities
:o shop for imported goods while the JETRO corner offers a little taste of
aersonal importation. In the Ehime Prefecture Trade and Tourism Center,
/vorks of the industrial arts and items made locally in the prefecture are
an display for on-the-spot sale, and Tobe ware china-painting and
ndigenous product fairs are held. At this center, information on
sightseeing locations, events, accommodations, transportation and on
ausinesses and industries in the prefecture is also available.
FAZ Plaza Outdoor Exhibition Are
(3,500 square meter




Facility Facts and Figures
Large exhibition hall Accommodates 200 standard international booths;
can be partitioned into 3 sections.
Ehime








JETRO FAZ support center
Large conference rooms (200 square meters or two rooms
each with 100 square meters)
Small conference rooms (50 square meters x 4;
partitioning can be changed)









Accommodates 63 standard international booths;
can be partitioned into 2 sections.
Ideal for staging a wide range of events as an
outdoor exhibition area.
Business and trade related bodies and
corporations.
Foreign government offices, international
institutions, and resident foreign diplomatic
representatives.
Provide information and sevices on the economic
situation of foreign countries, import, trade
business and foreign investments.
Ideal for business discussions, parties and seminars.
Display and on-the-spot sale of imported goods.
Where cuisines from all other world can be
enjoyed.
Conference Rooms
#1 to #6 are available, and they
can be flexibly adapted to suit
the scale of the proceedings.
They are equipped with the most
up-to-date video devices as well
as tri-lingual simultaneous inter¬
preting facilities for international
conferences.
Cubicle offices
These offices can be used by the
representatives of foreign govern¬
ments, organizations and business
concerns as centers for initiating
constructive interchanges with
Japan. Using their complete ass¬
ortment of facilities, international
networking can be promoted.
Multi-floor parking lot
(for 800 vehicles)
Ehime Trade and Tourism Center Display and on-the-spot sale of items made in the
prefecture; sightseeing exhibition hall.
Ehime Prefecture Trade and
Tourism Center
(1,800 square meters)
Exhibition and sale of products made in
Ehime Prefecture
Ehime Prefecture's industrial exhibition hall
Tourism exhibition hall
Large exhibition hall (4,500 square meters)
This hall is the largest of its kind in Shikoku, and it can be
used for multi-purpose events. Depending on how its
space is to be used, it can be partitioned into 3 sections
(to make available floor areas of 4,500, 3,000 and 1,500
square meters).
World Mart
ere that high-quality import-
rods from countries all over
rorld are on display and for
?diate sale. As a space for
iarizing visitors with import-
oducts, it embodies the
ig principle behind the FAZ
ram.
Small exhibition hall 0,500 square meters)
Depending on how this space is to be used, the hall can be
partitioned into 2 sections (to achieve floor areas of 900 and
600 square meters). It has a carpet-tiled floor, while the 484
roll-back seats can accommodate sophisticated exhibitions.
Ehime Trade and Tourism
Center
The Center serves to make visitors
familiar with the special products
and works of the arts and crafts
which are native to the prefecture.
Through its exhibits, it also serves
as a source of information on
sightseeing and industry. All the
prefecture's wares and sightseeing
details are gathered here under
one roof.
Sophisticated infrastructural facility for logistics which
can handle every conceivable kind of cargo
"l-LOT," the logistics terminal in the Ehime FAZ, was the second facility in Japan (following the Asia-Pacific
Trade Center in Osaka) to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Finance as an integrated bonded area
under the Customs Law. In this area, there is no need to submit to customs clearance formalities to move
cargo, and cargo can be moved and processed with no customs duties levied. This reduces the amounts
which tenant businesses need to pay in commissions and fees and reduces physical distribution costs. I-
LOT has about 37,000 square meters of storage space, a figure which has resulted in an approximately 2.5-
fold increase in the capacity of the Matsuyama outer port area. Whereas until recently petroleum products
and lumber accounted for virtually all the imported cargo, daily household items, miscellaneous goods,
foodstuffs and many other kinds of cargo are now being landed along with the opening of regular sea
routes from overseas ports.
tefrigerated and cold-storage
warehouse building
(tonnage accommodated: 13,290 tons)
Storage, unloading and other simple




(Indoor floor area: 1,497 square meters)
This building has everything to accommodate the
growing sophistication in distribution processing
(processing, packaging, and packing) and other aspects
of physical distribution.
Facility Facts and Figures
Refrigerated and
cold-storage warehouse building
Warehouse (distribution processing area) w-v' •
Warehouse building
(warehouse)
a, 54,105 square meters, building area: 27,650 square meters, extended
—• a*"
square meters m
Shed building, shed, packing area, truck yard
. .
ehouse building, warehouse, distribution processing area, truck yard
igerated and cold-storage warehouse building, office room, truck yard
Control room, rental offices, exhibition hall, printed matter display room,
health and welfare facilities
Container yard
Warehouse building
(indoor floor area: 14,549 square meters)
is is equipped with vertical conveyors and
leveler-cum-table lifter facilities
Control room
A digital communications network is used to meet
the need for high-speed communication and the
growing spread of the use of information. A local
communications system is used to exercise
centralized control over l-LOT's operations.
Container yard
This is where the containers are brought after they have been
unloaded from the container ships and kept before dispatch,
where the outgoing containers await loading onto the
container ships after they have been packed, and where
empty containers await further use.
Printed matter display room (1 st floor)
Imported goods are on display here, and products are
introduced in leaflets, catalogues and other printed
matter. Information concerning importation is also
available.
Exhibition hall (2nd floor)
Bonded products are displayed and business
negotiations can be held here. The hall can also be
used for conferences, seminars, workshops, etc.
Shed building
(indoor floor area of 12,712 square meters)
This building uses overhanging doors to
enable large trailers to enter inside. Cranes
are installed in 3 blocks.
Ehime FAZ: An International Cooperation Center Designed for the 21 st Century
Under the Ehime FAZ program, whose aim is to establish a center for
international industrial interchange and international physical distribu¬
tion in the Shikoku and Seto Inland Sea region, efforts to integrate
industrial functions, develop coastal areas and provide transportation
access are moving forward, and a new international exchange center
which can be accessed by land, sea and air is now in the process of
being carved out.
Formation of an air-
accessible city
Enhancement of the international
functions of Matsuyama airport




A vision of the future for Ehime FAZ
Formation of a sea-
accessible city
Enhancement of Matsuyama
Port's world trade functions
Development of western coastal
area of Matsuyama
• Redevelopment of Mitsuhama
area
• Promotion of an ocean
recreation industry
• Enhancement of ocean leisure
center functions
Matsuyama Port Harbor Plan
Improvements in the harbor facilities are very critical in terms of the
promotion of the second FAZ program. The completion of the foreign
trade quays and piers scheduled in the year 2000 will serve as a stimu¬
lus for the area where the foodstuff processing, manufacturing, pro¬
cessing and other trade-oriented industries will be integrated and a
greater dimension of self-containment will be achieved for the Ehime
FAZ by the double port facilities of Matsuyama port and Matsuya.ma
airport.
Ehime World Trade Center
Western area of Matsuyama:
development of coastal areas
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Creating an airport with





















Area earmarked for foreign trade quays and piers
(scheduled for completion in 2000)
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Ehime FAZ boasts
Japan's easiest access to
double ports.
Close to the port and airport, Ehime FAZ enjoys an excellent location. Matsuyama
Port, connected by regular cargo service to South Korea, Taiwan and China, is being
upgraded, and routes to foreign countries are being improved. Matsuyama Airport has
launched air service connecting it to South Korea, and more regular and frequent
flights are anticipated.
Matsuyama Airport Expressways Matsuyama Port
Aiming to Become a
World Trade Port
•Becoming a trade base of the Seto-lnland
Sea Economic Region and Shikoku




•Improving the CIQ system, including food
inspection and animal quarantine
We enjoy not only
convenient domestic







ways across the length
and breadth of the
island will be complet¬
ed at the beginning of
the 21st century. The
Hon-Shi Bridges con¬
necting Shikoku with
the main island of
Honshu will be ready in
1998.
Domestic coaster lines to Kobe, and
international sea links to Pusan in South
Korea, Chilung and Kaohsiung in Taiwan,
and Dalian and Ningbo in China are in full
use. A new wharf capable of accom¬
modating 40,000-ton cargo ships is
under development near the l-LOT
logistics terminal and will be completed by
the year 2000.
The FAZ is designed as
an import promotion zone.
What is a FAZ ?
Primarily a third-sector (in Ehime, the Ehime FAZ Co., Ltd.) initiative, Foreign Access Zones offer essential facilities for
the promotion of imports. These facilities include (J) facilities supporting the distribution of imported products (storage,
sales and other facilities); (D facilities supporting import business (including an imported goods exhibition hall and an
imported goods information center); and (D imported goods processing facilities. Also provided are import-related
information, import cargo storage and other services to expand and facilitate imports.
Outline of the Ehime FAZ Project
Operating I.T.E.M. EHIME and I-LOT has given us considerable information on foreign and local markets. Providing this
information to others is one of the ways we support trade.








150-1, 3 Chome, Okaga, Matsuyama City, Ehime Pref
TEL 089 (951) 1600
FAX 089 (951) 3221
permanent
distribution hall
trade hall & tourism center
Ehime world trade center
I.T.E.M. EHIME
1-28, 2 Chome, Okaga, Matsuyama City, Ehime Pref.
TEL 089 (951) 1211
FAX 089 (951) 2955
m
Trade Base for Shikoku and the
Seto Inland Sea Economic Zone
Matsuyama stands at the inter¬
section of Shikoku and the Seto
Inland Sea Economic Zone,taking
advantage of its double-port location
and well-developed coastal shipping.
Revitalizing Local Industries
through Efficient Distribution
Today many products, including
processed food and food materials,
fruit juice and textile materials, are
imported into Ehime from South
Korea, China, Taiwan and Southeast
Asia via Kobe, Osaka and Kita-
Kyushu by truck, ferry and coaster.
We aim to unload these goods
directly to reduce distribution costs




I.T.E.M. EHIME hosts international
trade shows and business fairs to
gather information ori business and
distribution and introduce and enh¬
ance new information and distribu¬
tion-related industries.
We will contribute to expanding
business opportunities in Shikoku
and promote international exchang¬
es and PD in the Seto Inland Sea
Economic Region and Shikoku.
3
Building a New Trade and Distribution Base in
Shikoku and the Seto Inland Sea Economic Zone
Forging ahead with the Second FAZ Plan
•Readying Matsuyama Port's New Foreign Trade Wharf
•Readying the "Ehime International Trade Zone"
•Readying FAZ-linked roads
•Promoting international business
To promote local industries that serve Japan's
Increasingly internationalized society, the Second
FAZ Plan aims to gather trade-related firms in the
"Ehime International Trade Zone" established on
the sea front of the Matsuyama port area. It also
involves the building of a new port and of roads
connecting the facilities to the expressway system.
The result will be a comprehensive upgrade of
industrial infrastructure.





(Major New Roads) Red
the "Ehime Inter¬
nationalTrade Zone"
The "Ehime International Trade Zone," covering
about 1,000 hectares of sea front from the Mitsu
Wharf in Matsuyama City to Tsutsui in Masakicho,
offers tax and financial incentives for trade-related
firms to locate within the zone.
The area within the zone is being consolidated,
manufacturers, processors and wholesalers are being
gathered on a strategic basis and plans are being
studied to make the entire zone a bonded area.
Readying Matsuyama Port
New Foreign Trade Wharf
To accommodate containerized cargo and large ships,
in the outer port of Matsuyama Port a quay for
40,000-ton ships with a 13-meter draft and a wharf
for 10,000-ton ships with a 10-meter draft arc being
built. These and other sites in the port area are being
prepared as part of the 28-hectare New Foreign Trade •
Wharf.
Readying FAZ - linked Roads
Principal transportation arteries within the Ehime
International Trade Zone are being improved and
connecting roads that bypass Matsuyama City built to
the expressway system (the Matsuyama and lyo
interchanges) and Highway 196.
Promoting International Business
Plans are being studied to nurture and promote
international businesses, including wholesalers,
retailers and service firms targeting consumers and
businesses involved in trade in the Matsuyama Port





Inland Sea Economic Zone
 
I.T.E.M. EHIME is a center of international exchange and business.
Its extensive equipment and facilities meet every possible need.
"I.T.E.M." stands for Internationa] Trade & Exhibition Messe.
item 1 item 2 item 3
The main exhibition hall, with the
sub exhibition hall, open-air
exhibition space such as the FAZ
Plaza, conference rooms and
state-of-the-art technology at the
trading terminal, is the biggest in
the Seto area in southwestern
Japan. A variety of tenancy options
is available to support your
business.
The facility houses the I.T.E.M. World Mart, the JETRO
Ehime Trade Infomation Center and the offices of other
trade-related organizations and support services for
firms embarking on business in Ehime. Up-to-date
information and technical support are also available.
The facility also houses offices of foreign governments
and companies.
Ehime shows its face to the world
with a local products market, tourist
information, and an introduction to
local-based industries.












Ehime Products and Tourism Center
business suport office
6
The biggest exhibition hall in the Chugoku-
Shikoku area hosts events of every kind.
The design of the main exhibition hall was inspired by the waves of the Seto Inland Sea. The highly
sophisticated facilities make every type of event possible.
screen rods
main exhibition hall
The biggest hall in the Shikoku-
Chugoku region of southwestern Japan,
it boasts 4,500 square meters of floor
space and a 12- to 16-meter ceiling, as
high as a five-story building. Its 200
rooms can seat 4,500 comfortably,
without annoying pillars. Disaster-
proofing measures have also been
taken. Three double-frontage 5m x 5m
loading bays have been installed and
the floor has a pressure rating of 5t/rh2.
Other amenities include electricity, gas,
telephone, air, water, eight elevators,
three sliding walls and six separate
waiting rooms. Lighting and other stage








You can utilize the facilities any way you like.
The state-of-the-art technology of the sub exhibition hall lets you tailor events to your ideas.
It expands the possibilities of indoor displays.
novable seats (in use)
removable seats (stored)
ling walls lighting facilities
sub exhibition hall
The sub exhibition hall has 484 (removable) seats and
one-third the space of the main exhibition hall. In this
1,500 square-meter hall, wide screens, a projector,
lighting facilities and other compact high-tech
amenities have been prepared. The tile carpet creates
a refined atmosphere. You can use the whole space as
a big lecture theater, or divide it into two or more
areas.
big screen projector
The FAZ facility closest to a major port ana airport
Convenient access from inside or outside Japan
The Ehime FAZ is an integral part of the Matsuyama port and airport
complex, and for a foreign access zone it is excellently situated. Mat¬
suyama port lies on regular sea routes to and from overseas destina¬
tions. Its foreign cargo quays and the domestic outer port have been
consolidated and updated. In addition, it is on an increasing number of
Asian sea routes. Matsuyama airport boasts regular flights between
Japan and South Korea, and the numbers of both existing and new
domestic and overseas flights to and from this popular destination will
be expanded in the future.
Matsuyama Port
Regular shipping services have been operat¬
ing between Matsuyama Port and Kobe and
other ports on domestic sea routes as well
as between Matsuyama Port and South
Korea (Pusan), Taiwan (Kaohsiung and
Keelung), China (Dalian) and other destina¬
tions on overseas sea routes. Matsuyama
Port's international regular freight shipping
services network is expanding all the time,
and it is now possible to transport trade
cargo items all over the world from this port.
Work is being carried forward to construct
by the year 2000 a new trading quay where
large freight vessels in the 40,000-ton class
will be able to berth by reclaiming the sea
adjacent to the l-LOT Ehime International
Logistics Terminal.
Matsuyama Airport
The airport offers regular flights to a grow¬
ing number of places in the Chugoku and
Shikoku regions. Regular international
flights also leave for Seoul in South Korea,
and the international flight network is cur¬
rently being expanded.
Poised to become an
international trade port
with doors which open
onto the world.
Promotion of activities to make this the
trade center of Shikoku and the Seto Inland
Sea economic zone
Encouragement of industry revitalization by
improving the efficiency of physical
distribution




up including inspections of foodstuffs and
animals
Expressway
With the system of expressways which will
criss-cross Shikoku scheduled for comple¬
tion at the beginning of the twenty-first cen¬
tury, the establishment of a high-speed road
infrastructure is well underway.
Construction work on the bridge extending
from Shikoku to Honshu (between Imabari
and Onomichi) was completed and the
bridge opened to traffic in May of 1999.
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Steering the Ehime FAZ program to success.
About a 5-minute drive from Matsuyama
airport
About a 1 5-minute drive from the JR
Matsuyama station.
About a 10-minute drive from Matsuyama
port
About a 20-minute walk from Yamanishi
station on the Takahama line of the lyo
railway
A regular bus service is available every 30
minutes from Matsuyama station.
A regular bus service is available every
hour from the JR Mitsuhama station.
Ehime Foreign Access 7Zone CO.,LTD
1-28, 2-chome Okaga, Matsuyama City, Ehime Prefecture 791-8057
Tel: 089 (951) 1211; Fax: 089(951)2955
http://www.ehime-iinet.or.jp/faz/index.htm
ITEM Ehime [Ehime World Trade Center]
1-28,2-chome Okaga, Matsuyama City, Ehime Prefecture 791-8057
Tel: 089 (951) 1211; Fax: 089 (951) 2955
I.-mail: ilemfa7.ff4ehiirie-iinct.or.jp
l-LOT [Ehime International Logistics Terminal)
150-1, 3 chome Okaga, Matsuyama City, Ehime Prefecture 791 8057
Tel: 089 (951) 1600; Fax: 089 (951) 3221

































Bridge consists of triple
bridges with a total length
of 4,105 m connecting
Imabari city and Oshima
and crossing the Kurushima
Strait, an international sea
route, where approximately
1,000 ships pass each day.
The 1st Kurushima Kaikyo
Bridge, nearest to Oshima
Island, is a suspension
bridge with box girders, a
total length of 960 m and a
center span of 600m. The
2nd Kurushima Kaikyo
Bridge, built over Bushi,
Kobushi and Majima islands,
has a total length of 1,515
m and a center span of
1,020 m. The 3rd
Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge is
on the Imabari side with a
total length of 1,570 m and
a center span of 1,030 m.
The girders were carried on
a self-propelled barge to
the site directly below each
erection point. The last
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General Government Gross Debt (National Account Basis)














83.9 92.8 approx. 105.2 approx. 109.6 approx. 109.6
Note 1. All figures are year end figures of the fiscal year.
2. FY1998, 99 are actual figures according to calculations by the Cabinet Office of Japan.
Figures for FY2000 and 2001 are estimations based on a fixed set of assumptions.
General Government Financial Balance (National Accounts Basis)














▲ 6.8 approx. ▲7.8 approx. AS.5 approx. 7
Note 1. FY1998, 99 are actual figures according to calculations by the Cabinet Office of Japan.
Figures for FY2000 and 2001 are estimations based on a fixed set of assumptions.
2. Figures noted with an are calculated on a basis excluding the Japan National Railway
Settlement Corporation and the National Forest Services.
General Government Gross Debt (National Account Basis)
(International Comparison)
(As a percentage of GDP)
( CY ) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Japan 63.5 69.0 73.9 80.4 86.5 92.0 103.0 115.3 122.9 130.5
United States 74.1 75.8 75.0 74.5 73.9 71.4 68.3 65.2 58.8 55.0
United Kingdom 49.4 58.4 56.1 61.1 60.6 60.9 62.0 57.0 54.4 52.6
Germany 41.8 47.4 47.9 57.1 60.3 61.7 63.0 60.6 59.7 58.0
France 44.7 51.6 55.3 59.3 62.3 64.7 65.1 64.8 64.4 64.1
Italy 116.1 117.9 124.0 123.1 121.8 119.6 117.2 115.7 110.8 107.3
Canada 110.3 116.9 117.5 120.6 120.9 117.4 116.2 111.6 104.9 99.8
Source:OECD Economic Outlook 69 (June 2001)
5K According to the estimate of the Japanese Government, the government gross debt of GDP (on a general
governmant basis excluding social security) will be approximately 136.0% in FY2000 (after revision)
and approximately 140.8% in FY2001 (after revision).
